The study is focused on space of attic room in the prose Z deníku sedmnáctileté Perly Sch., Colette: Dívka z Antverp, Krásné zelené oči, which for the characters made not only a vision of refuge from the outside world, but presented also a place of dreaming and remembering the times before World War II. The parts of each space are things which are also involved in overall nature of the space and on the what measure this object are entered to the awareness of the characters which will use the things not only for their own need, but these things also become a means enabling the characters to think back about past times. In accordance with the performed analysis we can conclude that the objects are not mere props that fill the almost empty space, but they are bearers of substance and that they also have their own ontological existence.
The author analyses the concept of existence in Christian Wolff's 'Philosophia prima sive ontologia' and confronts it with his concept of being. This distinction helps him to highlight the difference between ontology and more specific parts of metaphysics such as psychology, theology or transcendental cosmology. Wolff's ontology contains only a modal explication of being. No a priori ontological analysis can answer the question why this and not some other being has been brought about to exist. Contingent beings cannot exist without a sufficient reason, thus their existence can be explained only by specific sciences.
The paper seeks an interpretation of Berkeley's metaphysics, which is characterised in terms of an attempt to formulate a kind of ontology of the existence. Although essential, this existential aspect of Berkeleian thought is surprisingly neglected by commentators, presumably due to the dominant epistemological tendency in the interpretation of his philosophy. The aim of the paper is an attempt to fill the above lack in the scholarship on Berkeley's philosophy.
The article is an attempt to reveal and present the interpretation of Suarez's philosophy suggested by Hellin, specifically Suarez's metaphysics. The author focuses mainly on the characteristics and presentation of the attributes of created and uncreated being. According to Hellín, Suarez's fundamental thesis is based on the statement that God is existence through a being, whereas the creature owes its permanence in existence and action to the so-called dynamic participation. The metaphysical essence of the creature, after Hellín, consists neither in a real composition of a being and existence, his finiteness, nor the predicative interrelation called mensurae et mensurati, but it is based on a radical relationship, also called dynamic participation or casual participation.
Berkeley and Klima agree that for the sake of god the existence of the external world is to be rejected. While Berkeley replaces the eliminated external world with god, who is the source of our sensations and in whose mind all things exist, Klima's concept of god is a triumph over the deception of intentionality. Berkeley introduces a new concept of existence - to exist means to be perceived - things therefore really exist, either in our minds or in the mind of god. For Klima the elimination of the external world means that the world is an illusion. This illusion is the result of intentionality, which is the uneliminable structure of consciousness; by breaking with the deception of intentionality Klima arrives at the concept 'I am God.'
The paper consists of two parts. In the first part the author focuses on the possibility to use the impulses of philosophical phenomenology, especially the part that reflects on the issues of existence and identity as a methodological tool designed for literary theoretical reflection. The core of the reflection in question is an effort to show the interconnection between literature as the image of the world in writing and a man’s life situation in the actual „lived life“. In this respect the author considers literary works as the „expressions of life“ - symbolic forms, which are a version of „revealing“ the motion of existence. The other part of the paper is a poetics-oriented interpretational reading of a novel written by Janko Silan titled Dom opustenosti /The House of Loneliness/ and it is in relation with the first part as an attempt at verifying the theoretical principles of the „hermeneutics of existence“ in the practice of the hermeneutics of a literary text.
The article presents Martin Heidegger's early conception of foundational questions of logic and science. It focuses on their treatment in the Introduction to Phenomenological research (the lectures from 1923/1924, published as Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 17). Presenting the conception of phenomenon, perception, language/speech, noun and verb, proposition and deceit, the article shows the fundamental idea of facticity of speaking as the ground of these questions. It uses ideas of existence, fact and time to achieve the result. The impact on the most famous early book by Martin Heidegger is also considered.
The article offers a comparison of two entirely contrapositive conceptions of technology: those of Martin Heidegger and José Ortega y Gasset. While Heidegger conceives of technology as one of the effects of metaphysical, i.e. failing thinking of being and world, Ortega y Gasset sees the technology as a means which enables the person to set himself/herself free from his/her animal nature and create a space appropriate for actual human needs. Resulting from these opposite stands are the opposite views on the relationship between „dwelling“and „building“. According to Heidegger, we first have to master the art of dwelling; only then we can start building. According to Ortega y Gasset, we first need the technological building dispositions; the need to dwell appears afterwards. However, it is the concept of architecture which shows the limits in both thinkers. A more balanced attitude is represented by Karsten Harries in his book The Ethical Function of Architecture. Namely, it takes into account the free space as a place for encounters with other people. Thus the conception of dwelling, building and technology in general takes on a social dimension, which is apparently missing in Heidegger.
The article draws on the conclusions of the discussion which on one hand showed the reception of Foucault’s “aesthetics of existence” and on the other hand offered a partial reflection on the “topicality of the aesthetic” in postmodern philosophy. The issue is understood in question as related to the process of aestheticization from modernity to contemporary self-controlled society. The focus is on questions such as „What does the tendency to give one’s own existence a mark of “visible beauty” mean? How does the aesthetic promote itself in non-aesthetic (especially ethical) spheres of life? Attention is paid first of all to how the aesthetics of existence and the requirements of a higher standard individual ethics are interconnected. The conceptions of M. Foucault, J. Früchtl and W. Schmid are referred to as the main sources of consideration.
In his work, recently departed French philosopher Henri Maldiney, examines the forms of the human experiencing on formal level of openness to the world. According to him the fundamental modes of human experiencing in real sense are aesthesis and kinesis, what means certain formal emptiness, and at the same time a transformation. The transformation as a modification and pass-over is the essence of shaping the form. This contribution is concentrated on some of the constitutive elements of the human on pathic level. For as much as perception is not just a pure receptivity, absorbing information through our five senses, it is a manifestation of the self with regard to something what is not in the world yet, and simultaneously an incursion of the world, whose movement points to the other part of human self. The basic moment of becoming the self is an ecstatic openness of Emptiness, which is for Maldiney a measure of distance and spacing. Existence is thus just an open development of a closeness-distance of being.
In the history of thought we would hardly find an author accentuating passion in his work as strongly as Kierkegaard did. But his comprehension of passion does not correspond to common usage of the term. The paper begins, therefore, with pointing out to the differences between the common understanding of passion as a strong emotion and Kierkegaard’s specific concept of passion as an essential interest in one’s own existence. However, the main intention of the paper is to offer an interpretation of his specific concept of passion as the will to existence based on the analysis of the correlative relationship between passion and existence. Some positive aspects of passion as found in Kierkegaard’s authorship are outlined as well.
The aim of this text is to show the cognitive function of the art later referred to as conceptual. Conceptualism was particularly predisposed to express abstract messages which included philosophical ones. The basic question I would like to pose in this text is: can a conceptual art toolbox express in its own way that which had been formerly expressed by philosophy? How, with the usage of means suggested by conceptual art, may one build a general image of the world – comparable to that which philosophy had previously given? Perhaps a full answer to the above question leads us into the areas of art which ceased to fill the boundaries of conceptualism, or post-conceptualism and heads straightforward to action, which Grotowski called an ‘active culture’ — that is a place where art is not sufficient anymore.
The 1780s in German culture witnessed the phenomenon of Spinoza's revival, which was an important generational experience of the fourth philosophical generation of the German Enlightenment, called by Werner Schneiders the generation of I. Kant. Initiated by F. H. Jacobi Spinoza-Streit (Pantheismusstreit) introduced a new quality to the knowledge on the life and work of Spinoza because the question about the 'spirit of Spinozism' was posed for the first time. In the debate over Spinoza the following models of interpretation can be distinguished: (1) weak anti-Spinozism - the Berlin Enlightenment (M. Mendelssohn); (2) strong anti-Spinozism (F. H. Jacobi); Weimar neo-Spinozism (J. G. Herder, J. W. Goethe). The crucial controversy was that between strong anti-Spinozism and neo-Spinozism. In the view of Jacobi, Spinozism is an atheism which eliminates the God of religion (ens extramundanum) depriving him of personal character and free decision. Jacobi argued that the definitions of Spinoza's philosophy as pantheism or cosmotheism are of euphemist character which obscure the essence of Spinozism. He criticized Weimar neo-Spinozism as an inconsistent endeavour of mediation between theism and Spinozism.
The study compares two approaches to human being: Plato’s concept of three (parts of) souls and Patočka’s concept of three movements of existence. The aim of this contrastive study is to evaluate Patočka’s effort to make the concept of human being a-subjective and non-substantive. Special attention is dedicated to two key problems: the concept of body and the relationship between a part (an individual) and the whole (the world). The comparison of the thinkers indicates Patočka’s underestimation of the objective organization of body including its incorporation in the world. The presentation of the relationship between an individual and the whole provides an opportunity to discuss realistic moments of Plato’s approach and speculative moments of Patočka’s phenomenology of existence. Finally, these findings make it possible to articulate the main difficulties of an ontological interpretation of the phenomenology of movement.
In his last book on Locke's philosophy, E. J. Lowe claims that Frege's arguments against the Lockean conception of number are not compelling, while at the same time he painstakingly defines the Lockean conception Lowe himself espouses. The aim of this paper is to show that the textual evidence considered by Lowe may be interpreted in another direction. This alternative 'reading' of Frege's arguments throws light on Frege's and Lowe's different 'agendas'. Moreover, in this paper, the problem of singular sentences of number is presented, and Frege's and Lowe's views are confronted with it.
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