Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE

100%

Konarzewski M.

Archeus. Studia z bioetyki i antropologii filozoficznej

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2006

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tom 7

23-37

EN

In opinions on evolution of features of human mind one can spot the existence of clear dualism. Some biologists as well as the great majority of philosophers and theologians perceive human being as a creature of completely different nature from other living creatures, including biologically closest relatives of our species. As presenters of such views usually do not deny the process of evolution itself, most often they point to an enormous acceleration of the tempo of Homo sapiens intellectual development which took place 40 thousand years ago that, according to them, once and for all separated man from the rest of the world of nature. However, during last 30 years, at first a large group of biologists and later psychologists became convinced that there was nothing extraordinary about the character of human nature. Proponents of that view perceive evolution of human intellect as a continuum whose individual aspects can be derived from rudimentary animal features. According to them an overriding motivation of human behavior is a maximization of Darwinian fitness. The first serious trial of such a revision of beliefs on human mind was sociobiology created by an entomologist Edward O. Wilson. Because of its radical character, sociobiology has not gained general acceptance and has been criticized both on grounds of methodology of natural sciences and philosophy. However, in recent years there have appeared more and more supporters of evolutionary psychology. They try to explain the development of features of human mind by means of theories and hypotheses borrowed from evolutionary biology and behavioral ecology, e.g. family selection, reciprocated altruism, Good Genes Hypothesis, the Red Queen Principle, and the concept of 'selfish gene'. Although from the point of view of methodology of science the research program of evolutionary biology is correct, at present a significant part of evolutionary psychologists' statements go far beyond still scarce empirical support. Nonetheless, evolutionary psychology will certainly become an important voice in the discussion on sources of human nature, the voice which should be ignored neither by philosophers nor theologians.

2

HOMO PLATONICUS. THE DUALIST VIEW OF MAN (Homo platonicus i dualistyczna wizja czlowieka)

80%

Drwiega M.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

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2008

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tom 36

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nr 4

13-30

EN

In this article the author would like to draw the reader's attention to one of the most interesting conceptions of man, that of Plato. Plato is one of the main sources of the dualist view on the human nature, according to which man consists of the two elements, soul and body; the human soul is non-material and can exist apart from the material body. This statement is controversial because it is not clear how these two distinct entities can exist in one human being. For centuries prominent philosophers considered this to be an issue of prime importance; even now this problem continues to raise deep questions. However, it is worth noting that Plato himself did not formulate one solution to the problem; instead, he tried to describe it in many ways using various metaphors. The author believes that it is more fruitful to see Plato's strategy in this way instead of reducing the relation between the body and the soul to one of its common characteristics, for example, comparing the body to a prison of the soul. It is well known that the core of Plato's conception is knowledge about the soul. The Greek philosopher presents his threefold theory as the central point of reference for his anthropological concept. This is true, but the theory must be put into the proper context. On the one hand, it is bound up with the general conception of the universe, with the macrocosm, to use the Greek term; on the other, it is a basis for both ethical and political considerations. This is also important for the understanding of man. The result is that man is part of the chain of beings, of the rational cosmos. But as a microcosm he/she must imitate an external order in individual, as well as in political life.

3

INGARDEN'S REALISM

80%

Poltawski A.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

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2008

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tom 36

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nr 2

5-14

EN

In his attempt to analyze the problem of realism, Ingarden started from the Husserlian distinction between the world and 'pure consciousness'. Nevertheless, he rejected all the ontological - or rather metaphysical - features attributed to consciousness by Husserl, while at the same time he was convinced of the indubitability of our knowledge of the basic characteristics of it as a sort of being existent inside the human person. If he had resigned from this epistemological feature of a privileged access, he would have had to grant that we do not need to seek a proof of the existence of the world at all. Other ways in which Ingarden tried to elucidate the problem of being - in the first place the problem of human nature - led him to the sphere of free persons. Understanding our knowledge of this sphere demands an understanding of the human senses in a dynamic and holistic way and the acceptance of a personal model of the world as the basis of our knowledge. The 'primary data' of our experience are, in fact, human persons; they are the paradigm of independent being and full realism means accepting them as similar to us, as free creatures.

4

KOLAKOWSKI'S DISCOURSE ON MAN (Kolakowskiego dyskurs o czlowieku)

80%

Flis M.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

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2010

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tom 38

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nr 1

5-17

EN

The main thesis of this article is that thinking about man is rooted in the conception of human nature. From the perspective of the history of ideas, it is clear not only that the nature of man is intertwined with history but that the reaction of the 'essentialist' conception of man was and continues to be stronger than history. The best evidence of this is the discourse on man present in the legacy of Leszek Kolakowski. Kolakowski's faith in Reason and in Man already manifested itself in his 'Individual and Infinity: Freedom and Antinomies of Freedom in the Philosophy of Spinoza', published in 1958. There he sided with the 'figure of lone emancipation' - meaning the individual autonomy granted in Reason. Despite various intellectual tempests, he would remain faithful to that figure. The allure and magnetism of the works of Leszek Kolakowski lie, above all, in the fact that they not only constitute solid and interesting treatises in the field of the history of ideas, but that they are also motivating and inspiring commentaries on contemporary times. It is precisely in the context of those 'figures of lone emancipation' that the concept of the absolute (as is the case with several other philosophical categories) is tantamount to a concept burdened by internal contradiction. As such, it cannot comprise the foundation for anything indubitable; the paradox of relativists and advocates of the absolute stems from the belief that relativists are right for absolutist reasons'.

5

Jurgena Habermasa eugenika liberalna. Trzy argumenty przeciwko biotechnologii

80%

Słoniowska A.

Archeus. Studia z bioetyki i antropologii filozoficznej

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2013

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tom 14

17-28

EN

Jurgen Habermas is trying to face the ethical problems of biotechnology development. He notes that today we should consider setting the border in research. The laws of nature are being routinely violated in laboratories.. Scientists for instance are able to create hybrids, grow human skin and breed the hormones. We intuitively know the diﬀerence between “what was born”, and “what was made”, but words “natural”, and “unnatural” lose own meaning. Habermas alarms – manipulation of human genome is dangerous and immoral. While describing this immorality he refers to the categorical imperatives of Immanuel Kant. What’s interesting, when he criticizes biotechnologies, he doesn’t use catholic arguments about sanctity of life. In his opinion, human genetic engineering: ﬁrstly, would take away possibility to be themselves, and create their own biography, secondly, interpersonal relationship would be disturb, and ﬁnally freedom of genetically-modiﬁed person would be open to question. Individual whose biography would be outlined before its birth will be destined to some kind of a plan. Its illusory free decisions actually will be determined. If human doesn’t have a right of making independent decisions, then he can’t be responsible for them, and this situation creates a lot of issues. Besides, someone who has been artiﬁcially created, can’t be equal in relation to its Creators. And equality is the base of human relationships, which can be moral, or not moral. Habermas alerts, if we won’t sensitize to these issues, then people would be bred, like animals. Unborn children would be a product in this new reality. They will be treated like merchandises, which someone can buy. Parents will decide about talents, character and the look of their own baby. And their choices will be limited only by their wealth.

6

REMARKS ON HUMAN NATURE AND POLITICAL COMMUNITY IN E. BURKE. (Uwagi o naturze ludzkiej i wspólnocie politycznej u Edmunda Burke'a.

80%

Piekarski R. M.

Pieniądze i Więź

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2009

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tom 12

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nr 1(42)

9-18

EN

This article is an attempt to refute the accusation of hostility towards intellect and rationalism to Burke, which is also mentioned by MacIntyre. It is questionable that Burke was falsifying English history for his own benefits. It was ideological conviction connected with French Revolution judged as seditious and 'metaphysical', not conformism, that made him strive for split in his own party. Also in this context he warned of retreating to some founding state, of raising society from the beginning, of starting reforms with act of establishment's breakage. He was convinced that old-time social life, such as human cities and political communities, can't be forced in new political and legal constructions without a great waste and damage of prolonged evolution of human institutions and companionship. Burke's well known belief that to govern we need through knowledge of state's nature and spirit, which is complex and delicate, does not confirm his anti-intellectual attitude. Burke's view of power was probably a public service, in the interest of the nation. MacIntyre, who defends the values of tradition, owes more to Burke than he wants to admit. Nevertheless Burke in his attack on theoretical abstractions goes too far. There is a kind of reflexivity elimination form the practice. Practice without autocratic debates (as MacIntyre exposed) as well as axiological references, which are enabled by theory (as Leo Strauss exposed) would lead to lethal stagnation, but it was not really realized by Burke.

7

BECOMING WHAT ONE IS AS BECOMING NOBLE

70%

Majerník J.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2014

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tom 69

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nr 6

493 – 502

EN

Nietzsche’s famous dictum “Become what you are” is one of the most difficult aspects of his philosophy. Although Nehamas’ (2001) influential interpretation elucidates how we can understand the apparent contradiction between being and becoming inherent in it, it does so only at the price of divorcing the dictum from the larger concerns of Nietzsche’s thought. Therefore, the author will interpret this dictum in the light of Schopenhauer as Educator and its statement that “your true nature lies not concealed deep within you, but immeasurably high above you”. He aims to show that by understanding Nietzsche’s conception of human nature as it appears in the statement above we can grasp “becoming what one is” as inextricably bound together with his concepts of education and nobility and with his project of individual transformation, and thus with the core of his thought.

8

Zbieżność poglądów Bogusława Polniewicza i Stevena Pinkera w kwestii zła w naturze ludzkiej

70%

Smakulska J.

Archeus. Studia z bioetyki i antropologii filozoficznej

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2012

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tom 13

85-103

EN

The article is devoted to Bogusław Wolniewicz’s and Steven Pinker’s deliberations on human nature and its corruption with evil. Human nature can be deﬁned as a set of inborn qualities, inclinations or aspirations. Wolniewicz’s view on human nature is pessimistic, he claims that people can consciously do wrong despite knowing what is right in a certain case.What is more, some individuals are psychopaths and their rehabilitation is impossible. This conclusion has been strongly rejected by philosophical tradition, especially by modern thought forcing the idea of a man’s inborn kindness. Wolniewicz’s deliberations are based on axiological point of view, while Pinker’s on psychological and evolutionary ones. However, they come to very similar conclusions. They also discuss why the idea of evil in human nature is consistently rejected in spite of the history of mankind, everyday experience and results of biological science.

9

THINKING REEDS AND THE IDEAL OF REASON: OUTLINE OF A NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY

70%

Talmont-Kaminski K.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2006

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tom 13

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nr 2

161-169

EN

Pascal described human beings as 'thinking reeds', weak in flesh but magnificent in mind. While it is a poetic image, it is also an ambivalent one and may suggest inappropriately Dualist view of human nature. It is important to realize that not only we are thinking reeds but that we are thinking because we are reeds. In fact, rationality is reed-like itself, very much of a kind with the rest of human nature. It is now more than two and half centuries since David Hume first pointed out the lack of an argument that would fully justify claims about matters of fact. Being neither made evident by our observations nor arising out of the mere consideration of relations of ideas, claims such as that turkey will be fed dinner tomorrow - rather that being had for dinner (to use Russel's famous example) have remained problematic ever since. Many attempts have been made to show something of the beauty and certainty of reasoning about relations of ideas could be recaptured in our dealings with matters of fact, but all attempts have remained mere shadows of what we tried to grasp. Hume's argument stands. An infinite being might watch countless sunsets and yet should witness each new sunrise with surprise, always withholding its judgment regarding what will follow.

10

Strukturální antropologie a „konec člověka“

60%

Svec O.

Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)

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2009

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tom 31

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nr 1

19-48

EN

According to the traditional interpretation, Levi-Strauss' structural anthropology deposes the concept of man and the notion of human nature from its central place in human and social sciences. While it is necessary to acknowledge Levi-Strauss' distance vis-a-vis all philosophy based on intentionality, experience and consciousness of subject, the author argues that the most interesting purpose of the structural anthropology lies elsewhere. Not only Levi-Strauss never declared himself being part of anti-humanism movement, but most of all, his famous polemics with Sartre at the end of 'La Pensee sauvage' should be interpreted as part of his fight against ethnocentrism. The project of 'dissolving the man' can be thus read as deconstructing the idea that western man makes of himself in the light of ethnological findings about universal structures orchestrating all human societies. He further shows that the notion of subject survived its very death announced by the most radical structuralist thinkers and that structural method could be effectively employed in order to study different techniques and modes of subjectivation, revealing that 'becoming subject' is a process structured by our language, symbolic universe and ethical teleology

11

FAITH AND REASON IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PASCAL

60%

Lubanska S.

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2009

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nr 15(28)

79-87

EN

The paper analyzes Pascal's understanding of the relation between faith and reason as the two possible ways in which man attempts to establish whether God exists and how He may be reached. Pascal departed from an analysis of 'physical knowledge' and its possible application to the questions of faith and things infinite. Discovering the limitations of reason, the philosopher turned elsewhere to search for both proof of Gods existence and the possible ways in which man can strive to be closer to Him. The paper analyzes the meaning and various interpretations of Pascal's notion of 'knowing through the heart'. The author shows how the French philosopher's concept developed, departing form a critique of Cartesian philosophy, his concept of faith and love as essential elements of creating a real relationship with God.

12

FENOMENOLOGICKÉ POJETÍ ROZDÍLU ŽENY A MUŽE U EDITY STEINOVÉ

60%

Urban P.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2016

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tom 71

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nr 7

572 – 582

EN

The paper aims to make the case that Edith Stein’s thought on feminine distinctiveness and sexual difference between man and woman deserves interest not only from historical point of view but also as a potential contribution to the present-day debates in feminist theory. In the first part, we argue for the relevance of classical phenomenology to current feminist theory. Phenomenologists avoid reducing the question of sexual difference to its empirical level. They rather reveal the sense of the difference by tracing its genesis within the experience of a concrete person and conceive it as a difference regarding the form or style of the entire intentional life. The aim of the second part is to show that Edith Stein phenomenological account of sexual difference is just of this sort. Therefore, her philosophy provides a basis of a fruitful phenomenological alternative to naturalistic and constructivist approaches in current feminist theory.