Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Co je Fenomenologie?

100%

Sobotka M.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2007

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tom 55

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nr 6

805-832

EN

In the opening part of the paper the author emphasises the thematic kinship between the legitimisation of philosophical 'science' in Hegel's article 'Enleitung: Uber das Wesen der philosophischen Kritik' and in Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Mind'. In the article Hegel argues that when philosophy, which is conducted according to the idea of a world reason as the basis of the world, confronts other philosophies, it is a mere 'subjectivity' in opposition to other 'subjectivities' and its claim that its knowledge is right is only a power claim. In the Preface to the 'Phenomenology of Mind' Hegel says that 'Science ... must liberate itself from this phenomenality', the science is characterised by at its very beginning. The legitimisation of the philosophical 'science' should - according to the Introduction to the Phenomenology - serve the development of knowledge understood on the basis of the theory of the 'Experience of Consciousness'. In the Preface this theory is used to explain the development of the spirit to the contemporary viewpoint, on the basis of which a philosophical 'science' is possible. The main theme of the second part is a demonstration of the inspiration of Fichte in justifying our knowing the world. 'The repressed and subordinated type of consciousness ... becomes in the formative activity of work an object to itself, in the sense that the form, given to the thing when shaped and moulded, is his object'. From there consciousness comes to the thinking of formed things. It is the theory of formed things as of 'a notion ... that is at the same time an existent ...', and this 'content' is at the same time 'a comprehended content'. Through the 'notion that is an existent', transcendence arrives at the knowledge of contents which man did not form, if we can comprehend them in the same way as formed things. The third part analyses the change in status of the Phenomenology, which arose after the publication of the third volume of the 'Science of Logic' in 1816. The fourth part concerns itself with various important interpretations of Hegel's Phenomenology (Kojeve, the Young Hegelians as presented by K. Lowith). The author emphasises that the Phenomenology is the apotheosis of human history in the context of the philosophy of mind which arrives at its self-knowledge.

2

Juliusz Tadeusz Kroński — "heglowskie ukąszenie

80%

Tuz-Jurecka E.

Prace Literackie

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2010

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tom 50

103-113

EN

Juliusz Tadeusz Kroński — “Hegelian bite” examines intellectual relations between Czesław Miłosz, a poet, and Juliusz Tadeusz Kroński, a Hegelian, relations that influenced the poet’s historical sense. The poet was fascinated by his friend who in 1943 was by no means a “ritual mourner” and whose political attitude was different from the one imposed by Polish society during the Second World War. Kroński taught Miłosz to be ironic and distant, but this fascination changed into rejection when he became a follower of the New Faith. Kroński’s attempts to persuade Miłosz to accept the new political system and abandon reactionary beliefs only deepened the conflict between the two friends. However, thanks to Kroński and his theories Miłosz was able to look critically at the ahistoric America and its capitalist temptations. He looked for his own path between movement and persistence, and confronted the historical perspective with the perspective of individual self.

3

"Denaturalized" Mimesis

80%

Zuska V.

Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics

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2006

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tom 42

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nr 1-3

46-51

EN

The traditional theme of mimesis as a fundamental factor in art, art theory, and aesthetics has undergone many changes of meaning, ups and downs. The present article traces the development of the idea from the point of view of the understanding and appreciation of natural beauty. An inquiry into the relationship between art and reality, that is, mimesis, and the question of the order, reveals two lines of development and their point of bifurcation in Kant and Hegel. The Hegelian line heads towards structuralism, semiotics, semiology and linguistics, to a reduction of orders into standardized norms and epistemes, where the auto-referentiality of art is accented. The Kantian notion of mimesis as 'imitation', which understands the aesthetic idea of the natural order enables the transcendence of episteme and the presentation of the order in the state of becoming. This approach restores the true nature of art.

4

LAW AND STATE IN GERMAN IDEALISTIC PHILOSOPHY (KANT, FICHTE, HEGEL)

80%

Kwiecien R.

Studia Prawnicze

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2005

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nr 1(163)

5-49

EN

The study presents the philosophy of law and state of the most eminent thinkers of German idealism: Kant, Fichte, Hegel. The analysis focuses on the following issues: the idea of law, the idea of state and the grounds of international legal order. The main aim is to show the importance of German idealistic philosophy to present-day legal thinking, especially to philosophy of international law. In the author's estimation, German idealistic philosophy can be availed itself as an explanation of the divided ongoing debate into positivism and naturalism, political competition and common values, pluralism of the society of states and hegemony of great powers. The following conclusions can be drawn from the critical analysis of German idealistic thought: 1) legal orders of states are of great weight for international legal order considering their strong mutual relations; 2) overestimation of the will of state denies sovereignty of other states; 3) legal consciousness (opinio iuris) of common values important for all states and their nations establishes the basis of a just international legal order, that is to say an order which can protect both states and individuals. Taking into account the above statements, current international practice, on the one hand, speaks in favour of Kant's thought and on the other against Fichte's and Hegel's ones. For Kant's recognition of peace as the most important value within interpersonal and international relations leads him to the conception of 'civitas gentium', that is the legal shape of the society of states. Fichte and Hegel, however, treat state as the biggest value. Consequently, interstate relations create a source of wars just as Hobbes's state of nature. That is why their theories cannot account for objective importance of international law. No wonder that Fichte's and Hegel's theories reject Kant's idea of perpetual peace and present international law as an external state law depending on its arbitrary will.

5

HEGEL AND FRENCH REVOLUTION

80%

Milewska M.

Edukacja Filozoficzna

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2007

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nr 44

171-183

EN

The French Revolution was undoubtedly the most important political experience in the life of young Hegel and it had a great impact on his later philosophical system. One of the main ideas of the Revolution: the liberty became one of the main notions of his philosophy of history. He considered the Revolution an universal history event and a manifestation of the activity of the 'Weltgeist'. Thanks to the Revolution it was possible to destroy the alienated state of the 'Ancien Régime' and to build a new one founded on the basis of the reason. However, destructive forces of the Revolution were at the same time its advantage and its greatest danger. The liberty degenerated into the 'absolute liberty', which led to the terror. Notwithstanding this ambiguity of the Revolution Hegel perceived it as a necessary stage in the historical process of realization of freedom, in which France at the moment bore the palm.

6

HEGEL V MAĎARSKEJ A SLOVENSKEJ FILOZOFII 19. STOROČIA

70%

Mészáros O.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2016

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tom 71

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nr 10

845 – 857

EN

The article sheds light on the reception of Hegel’s philosophy in Hungarian and Slovak philosophical thought of the 19th century. It tries to answer the question: Why the canonizations of Hegel in these two philosophical milieus differ? The canonization itself is rendered as a process and result of controversial coaction of subversive doings of the respective national subjects as well as the protecting interventions of political power. Two arguments, which have as yet been omitted, are offered in support of this thesis: (1) reception of Hegel in the Monarchy, i.e. also in Hungary, has been in the 19th century strongly determined by the established cultural and teaching politics, which (especially in the second half of the 19th century) preferred Herbart’s philosophy rejecting at the same time Hegel’s ideas. (2) Hegel’s system became in Hungarian as well as in Slovak philosophy closely connected with the respective conceptions of national philosophy. It was the character of these national philosophies that influenced the reception of other ideas including those of Hegel.

7

PATOČKOVA PŘEDNÁŠKA O HEGELOVĚ FENOMENOLOGII DUCHA ZE ŠKOLNÍHO ROKU 1949/1950

70%

Sobotka M.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2015

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tom 70

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nr 6

420 – 428

EN

The article deals with Patočka’s lecture on Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit from the school-year 1949/50, which remained uncompleted. The lecture was a response to the post-war interest in Hegel, which found its expression in Hyppolite’s translation of Phenomenology of the Spirit (1939, 1941) as well as in his book Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s "Phenomenology of Spirit" (Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy) (1946), and first of all in A. Kojeve’s Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (1947). The lecture evolves from introducing the commentaries on Hegel’s book to author’s original considerations. Hegel was a subject of interest also for later Patočka; his translation of Phenomenology of the Spirit appeared in 1960, although his Introduction has not been included and is preserved only partially.

8

HEGEL AND THE EGYPTIAN RELIGION AS A MYSTERY OR ENIGMA: THE INNER AND THE OUTER

70%

Stewart J.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2017

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tom 72

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nr 1

54 – 63

EN

Hegel designates the Egyptian religion “the religion of mystery”. This designation involves a hiddenness, which is the opposite of revealedness, i.e., revelation. Similarly, he frequently refers to this religion as a “riddle” or an “enigma” (Rätsel). According to his interpretation, one feature of the Egyptian religion is dualism between the inner and the outer, i.e., an inward hidden sphere, and an outward revealed one. This article explores this characterization and the meaning behind it. What elements of the Egyptian religion did Hegel consider mysterious or enigmatic and what role did this play in his placement of this religion as a transitional one between the religions of nature and those of spirit?

9

REMARKS ON ROMANTIC ART (Uwagi o celu sztuki romantycznej)

70%

Tendera P.

Studia Humanistyczne AGH

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2010

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tom 9

73-82

EN

Art based on the category of mimesis is over nowadays. One can ask about the time when its history has been finished. However, as far as one agrees that the mimetic art belongs to the past it is neither a matter of whether its decline refers Hegel's theory of history nor whether it was the real end of art. The main purpose of this article is to consider the idea of the end of the mimetic art as a perfect presentation of the sensual world. This type of art was seen as a source of specific aesthetic experience.

10

Sofoklesowa Antygona jako przykład urzeczywistnienia Heglowskiego ideału bohatera narodowego

60%

Tendera P.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

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2014

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tom 42

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nr 2

131-148

EN

In my paper I present a new understanding of difficult relations in a post-war society, in which its members are wrestling with the problems of forgiveness, sadness, and sorrow. Hegel gives us an interesting interpretation of regaining control of a state and restoring order. We can see an example of this in Antigone, where we also find a typical Hegelian implementation of the concept of historical character.

11

The Construction of Hegel's Philosophy of Law

60%

Ostrowski J.

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2008

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tom 17

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nr 3(67)

71-82

EN

Contemporary philosophy of law often relies on the heritage of the classical German philosophy. This is connected with the decline of the traditional positivistic model of law as a collection of rules established and executed by a sovereign. The main issue behind that change - universality of norms in the contemporary philosophy of law - has its roots in Hegel's thought and his theory of intersubjectivity. That is why the interpretation of this theory is highly important for questions concerning the possibility of reconstruction of such philosophy of law which would permit the inclusion of a formally procedural model of law as something original vis-a-vis every possible material legal order, and whose content would emerge from its form (Inhalt aus der Form). In this context the leading motif of the article is a critique of Manfred Riedel's reconstruction of Hegel's theory of intersubjectivity. Riedel reduces the Hegelian concept of intersubjectivity to the dimensions of emancipation and socialization processes. He neglects thereby the fact that Hegel's theory also has a strong onto-political dimension which makes 'the ethical life' possible.

12

WESLEY C. SALMON VERSUS G.W.F. HEGEL ON CAUSATION, PRINCIPLE OF COMMON CAUSE AND THEORETICAL EXPLANATION

60%

Hanzel I.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2011

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tom 18

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nr 2

189-212

EN

The aim of this article is to analyze the main contributions of Wesley C. Salmon to the philosophy of science, that is, his concepts of causation, common cause, and theoretical explanation, and to provide a critique of them. This critique will be based on a comparison of Salmon's concepts with categories developed by Hegel in his 'Science of Logic' and which can be applied to issues treated by Salmon by means of the above given three concepts. It is the author's contention that by means of Hegelian categories it becomes possible to provide a critique of Salmon's philosophy of science and at the same time to enlarge the concept framework of philosophy of science.

13

Sartre and the Generation of Kojeve

60%

Ostrowski J.

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2005

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tom 14

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nr 4(56)

1870197

EN

Alexander Kojeve and Jean-Paul Sartre belong to a generation that learned philosophy in the thirties studying Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger. The entire generation believed that an authentic life is possible only if one shares the condition of one's contemporaries. Isolated or purely intellectual life are not sufficient. Only after joining one's peers is it possible to 'decide what next one must decide'. The choices made by Kojeve and Sartre were very different though similarly motivated. For Kojeve the intellectual decision to form an identity meant to acquire 'an Asiatic ironic awareness of one' inessentiality', or to become a 'Schoene Seele'. That desire led him to follow Hegel, to speculate about the sense of history and the ontology of the subject. He agreed with Hegel that history is made by a dialectical relation between man and nature. He rejected, however, Hegel's assumption that both man and nature have a dialectical character, too. Instead he proposed a concept of a 'being-in-itself-that-is-also-for-itself', and called it God. Sartre found that proposal incoherent, and argued that neither Hegelian conception of God, nor any other, is tenable.

14

HEGEL’S CRITICISM OF SCHLEIERMACHER AND THE QUESTION OF THE ORIGIN OF FAITH

60%

Stewart J.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2018

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tom 73

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nr 3

179 – 190

EN

Hegel’s criticism of Schleiermacher represents an important episode in his general critical campaign against Romanticism. In this article the author explores his objections to Schleiermacher’s theory of faith as the feeling of absolute dependency. The different statements of Schleiermacher’s view in On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers and The Christian Faith are outlined. Then an account is given of Hegel’s various criticisms of this view. The author wishes to argue that what is ultimately at stake in the discussion is not just the nature of faith and knowing, but something more fundamental: philosophical anthropology. By focusing on intuition and immediate feeling as the locus for religious faith, Schleiermacher, according to Hegel, reduces the human to the subhuman. For Hegel, by contrast, the faculty of religious faith should not be the lowest but the highest, which in his view means speculative reason.