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3 Filo-Sofija

3 2012

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Co – zdaniem angielskich myślicieli XIV wieku – Bóg wie o przygodnej przyszłości?

100%

Jung E.

Filo-Sofija

2012

tom 12

nr 4(19)

75-98

The paper is concerned with the problem of God’s knowledge about future contingents, which has raised many doubts connected with the incompatibility of certainty and necessity of God’s knowledge and contingency of future events, or, even more, with the incompatibility of God’s precognition causing necessary events with human’s free choice guaranteed by his free will. From the very beginning of the Middle Ages theologians tried to find solutions to these questions, but—in my opinion—the most interesting ones were those expressed by John Duns Scotus. This paper presents mostly the theories of some English thinkers who were active at Oxford University in the 14th century and who criticized or agreed with Scotus’s ideas. They introduced new terminology and clarified particular problems initiating original logico-theological debates, in which the problem of God’s action with regard to His potentia absoluta et ordinata played the main role.

Futura contingentia jako przedmiot wiedzy Boga. Stanowisko Jana Dunsa Szkota

75%

Filo-Sofija

2012

tom 12

nr 4(19)

53-74

The article concerns John Duns Scotus’ views on the problem of God’s knowledge of future contingents, presented by Scotus in his Lectura in librum primum Sententiarum d. 39, n. 1-93. He begins his analysis of the notion of God’s knowledge concerning the future events by criticizing two theories: first, the claim that the content of the idea of a thing, possessed by God, can include contingency of this thing; second, the claim that eternity of God is simultaneous with the flowing time as a whole, and therefore His knowledge of future contingents is the knowledge of present contingents. Duns Scotus presents his own conception in the form of the following claims: (1) there is contingency in the reality, however, we are not able to prove it; (2) the proximate second causes are not the causes of contingency in things; (3) the main cause of contingency in reality is God, precisely His will. Thus, contingency is not an imperfection because it is produced immediately by God. The article also presents Scotus’ theory of synchronic contingency. This conception explains the possibility of God’s contingent knowledge of contingent reality.

Wiedza przedziwna. Akwinata o niezmienności i wieczności wiedzy Boskiej

75%

Głowala M.

Filo-Sofija

2012

tom 12

nr 4(19)

157-174

The general concept of knowledge is a kind of concept closely akin to transcendentals: its use is not restricted to a certain kind of being, and it does not itself designate a kind of entity. Such concepts may be applied to God not as metaphors: when we grasp (through the analysis of cases of finite knowledge) some general traits of knowledge as such, we can show that God has knowledge, and his knowledge, as opposed to ours, is infinitely perfect. We have no insight into this realization of knowledge as opposed to ours, but as far as we know what general traits of knowledge are, it is important to know that God has infinitely perfect knowledge. To grasp the general traits of knowledge, I focus on the topic of mutability and immutability of knowledge analyzed systematically by Aquinas, and thus on the topic of identity criteria specific for knowledge in general: the question of when knowledge that p and knowledge that q are (in a certain knower) one and the same knowledge; the criteria of identity of knowledge vary according to natures of knowers. I think that the problem of the criteria of identity of knowledge is rather neglected in omniscience-immutability discussions. I analyze Aquinas’ arguments for the thesis that human knowledge is mutable, and God’s knowledge is absolutely immutable (they concern the role of tense). The analysis sheds light on some general traits of knowledge: it is always something formulated by the knower which manifests some truth to him, and in general the way it is formulated corresponds to (i) the way it manifests some truth, (ii) its identity criteria, (iii) the way it is propositional, (iv) the way it is related to tense, and finally (v) the nature of the knower. Focusing on the criteria of the identity of knowledge shows that God’s knowledge is absolutely immutable, and that time and change in its objects are nevertheless undoubtedly real.