This book is an extended version of a doctoral dissertation about the system state and law in Ireland, taking into account the comparison with English law (England and Wales) and some other countries (eg USA). This extension is primarily concerned issues recognized in the sixth chapter (and the practice of institutional legitimacy administrative) and seventh (the relationship between government and other types of institutions).
The subject of this article is an attempt at analysing Adam Jerzy Czartoryski opinions on the operation of English courts and the specificity of the common law system. The text presents Adam Jerzy Czartoryski’s familiarity and level of fascination with the functioning of the above-mentioned court system, which the prince probably intended to apply as a model in the reborn Poland. Such a claim is supported by a detailed analysis of his notes. Czartoryski used original English sources and fell back on the experiences from his stay in England. His subjects of interest included types of judiciary in England, the activity of the so-called justices of peace, objectives of the judiciary, procedures for jury debates, and the administrative division of England.
PL
Artykuł jest próbą analizy sposobu opisu przez księcia Adama Jerzego Czartoryskiego kwestii funkcjonowania sądów i specyfiki systemu common law w Anglii. Tekst prezentuje stopień wiedzy i poziom fascynacji Czartoryskiego działalnością tego systemu sądowniczego, który zapewne miał być wykorzystany przez autora jako wzorzec dla sądownictwa w przyszłej, odrodzonej Polsce. Wskazuje na to szczegółowa analiza notatek księcia, który podczas pobytu w Anglii korzystał bezpośrednio ze źródeł angielskich, a także spisywał swoje doświadczenia. Przedstawiono między innymi następujące przedmioty zainteresowania księcia Czartoryskiego: typy sądownictwa w Anglii, działalność tzw. sędziów pokoju, cele sądownictwa, sposoby obradowania przysięgłych, podział administracyjny Anglii.
In a referendum held on June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom voted in favour of leaving the European Union. For the first time since its creation in the Lisbon Reform Treaty of 2009, art. 50 TEU will probably now be invoked by the UK for the withdrawal process from the EU, envisaged by the outcome of the referendum, to commence. Article 50 TEU requires that national constitutional arrangements exist so that notification on withdrawal can be made to the European Council. Curiously, to date, the biggest consequence of the referendum outcome has not been the creation of a debate about the role of EU law in the UK legal order, but rather the separation of powers within the UK’s unwritten constitution and which organ of state has authority to activate the art. 50 TEU withdrawal: Parliament or the Executive. The debate has spawned dozens of constitutional blog posts, numerous academic articles, a High Court judicial review of the Government’s position, a second draft independence bill published by the Scottish Government and a judicial review before the Northern Irish Court of Appeal. On one side of the debate, the Government maintains that it alone possesses the Royal Prerogative to ratify and withdraw from international treaties, and thus to make the notification of withdrawal. On the other hand, Parliament and the ’Bremainers’ maintain that any unilateral action by the Government exceeds its authority, and Parliament must provide authorisation; a position which could ultimately result in the referendum outcome being ignored and the UK remaining a Member State. In a third corner, the governments of Scotland and Northern Ireland, two countries within the UK whose electorates voted to remain in the EU, demand a voice in both the decision to leave and in the subsequent negotiations with the EU institutions (note, however, that the status of the devolved administrations will not be addressed in this article, as the issue is considered by the author as being too unclear in the absence of any judicial statement on matters of devolution and institutional hierarchy, including but not limited to the limitations imposed on the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty by the Sewel Convention). The judgment of the High Court has not yet been published, and even if it were there will inevitably be an appeal to the Supreme Court, so it is only possible to speculate on what will happen, but this article intends to provide clarity on the legal principles currently under discussion in the most important constitutional discussion to happen in the UK since it joined the EU in 1973.
Starting with the Middle Ages, the system of writs (forms of actions) began to dominate the English law. Like Roman actiones which may be regarded as equivalents of writs, thus also the latter allowed to determine the circumstances in which an individual was guaranteed to protection of law. The list of writs was exhaustive while the law was considered to be something that was not subjected to changes. Therefore the legal fictions were found to be the only mechanism that made it possible to adapt the common law to the evolving socio-economic circumstances. Thanks to these fictions the parties involved in the litigation could reach the objectives that they desired and that otherwise (without resorting to the fiction) might be unattainable by them. The exploitation of the fiction consisted in the invoking by the trial participant the circumstances that notoriously were not true, the adversary party being simultaneously prevented from proving the opposite. In the course of time the fictions became a characteristic feature of the common law. It was thanks to their application that in the 15th through 17th centuries the scope of the Westminster courts’ jurisdictional competence became enlarged. The fictions enabled these courts to settle matters that originally were beyond the scope of their jurisdiction. The application of fictions resulted also in the broadening of the scope within which the particular writs could be resorted to. This consequently led to the extention of legal protection to the situations with respect to which the earlier common law proved helpless for the lack of any legal remedy.
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