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1

FUTURE MODEL OF PREPARATORY PROCEEDINGS

100%

Stefanski R. A.

Ius Novum

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2009

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nr 1

20-34

EN

Inefficiency of the present model of preparatory proceedings, which results in the significant lengthening of the whole penal procedure and causes inability to finish it within reasonable time limits, creates a necessity to develop a new model. It is suggested that in the model to be developed preparatory proceedings should not play the present role and clarify all the circumstances of an event and obtain all the evidence for a successful prosecution. Evidence and its contents should be only amassed during preparatory proceedings and they should be clarified during a trial. At this stage of a penal procedure, it should be only established whether there are substantial grounds to draw up charges against somebody and protect evidence that cannot be repeated at a trial. It is to help a public prosecutor take a decision whether to bring an accusation or drop the charges and refrain from prosecution. Only non-repeatable actions should be conducted by a judge responsible for the proceedings. A formation of such a model of these proceedings requires resignation from the rule of material truth and restructuring a trial to make it more contradictory that may be achieved by, among other things, depriving a court of an ability to perform acts of taking evidence in the proceedings as its official duty. Prosecutors as those who act mainly as public prosecutors should be located close to courts. Implementation of such a model would undoubtedly speed the performance of penal procedure and thanks to that we would put an end to one of the maladies of our legal system, lengthy duration of proceedings.

2

UNDER-DETERMINATION, SCEPTICISM, AND REALISM

100%

Koreň L.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2014

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tom 21

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nr 2

145 – 167

EN

This study aims to articulate and compare the structure, presuppositions and implications of two paradigmatic sceptical arguments, i.e. arguments from under-determination of scientific theories by observational data (UA) and Cartesian-style arguments (CA) invoking sceptical scenarios of severe cognitive dislocation. Although salient analogies between them may prompt one to think that a unified diagnosis of what is amiss with them is called for, it will be argued that this may be a false hope, if those analogies do not underwrite a complete homology. That said, possible parallels of one promising anti-sceptical exposure of CA are pointed out for the case of UA, which conspire together to render the problem of under-determination less threatening than it could at first appear.

3

EVIDENCE VS. VIRTUES IN EPISTEMIC DISAGREEMENT

88%

Bakalova M.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2016

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tom 23

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nr 1

72 – 82

EN

In situations of peer disagreement there are two kinds of factors that matter. These are the factors internal to the discussion, such as evidence exposed and arguments presented by both sides and there are also factors external to the discussion, also called “independent factors”. The external factors include mainly virtues and competences of the participants. There are two main theories about epistemic disagreement, “the stead-fast view” and “the conciliationism”, and each of them stresses the importance of one group of these factors over the other. This paper is a defence of the greater epistemic significance of independent factors over internal factors. However, it is not a defence of the conciliationism which takes independent factors to be systematically the ultimate arbiter in situations of peer disagreement. The argument in the paper goes like this. Although the steadfast view receives strong intuitive support from two cases presented by Thomas Kelly: “Right and Wrong” and “Wrong and Wronger”. The author argues that the view is undermined by Timothy Williamson’s recent “Very Improbable Knowing” argument. This argument shows that for some basic type of evidence E when S uses it in favour of p, it is very improbable that S knows that S knows that p. Therefore, in situations of peer disagreement, S is unjustified to push her evidence in support of her side. There are arguably some exceptions, e.g. when one claims to have knowledge based on a priori evidence and on holistic evidence, but these are not sufficient to save the day for the steadfast view. In contrast to that, the reflective knowledge of one’s first order competences and virtues (i.e. external factors) is not vulnerable by Williamson’s argument. One reason for that is because we know about independent factors on the basis of holistic evidence. The author claims that our epistemic goal in the face of peer disagreement is to end up on the side that is non-accidentally closer to truth. In accordance with achieving this goal, it is safer to stick to independent factors in resolving peer disagreement situations than to follow one’s nose concerning first-order evidence disclosed by the opponents. This might seem a counterintuitive result, which makes it worthy of further discussion.

4

EVIDENCIA V SÉMANTIKE

75%

Bielik L.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2017

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tom 72

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nr 1

1 – 14

EN

The paper contributes to the methodological discussion of what evidence the philosophers of language (e.g. Devitt, Machery, Stich, etc.) use in support or disconfirmation of semantic theories. Three classical theories of empirical confirmation are discussed. We suggest that in the methodological literature on semantics one of them – namely H-D conception – prevails. Further, we provide a basic framework for testing modal semantic statements. Finally, we discuss the role of intuitions, language corpuses and other linguistic data in the methodological considerations.