Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

The Concept of 'Lebenswelt' in Husserl's Phenomenology

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Lukasiewicz D.

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2005

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tom 14

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nr 2(54)

149-162

EN

The world of everyday life is a central concept in Husserl's philosophy. Its origins are not clear, however. It is often claimed that Husserl proposed the concept of 'Lebenswelt' rather unexpectedly (in 1936) and at the cost of destroying the continuity of his thought as a reaction to the growing popularity of the concept of 'Dasein' that had been introduced by Heidegger in the 'Being and time' (in 1927). The author finds this interpretation too simple and superficial. In his opinion problems subsumed under the notion of 'Lebenswelt' had been present in Husserl's writings at least twenty years before the name was first used. Husserl's unpublished manuscripts, books and lectures often referred to problems that directly or indirectly hinged on the idea of 'Lebenswelt'. Taking all of this into account plus the fact that 'Lebenswelt' is a private and individual experience for every human being, it is clear that we should accept as a logical possibility that different experiences of the world can be incommesurable, and their truth, though it appears unshaken to those who experience it directly, may in fact be no more that a sum of highly relativised visions of the world. But the author does not find this difficulty insurmountable.

2

Husserlian Lebenswelt as a metaphysical structure

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Rolewski J.

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2005

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tom 14

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nr 2(54)

163-174

EN

In his 'Crisis of European Sciences' Husserl reports that he has made a discovery of the 'deep structure' of the experienced world (a priori 'Lebenswelt') which plays a fundamental role in cognition. It is the most essential condition of knowing the truth about the world and it is a metaphysical structure that determines the world's mode of existence. Husserl defined this structure as the 'primary ratio' that underlies all forms of rationality, including also scientific rationality.

3

Actions as a Context for Realization of Meaning

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Duraj J.

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2007

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tom 16

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nr 1(61)

281-290

EN

The article shows how 'early' Heidegger approached the problem of intentionality. It begins with a reconstruction of Husserlian concept of intentionality understood as a perceptive act in which the object of experience is first constituted. The author shows subsequently that the Heideggerian understanding of intentionality does not apply to objects of perception but to meaning which can be 'grasped' in the practical attitude only. This attitude determines the pre-theoretical context of intentionality. In consequence, an overcoming of Husserl's 'methodical solipsism' is required if such a context of intentionality is to be understood. The experienced meanings express past intersubjective practices and the knowledge developed within it. An understanding based on the participation in the common world determines the perceptual situation. In consequence Husserl's idea of identifying the bare experience data becomes very questionable in this context.

4

Theory of Intentionality in 'Logische Ungersuchungen' by Edmund Husserl

88%

Plotka W.

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2008

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tom 17

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nr 1(65)

111-123

EN

The article examines the problem of intentionality in the Husserlian philosophy. The author is interested especially in the theory of intentionality, which is presented by the philosopher in the 'Logical Investigations'. According to Husserl phenomenology is the science which is founded on the genuine knowledge. The genuine character of knowledge means that it has direct character. Also scientist would have infallible and unmediated link to the reality. Consideration about relationship between the structures of intentionality and the language, could question legitimacy of the postulate of the direct experience. Syntactical and semantical structures of language seem to determine Husserl's considerations about the intentionality of consciousness. If it was so, knowledge about the intentionality always would be indirect. The knowledge mediates in the earlier pre-reflective understanding of expressions. The postulate of the direct character of knowledge had been specific to the 'Logical Investigations', but Husserl's attitude to that postulate was changed in his mature philosophy. The author suggests that we could find in Husserl's mature philosophy the new model of science. The new science is founded on the confidence that the knowledge is always indirect.

5

K FENOMENOLÓGII KULTÚRY: TYMIENIECKA VERZUS HUSSERL

75%

Sivák J.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2017

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tom 72

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nr 4

283 – 293

EN

The work an American philosopher coming from Polish lineage by A.-T. Tymieniecka (1923 – 2014), has become a subject of still growing interest after her death. The focus of the article is on several key concepts of her Logos and Life (1988 – 2000; 4 vls.), concerning creativity and production. On one hand, Tymieniecka exploits Husserl’s fiat of consciousness (rejecting at the same time his rationalism); on the other hand, she draws upon Aristotle’s poetics, which she wants to reconstruct. Her world is constituted as a “tree of life” with imaginatio creatrix on its top. The latter makes the memory, will and intellect to work through association and dissociation acts. The desired result is a new, ontopoietic life with all aspect of life in work, embodied in art and its genres. During his/her life the person is continually interpreting himself/herself. The highest point of the ontopoiesis of life is the ontopoiesis of culture – an objective Husserl also aimed at in his phenomenology.

6

O fenomenologii konstytucji przestrzeni

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Płotka W.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

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2014

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tom 42

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nr 3

187-202

EN

The article reconstructs main topics presented by Husserl in his “D 17” research manuscript entitled Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature. The author claims that in the “D 17” manuscript Husserl introduces a non-idealistic concept of constitution, i.e., he understands constitution as a correlation of the ground (Boden), living body, and a perceived object. A phenomenological analysis of the phenomenon of the ground, however, leads to generative phenomenology which introduces intersubjectivity and history into the process of constitution.

7

OD RÚK K CELÉMU TELU. HUSSERLOVO DVOJITÉ POCIŤOVANIE V MYSLENÍ A V SKÚSENOSTI

75%

Alarcón Dávila M. E.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2013

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tom 68

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nr 5

358 – 366

EN

Like other philosophical theories Husserl’s phenomenology can also be studied and interpreted. However, besides the scientific work there is also an “experimental” aspect of his phenomenology, which is visible in his descriptions and working procedures. The paper deals from the theoretical and practical perspectives with the self-constitution of the body in Husserl’s double sensation.

8

TRANSCENDENTÁLNA FUNKCIA UMENIA V HUSSERLOVSKEJ FENOMENOLÓGII

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Lipták M.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2013

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tom 68

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nr 9

779 – 789

EN

In the paper the anticipation of the transcendental function of art and artistic production in the phenomenological system of Edmund Husserl is under scrutiny. Despite the strong links between art and Husserl’s phenomenology, explicitly Husserl himself never considered art as having philosophical significance for his system. Thus I start by describing the way in which the “principle of art” closes up another transcendental system – that of Immanuel Kant. Then the author proceeds to show the close parallels between Kant’s reasoning in transcendental deduction and Husserl’s genetic analyses. He continues by analysing the possible reasons why Husserl has not applied the “principle of art” in the way Kant did and then he looks for possible places of application of this principle in Husserl’s phenomenology. Finally the author shows how Husserl actually prepared the ground for such application for the further generation of phenomenologists.

9

DILHEYOVSKÝ OBRAT FENOMENOLÓGIE: RICŒUR A HUSSERL

75%

Petit J.-L.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2013

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tom 68

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nr 9

741 – 751

EN

The author’s focus is on the comparison of two phenomenologists, one of them being the founding father of phenomenology and another French phenomenologist of the second generation. The key issue of the comparison is the constitution of the cultural world implying the confrontation with human sciences. This is something tried already by Husserl, who was influenced in his endeavour by Dilthey (the evidence of it is one of the last volumes of Huserliana (No XXXIX). Ricœur’s hermeneutics of culture also aimed at a dialogue with humanities, although for him this “Diltheyan turn” remained unnoticed: the above mentioned volume of Husserliana has not been at his disposal when he was opening the phenomenology to humanities.

10

Sartre and the Generation of Kojeve

75%

Ostrowski J.

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2005

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tom 14

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nr 4(56)

1870197

EN

Alexander Kojeve and Jean-Paul Sartre belong to a generation that learned philosophy in the thirties studying Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger. The entire generation believed that an authentic life is possible only if one shares the condition of one's contemporaries. Isolated or purely intellectual life are not sufficient. Only after joining one's peers is it possible to 'decide what next one must decide'. The choices made by Kojeve and Sartre were very different though similarly motivated. For Kojeve the intellectual decision to form an identity meant to acquire 'an Asiatic ironic awareness of one' inessentiality', or to become a 'Schoene Seele'. That desire led him to follow Hegel, to speculate about the sense of history and the ontology of the subject. He agreed with Hegel that history is made by a dialectical relation between man and nature. He rejected, however, Hegel's assumption that both man and nature have a dialectical character, too. Instead he proposed a concept of a 'being-in-itself-that-is-also-for-itself', and called it God. Sartre found that proposal incoherent, and argued that neither Hegelian conception of God, nor any other, is tenable.

11

Rola stosunków aktywność-pasywność w Husserlowskiej teorii świadomości

63%

Maciejczak M.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

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2014

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tom 42

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nr 3

31-45

EN

At the very basis of the cognitive efficacy of consciousness there is a domain of passive synthesis, a pre-linguistic and pre-predicative intentionality that Husserl called world-experiencing life (welterfahrenes Leben). It also makes possible thematic consciousness and its connection to the world. Husserl holds the opposed notions of passivity and activity to be functional. What has been actively constituted becomes passive and a basis for higher forms of understanding. The article offers arguments for the above mentioned thesis, taking into account the systematic unity of consciousness. It presents the formal and material aspects of consciousness, the domain of passive synthesis and also the role of reflection for its peculiar autonomy. In the broader view it is easier to explain the meaning of the opposed notions of passivity and activity. The opposition depicts the dynamics of the system of consciousness.

12

Złożona jaźń: Perspektywy empiryczne i teoretyczne

63%

Zahavi D.

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2011

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tom 2

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nr 2

59-75

EN

I have throughout this paper emphasized the complexity of the self. This complexity necessitates interdisciplinary collaboration; collaboration across the divide between theoretical analysis and empirical investigation. To think that a single discipline, be it philosophy or neuroscience, should have a monopoly on the investigation of self is merely an expression of both arrogance and ignorance.

13

O subiektywnej fenomenologii Jana Patočki

63%

Drwięga M.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

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2015

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tom 43

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nr 4

151-165

EN

In the paper the author would like to draw the readers’ attention to some aspects of Jan Patočka’s philosophical position. The Czech philosopher, a disciple of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, developed his own original version of phenomenology. In his approach he severely criticized Husserl’s idealistic position, which in Patočka’s opinion was directly connected with Cartesian subjectivist heritage. One can say that he defended a version of phenomenology called a-subjective phenomenology, in which he tried to combine elements of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s positions. In the paper the author presents and analyses the main lines of the Patočka’s phenomenology, focusing on the themes such as epochē, the reduction, the new way of understanding phenomena, and freedom and responsibility.