Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Bezpieczeństwo europejskie czterdzieści lat po podpisaniu Aktu Końcowego KBWE

100%

Zięba R.

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nr 9

109-122

EN

The CSCE Final Act, signed in Helsinki in 1975, opened a new chapter in the search for the optimal security system in the Euro-Atlantic area, stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It established a cooperative security system introducing a supra-bloc negotiation mechanism of political and economic cooperation, as well cooperation in such humanitarian fields as culture, education, exchange of information and interpersonal contacts. After the Cold War, CSCE organs were created and equipped with new competences in the field of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, but the evolution of the international order in Europe meant that, contrary to the original intention of the CSCE (renamed at the beginning of 1995 as the OSCE), it has not become the central institution of European security. As a result of the Eastern enlargement of NATO and the European Union, the principle of equal security for all participating states was abandoned. The OSCE remained a secondary institution specialising in what is called the soft aspects of security. The Ukrainian crisis, which broke out in the autumn of 2013, accompanied by other challenges and threats to security originating in other regions showed the need to revitalise the OSCE and create a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community.

2

The importance of the Mediterranean region for European security

87%

Arcipowska M.

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tom R. 1, Nr 1

215--227

EN

Problemy bezpieczeństwa w regionie śródziemnomorskim pozostają w ścisłym związku z problemami bezpieczeństwa i współpracy w Europie. Wynika to z tego, że obszar ten znajduje się w bezpośrednim sąsiedztwie Unii Europejskiej, zaś jego problemy (brak pokoju i stabilności) wpływają bezpośrednio na bezpieczeństwo w Europie. Z tego punktu widzenia basen Morza Śródziemnego jest dla UE wielkim wyzwaniem (szczególnie po 11 września 2001 roku). Z geopolitycznego punktu widzenia jest on obszarem możliwości dla UE oraz potwierdzeniem jej zdolności oddziaływania na arenie międzynarodowej. Mówiąc o bezpieczeństwie w regionie śródziemnomorskim w kontekście bezpieczeństwa europejskiego, należy także wspomnieć o bezpieczeństwie energetycznym. Niepowodzenia procesu barcelońskiego wskazały na brak efektywnej, unijnej strategii partnerstwa dla regionu. Złożoność szeroko rozumianego bezpieczeństwa w regionie Morza Śródziemnego sprawia, że powstaje duża luka między „zdolnościami a oczekiwaniami” w dialogu politycznym. O tym, jak trudno w regionie śródziemnomorskim tworzyć efektywny dialog polityczny, świadczą zakończone niepowodzeniem prace nad przyjęciem wspólnej Eurośródziemnomorskiej Karty dla Pokoju i Stabilności. Aby uniknąć nieefektywności procesu barcelońskiego (brak jego symetrii i równowagi), UE musi wyciągnąć konstruktywne wnioski z błędów popełnionych w przeszłości, by przyszłe stosunki eurośródziemnomorskie miały lepsze warunki rozwoju. W tym kontekście szansą jest nowa inicjatywa Unii dla Śródziemnomorza.

3

ГЕЛЬСІНСЬКІ УГОДИ: УРОК ЗАГАЛЬНОЄВРОПЕЙСЬКОГО ПРОЦЕСУ

58%

Kotlyar O. , Bevzyuk E.

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nr 31

301-321

EN

The article examines the main reasons for the signing of the Helsinki Final Act by actors of the global and European international system. The description of individual provisions of the document itself is provided. As a result of the study, it was proved that the Helsinki Agreement became a compromise that consolidated the existing status quo in Europe and defined the framework for the peaceful regulation of relations between the West and the East. The key principles of European peace and security were fixed by the document for many years. The agreement significantly eased the inter-bloc tension without dividing the sides of the process into "losers" and "winners". Individual ideas of Helsinki have not lost their relevance and still contain the potential to support the European security system. The main thing is non-interference in internal affairs and a balance of interests. The formation of the international organization – CSCE/OSCE - was a significant legacy of Helsinki. It opened up the opportunity for Europeans to pursue policies for the creation of a united, peaceful, democratic and prosperous Europe. At the same time, it is difficult to ignore the fact that the modern OSCE in many parameters of its activity is fundamentally different from the initial, conceived option. Today's polemics within the organization are increasingly reminiscent of the inefficient discussions of the former League of Nations. In general, little has been accomplished from the large-scale plans, for which everything started back in the 60s and 70s of the last century. However, a topic that initially seemed secondary to many came to the fore, the issue of observing human rights ("the third basket"). The European practice of interstate relations has demonstrated that the humanitarian part of the Helsinki Agreements remains relevant even today, especially in post-Soviet countries, where, by and large, little has changed since the time of the USSR in terms of the protection of human rights. The OSCE has not become and is unlikely to become the main factor in the formation of a comprehensive system of European security, covering all aspects - from military to humanitarian. Today, pettiness prevails in the organization, which does not correspond to the original intentions of its founders. In addition, the lack of a mechanism to guarantee compliance with the principles of the OSCE can finally "bury" the organization

4

Amerykański program obrony przeciwrakietowej w Europie ‒ aspekty polityczne

58%

Czajkowski M.

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tom 6

119-134

EN

The article aims to analyze some of the political problems associated with the location of elements of the US global missile defense system in Europe. It primarily discusses the place of missile defense in the US security strategy, as the United States perceives the military instrument as one of the most important elements of its national security strategy; hence the determination and consistency in its location, as well as all the consequences in the political dimensions being the subject of our interest. In the further part, it shows the current status and prospects of the missile defense program for Europe, including some necessary technical details and organizational issues, as this part of the issue constitutes the second fundamental determinant of the political role of the missile defense in Europe. Finally, it examines the political importance of the missile defense in Europe from the point of view of European security, devoting a special place to the presentation of the role played by it in relations between the West and Russia.