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2 2012

1 Jung E.

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Co – zdaniem angielskich myślicieli XIV wieku – Bóg wie o przygodnej przyszłości?

100%

Jung E.

Filo-Sofija

2012

tom 12

nr 4(19)

75-98

The paper is concerned with the problem of God’s knowledge about future contingents, which has raised many doubts connected with the incompatibility of certainty and necessity of God’s knowledge and contingency of future events, or, even more, with the incompatibility of God’s precognition causing necessary events with human’s free choice guaranteed by his free will. From the very beginning of the Middle Ages theologians tried to find solutions to these questions, but—in my opinion—the most interesting ones were those expressed by John Duns Scotus. This paper presents mostly the theories of some English thinkers who were active at Oxford University in the 14th century and who criticized or agreed with Scotus’s ideas. They introduced new terminology and clarified particular problems initiating original logico-theological debates, in which the problem of God’s action with regard to His potentia absoluta et ordinata played the main role.

Futura contingentia jako przedmiot wiedzy Boga. Stanowisko Jana Dunsa Szkota

75%

Filo-Sofija

2012

tom 12

nr 4(19)

53-74

The article concerns John Duns Scotus’ views on the problem of God’s knowledge of future contingents, presented by Scotus in his Lectura in librum primum Sententiarum d. 39, n. 1-93. He begins his analysis of the notion of God’s knowledge concerning the future events by criticizing two theories: first, the claim that the content of the idea of a thing, possessed by God, can include contingency of this thing; second, the claim that eternity of God is simultaneous with the flowing time as a whole, and therefore His knowledge of future contingents is the knowledge of present contingents. Duns Scotus presents his own conception in the form of the following claims: (1) there is contingency in the reality, however, we are not able to prove it; (2) the proximate second causes are not the causes of contingency in things; (3) the main cause of contingency in reality is God, precisely His will. Thus, contingency is not an imperfection because it is produced immediately by God. The article also presents Scotus’ theory of synchronic contingency. This conception explains the possibility of God’s contingent knowledge of contingent reality.