Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

LOGICKÁ (NE)KONZISTENTNOSŤ NORMATÍVNEHO SYSTÉMU A JEJ METODOLOGICKÉ KOREKCIE

100%

Gahér F. , Števček M.

Právny obzor. Teoretický časopis pre otázky štátu a práva (Juridical Review. Theoretical journal for the questions of state and law)

|

2016

|

tom 99

|

nr 3

186 – 203

EN

The article is a part of a discussion about the meaning of logic in the area of law. The authors treating in a polemic way some common ideas and connotation of the term „legal logic“ – according to them there is a difference between a logic in a formal meaning, dealing with the structure of the nature language and methodology. In a situations, where formal logic seems to be insufficient to provide a solution of problems with the interpretation and/or application, correct methodology is only able to solve such problem. The authors of the outlined purposes briefly explicate core concepts, such as the normative system (as a set of relatively closed binding rules as defined segment of social relations), paying particular attention to the law system, further interpretative rules and methods (with interpretation, in general, is explaining the connection between the facts (actions) or the interpretation or clarification of the meaning of a particular text), logical consistency and inconsistency (a condition where the set of rules may or may not also draw the assertion and also a negation of this assertion). Inconsistency of normative texts can be either a logical inconsistency or methodological inconsistency. In addressing challenging legal matters, it is necessary to pass from the logic to the methodology, which, of course, logic and logical semantics remains necessary armature of reasoning.

2

IS FORMAL LOGIC A SCIENCE ABOUT RATIONAL ARGUMENTS?

88%

Nevrkla S.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

|

2011

|

tom 18

|

nr 4

499 – 511

EN

The goal of this article is to explore the ways in which logic can contribute to study of rational argumentation. Basic concepts of valid, sound and rational argument are introduced. The concept of logical entailment is presented and its fundamental properties, i.e., necessity and formality, are explained. It is argued that these are essential properties of the entailment relation in all modern logical systems. It is mentioned that conclusions of most every day’s arguments are not entailed by their premises. This objection against identifying rational arguments with sound ones is even strengthened by presenting defeasible arguments, which cannot even be turned into valid ones with true premises by adding additional premises. Systems for describing defeasible argumentation are mentioned, but it is argued that they are neither formal logical system in the discussed sense, nor they can provide exhaustive description of rational argumentation. Such an exhaustive account is impossible and defeasible logics merely present a partial tool for bridging formal and informal logic and theirs accounts of argumentation.

3

PREFACE: THE VARIETY OF RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES IN THE STUDY OF ARGUMENTATION

63%

Koszowy M.

|

2009

|

nr 16(29)

7-14

EN

I characterize informal logic and argumentation theory as disciplines consisting of a great variety of research ideas, approaches, conceptual frameworks, and methods which allow to inquire into the complicated phenomenon of argumentation. Yet, the argumentative discourse constitutes a key subject of inquiry for disciplines which deal with various forms of language and reasoning. Among those disciplines there are: formal logic, semiotics, methodology of science and informatics. The articles included in this volume support the thesis that various approaches in the study of argumentation, despite of differences in methods of inquiry, try to realize a common research goal: elaborating tools, in particular (1) language and (2) methods, for analyzing and evaluating common-sense reasoning performed in an argumentative discourse. After discussing the content of the present volume I make some remarks on popularizing informal logic and argumentation theory in Poland.

4

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE INFORMAL LOGIC INITIATIVE

63%

Johnson R. H.

|

2009

|

nr 16(29)

17-46

EN

In this paper, I undertake to present clearly just what informal logic ('logika nieformalna') is and how it relates to formal logic, and to logic as such. To do that, I start by explaining how the Informal Logic Initiative (ILI) began in North America in the 70s. That will lead to a discussion of what is meant by 'informal logic' and how it stands related to cognates such as formal logic, critical thinking, and argumentation. In Section 3, I discuss what I take to be basic theses about argumentation that have emerged from the informal logic perspective. In Section 4, I discuss some achievements of informal logic, and in Section 5, I discuss several interesting recent developments and in Section 6, I discuss the possible future developments. I conclude with some remarks on the importance of the Informal Logic Initiative in Section 7.

5

INFORMAL LOGIC AND LOGIC

63%

Blair J. A.

|

2009

|

nr 16(29)

47-67

EN

This article examines the relation between informal logic and logic. Informal logic originated with the rejection of formal logic in the analysis and evaluation of natural language discursive arguments. Various alternatives are mentioned: fallacy theory; acceptability, relevance and sufficiency; and argument scheme theory. The last is described at some length as involving warrants, schemes, and critical questions. Argument scheme analysis and critique, while informal, has been used in AI to develop computer programs to analyze, assess and even construct arguments in natural language. Thus informal and formal logic have come together.