Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Obsceniczność w świetle I poprawki do Konstytucji USA

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Dziduszko-Rosciszewska A.

Politeja : Pismo Wydziału Studiów Miedzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego

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2010

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nr 1(13)

229-239

EN

In the United States, the cradle of civil rights and modern democracy, the freedom of expression is guaranteed in the First Amendment to American Constitution (Bill of Rights), enacted in 1789 (came into force in 1791). On its virtue, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of […] the freedom of speech, or of the press […]”. Although the record suggested that this freedom is absolute (not restricted of any legislation), the later jurisdiction of the US Supreme Court (by case law) isolated categories of utterances that have not been contained by the First Amendment. The essential issues are answers on the following questions: in the name of what values Congress can limit the First Amendment? And where is the border of freedom of speech? One of the expressions that is not protected by the law is obscenity. The term (in Latin obscenus, meaning foul, repulsive, detestable) describes all categories of expressions that profane the standard of sexual morality, that is commonly in force in present time. Obscenity is defined differently in cultures and societies. It is extremely difficult to find the border between art and pornography (e.g. Michelangelo’s David can be an example). What for one is full accepted in art, for others can be recognized as abusive (especially when it is concerned to religion feelings). The role of the government is to take common definition that reflects social consensus in the subject: on the one hand to guarantee the right to freedom of speech, on the other hand to protect citizens from the obscenity matters that are not accepted by them because they flout their customs. American understanding of the obscenity has been changed with the evolution of the social sense of decency. Creating common definition was not easy because general concept could encroach the right to the First Amendment. Subjects that for some readers could cause sexual association and excite them, not necessarily cause similar feelings in other ones. The aim of this analyze is to introduce the history of the debate about obscenity in United States.

2

Engaging in hate speech as grounds for enhancement of criminal punishment — Wisconsin v. Mitchell

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Machaj Ł.

Studia nad Autorytaryzmem i Totalitaryzmem

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2020

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tom 42

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nr 1

101-116

EN

The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits any abridgement of freedom of speech, must be regarded as a cornerstone of the American social and political order. The number of expressive categories placed beyond the First Amendmentʼs protective mantle is very small. In particular, there is no hate speech exception to the free speech Constitutional clause. The article analyzes the decision of the United States’ Supreme Court in the case of Wisconsin v. Mitchell. The issue at hand concerned the question of whether it is constitutionally permissible to enhance criminal punishment for bias-motivated crimes in comparison with crimes motivated by other factors. In those types of cases, the factual basis for meting out a more severe punishment is usually and necessarily provided by a criminal’s expression that reveals the aforementioned bias. By considering such regulations to be constitutional, the Supreme Court created an exception regarding the First Amendment protections granted to hate speech by permitting the courts — albeit in a very narrow and specific set of circumstances — to attach negative consequences to someoneʼs engagement in constitutionally protected expressive activity. The article critically describes the doctrinal justifications given for this conclusion by the Supreme Court, considering them to be cursory and doctrinaire. The author contends that the Mitchell decision is an example of results-oriented jurisprudence, issued with the political aim of combatting hate crimes in mind. While this objective remains a worthy one, it does not — in the author’s opinion — provide a sufficient justification for reducing the scope of the First Amendment’s protection of (admittedly outrageous, immoral, and shocking) expression a majority may find distasteful. While the legislative branch ought to be permitted to consider specific motives as aggravating factors in a crime (at least from the First Amendment standpoint), a penalty-enhancement should not be contingent on the question whether the accused engaged in protected expressive activity, distinguishing “silent” and “vocal” criminals. The paper utilizes descriptive and analytical methods.

3

Kilka uwag o teorii interpretacji konstytucyjnej Ronalda Dworkina na przykładzie klauzuli wolności słowa

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Machaj Ł.

Przegląd Sejmowy

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2021

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nr 5(166)

77-98

EN

The article analyses the concept of constitutional interpretation of Ronald Dworkin, one of the most eminent representatives of contemporary liberal legal thought. Its basic assumption is the conviction that fundamental laws contain abstract concepts which are the domain of political philosophy (e.g. ‘freedom’, ‘property’, ‘due process’), and that those who interpret them – judges in particular – must refer to axiological, ontological or epistemological findings in an attempt to find the best possible interpretation of such terms. Dworkin rejects the originalist paradigm of interpretation, which assumes a static content of the provisions of the Basic Law. The interpreter is obliged to search for the proper meaning of the constitution, regardless of both the intentions of its drafters and its original public meaning. The article also shows Dworkin’s application of this theory to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution in the area of freedom of speech.

4

Prawo do krzyża w przestrzeni publicznej. Odpowiedź stowarzyszeniu humanistów

86%

Kudła W. , Longchamps de Bérier F.

Forum Prawnicze

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2019

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nr 4 (54)

19–37

EN

The paper focuses on the right of citizens who are believers and nonbelievers to the Cross’s presence on public land or in prominent public buildings. The au- thors support arguments used in the 2019 case of the United States Supreme Court American Legion v. American Humanist Association by outcomes of legal analyses presented during the 2011 controversy concerning the presence of the Cross in the chamber of the Polish parliament. There seems to be no logical con- nection between the presence of the Cross in public places and the government’s impartiality in religious matters. The Cross does not threaten the impartiality as it fulfills an important social function: it calls for readiness to sacrifice in the name of the good of other people. The right to the Cross becomes an expression of sincere concern for the common good and of true humanism. The people’s expectation that their right to the Cross is respected proves to be both legitimate and constitutional in Poland and in the United States. It is true particularly when the Cross had already been present on public land for a significant period of time. An act of establishing the Cross in public space is different in its nature from demolishing the Cross by cutting its arms or removing it completely from any public space.

5

Symbolic Speech and the First Amendment - A Proposal of Adjudicative Model

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Machaj Ł.

Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego

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2021

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nr 6 (64)

91-105

PL

Pierwsza Poprawka do Konstytucji Stanów Zjednoczonych zakazuje jakiegokolwiek ograniczania wolności słowa. Zgodnie z konsekwentną linią orzeczniczą Sądu Najwyższego od 1931 r., pojęcie „słowo” obejmuje także niewerbalne zachowania ekspresyjne. Udzielanie takim symbolicznym wypowiedziom ochrony konstytucyjnej jest uzasadnione względami fenomenologicznymi, aksjologicznymi i historycznymi. Orzecznictwo konstytucyjne w tej materii było jednak dotąd nieco chaotyczne. Artykuł zawiera propozycję sądowego modelu stosowania prawa, który mógłby zostać wykorzystany do wszystkich spraw tego rodzaju, zwiększając spójność i przewidywalność sędziowskich rozstrzygnięć. Sugerowana procedura obejmowałaby pięć podstawowych kroków: analiza wstępna (ocena podstawowych znamion badanego prawa niezależnie od kwestii związanych z Pierwszą Poprawka), zastosowanie „testu Spence’a”, zastosowanie doktryny wykluczenia kategorialnego, zastosowanie pośredniego nadzoru sędziowskiego, zastosowanie ścisłego nadzoru sędziowskiego.

EN

The First Amendment to the United States’ Constitution prohibits any abridgment of the freedom of speech. According to the consistent line of the Supreme Court’s precedents, dating from 1931, the term “speech” encompasses non-verbal expressive conduct. Granting such symbolic speech constitutional protection can be justified with phenomenological, axiological, and historical arguments. Nevertheless, the constitutional jurisprudence regarding symbolic speech has so far been a little inconsistent and haphazard. The article proposes an adjudicative model that could be applied to all symbolic speech cases, bringing greater coherence and predictability to judicial decisions in this area. The suggested procedure comprises five basic steps: preliminary analysis (assessing basic features of the law in question independent of any First Amendment-specific enquiries), application of the “Spence test”, application of the doctrine of a categorical exclusion, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.