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EN
The paper attempts to indicate the variables that define the framework of EU policy towards Egypt in 2012–2014, and to analyse the scope of the new approach to mutual relations in terms of politics. Particular attention is given to the mechanism of various instruments applied by different EU policies and their implementation in the context of political developments in Egypt. These considerations allow the author to draw conclusions on the future possibilities for the European Union to continue its activities within the framework of cooperation in Egypt, taking into consideration the necessity to agree on common interests and to implement an adopted stand- point.
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nr 1
54-68
EN
The EU’s foreign policy response(s) to the unfolding Ukraine crisis has further illustrated its difficulty in making effective foreign policy decisions. Using a neoclassical realist analytical framework, this paper argues that although the EU did have tangible collective interests in pursuing its Ukraine foreign policy, it was unable to adequately filter these through its domestic setting. Three key constraints to the EU’s Ukrainian foreign policy> were identified: decision-makers ’ miscalculations; rigid normative demands; and a reliance on consensus politics. Ultimately, the Ukraine crisis illustrated that the EU, in current incarnation, cannot translate interests into effective foreign policies, even when making policy for their direct neighbourhood.
EN
The aim of the article is to present the conditions of the establishment of the European Endowment for Democracy, in particular, to analyze the potential support of civil society actors’ initiatives in the neighbouring countries. The paper analyzes the added value of the EED, based on criteria: the category of beneficiaries, the type of intervention/support, methods and procedures for transferring funds. The final section provides a description of the challenges that the EED will have to face in the future.
PL
Autorytarny sposób sprawowania władzy przez prezydenta Białorusi A. Łukaszenkę powoduje, że od mniej więcej połowy lat dziewięćdziesiątych XX w. stosunki tego państwa z Unią Europejską (UE) kształtują się w sposób zupełnie odmienny od relacji UE z innymi krajami Europy Wschodniej. Również polityka UE wobec Białorusi i jej rezultaty są zdecydowanie różne od działań UE wobec innych krajów wschodnioeuropejskich. Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie polityki UE wobec Białorusi w kontekście wyborów prezydenckich (19 grudnia 2010 r.) w tym państwie. W pierwszej części artykułu wspomniane zostały najważniejsze działania UE wobec Białorusi z okresu poprzedzającego ww. wybory, stanowiące tło dla wydarzeń, jakie nastąpiły po elekcji prezydenckiej z grudnia 2010 r. na Białorusi. W podsumowaniu przedstawiona została analiza przyczyn tego, że jak do tej pory polityka UE wobec Białorusi nie przynosi widocznych efektów.
EN
The authoritarian regime of the president of Belarus A. Lukashenko makes the European Union’s policy towards Belarus completely different from the policy with regard to its other neighbours. The main aim of the paper is to show and analyze EU’s policy towards Belarus in the context of presidential elections in Belarus in December 2010. In the first part of the paper, the author very briefly describes the UE’s policy towards Belarus before elections. The following part is devoted to the most important events in the EU’s policy towards Belarus in the context of the last Belarusian presidential elections. The summary contains an analysis of reasons why the UE’s policy towards Belarus and its president A. Lukashenko is so difficult and, up to the present, rather ineffective.
5
82%
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nr 8
49-61
EN
The European Union acts in numerous capacities on the international arena, and one of its priorities in foreign policy involves the Mediterranean. Since the mid-1990s, the EU has been trying to play several roles in its relations with countries in this region, the most significant being: an active participant in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict; a promoter of measures to build trust, partnership, security and disarmament; a promoter of market reforms and sustainable development; an advocate of democracy and human rights as well as cross-cultural dialogue. Assessed on the basis of its Mediterranean policy, the efficiency of the EU’s international roles, however, is poor, on account of the conflict between the roles the EU declares to be playing, and its actual and expected roles. As a consequence, the Mediterranean has not transformed into the area of peace, stability, welfare and cross-cultural understanding which has been declared as the EU’s objective since 1995.
PL
Unia Europejska odgrywa na arenie międzynarodowej wiele ról, a jednym z priorytetowych kierunków w jej polityce zagranicznej jest region śródziemnomorski. Od połowy lat 90. XX wieku UE stara się odgrywać jednocześnie kilka ról wobec państw w nim położonych. Najważniejszymi z nich są role: aktywnego aktora w rozwiązywaniu konfliktu arabsko-izraelskiego; promotora środków budowy zaufania, partnerstwa, bezpieczeństwa i rozbrojenia; promotora reform rynkowych i zrównoważonego rozwoju; propagatora demokracji i praw człowieka oraz dialogu międzykulturowego. Efektywność ról międzynarodowych, analizowana na przykładzie unijnej polityki śródziemnomorskiej, jest jednak niska, ze względu na konflikt między rolami deklarowanymi, rzeczywistymi i oczekiwanymi. W konsekwencji region śródziemnomorski nie został przekształcony w obszar pokoju, stabilności, dobrobytu i porozumienia międzykulturowego, co od 1995 roku było deklarowanym przez Unię Europejską celem.
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2021
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nr 3 (380)
85-110
EN
The accession of Cyprus to the EU changed the nature of the dispute on the island. As a result the government from the north stopped perceiving the Union as a neutral player. Despite EU help, it accuses the EU of bias and uneven treatment of the two communities. However, the EU is limited in its activities due to Greece and the Republic of Cyprus blocking any EU cooperation with the TRPC Government, because in the future it could help Turkish Cypriots in obtaining international recognition. The fifth president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Ersin Tatar, used the weariness of the Turkish Cypriot communities with endless negotiations to build a new narrative around the conflict - the creation of two independent states. On April 27, 2021, in Geneva, an informal meeting of 5 + 1 took place, during which Tatar presented his vision of the political solution of the impasse on the island. The aim of the article is to present the EU policy towards the Cypriot Turkish community during the 17 years of the presence of Cyprus in the EU in order to provide an insight into the changing moods of Turkish Cypriots and the rhetoric used by their representatives. Since 2004, the EU has demonstrated an inconsistency in its policy and a lack of plan to solve the dispute on the island, despite the fact that it has the ability to use its skills, knowledge and competences, as could be seen during the round of negotiations in 2017 in Crans Montana. Turkish Cypriots still show pro-EU tendencies, however, time works to the disadvantage of the federal solutions supported by the Union and the perception of the organization itself. The text is based on an analysis of the source material especially EU legal acts pertaining to the Republic of Cyprus and the community of Turkish Cypriots, as well as the official statements of the TRNC government – in the part which characterizes the policy pursued by Ersin Tatar
PL
Autor artykułu twierdzi, że spory w odniesieniu do polityki zagranicznej Unii Europejskiej są uwarunkowane traktowaniem nowych państw członkowskich jako mniej rozwiniętych państw, które powinny podlegać procesowi socjalizacji zgodnie z zasadą, że „Zachód wie najlepiej”. Z punktu widzenia nowych państw członkowskich niska efektywność polityki zagranicznej Unii Europejskiej wynika z faktu, iż ich interesy nie były dotychczas uwzględniane przez organizację w dostatecznym stopniu. Zainicjowana przez tandem francusko-niemiecki polityka zdystansowania się od Stanów Zjednoczonych i jednoczesnego zbliżenia z Rosją była niezgodna z interesami nowych państw członkowskich i zakończyła się fiaskiem. Rosji nie udało się zdemokratyzować poprzez politykę „Wandel durch Annäherung” a światowy kryzys gospodarczy obnażył słabość gospodarczą Unii Europejskiej oraz uświadomił państwom członkowskim konieczność współpracy ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi. W rezultacie cele polityki zagranicznej nowych państw członkowskich okazały się słuszne w skali całej organizacji.
EN
The author of the paper submits that EU foreign policy disputes can be attributed to the fact that Central and Eastern Europe was admitted into the European Union as a less developed part of Europe. As a result, particularly the Franco-German axis intended to run EU foreign policy in accordance with the rule “the West knows best”. This approach is based on the assumption that the new EU member states should be socialized into Western, superior values. EU foreign-policy problems were created mostly by the Franco-German axis when these two countries decided to support a multi-polar world trying to counter American dominance and forging close ties with the Russian Federation. This approach to EU foreign policy was not acceptable to the new member states for political, economic, military and historical reasons. In the context of the current economic and financial crisis, the new member states’ foreign-policy choices have been vindicated as it turned out that the European Union cannot distance itself from the United States due to its economic weakness and the organization was not able to change Russia by way of the policy of “Wandel durch Annäherung”.
EN
The aim of the presented research is to analyze the decision-making process in the EU with regard to imposing and extending sanctions against Russia and to assess the cause of the sutainability of decisions and agreements between EU Member States despite their different position towards sanctions. In particular, the article analyzes the decision-making process, dynamics and changes taking place within the Council’s working groups, such as COEST (Working Group on Eastern Europe and Central Asia) for Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. Research shows that geopolitical and economic factors are very important in creating dynamics that takes place in advisory groups of the European Council; nevertheless, despite these differences, unanimity is observed that is largely the result of the actions of France and Germany.
PL
Celem przedstawionych badań jest analiza procesu decyzyjnego w UE w odniesieniu do nakładania i rozszerzania sankcji wobec Rosji oraz ocena przyczyny trwałości decyzji i porozumienia między państwami członkowskimi UE, pomimo odmiennego stanowiska. W szczególności artykuł analizuje proces decyzyjny, dynamikę oraz zmiany zachodzące w ramach grup roboczych Rady, takich jak COEST (Grupa Robocza ds. Europy Wschodniej i Azji Środkowej) dla Ukrainy, Białorusi oraz Rosji. Badania pokazują, że czynniki geopolityczne oraz ekonomiczne mają bardzo duże znaczenie w tworzeniu dynamiki, jaka zachodziła w grupach doradczych Rady Europejskiej, niemniej jednak pomimo tych różnic jednomyślność jest w dużej mierze wynikiem działań Francji i Niemiec.
EN
Eastern Dimension is a programme proposed by Polish diplomacy of complex EU co-operation with Russia, Ukraine, Byelorus and, in future, Moldova. It concerns a regional comprehensive strategy of activities for stability and security of the European Union’s eastern environment. It is built basing on the EU experiences of Northern Dimension that includes north-eastern regions of Europe and other EU regional policies. The post-Russian area is still perceived as unstable. Therefore the activities for spreading democratic values, free market principles and civil control of the armed forces have weigh a great importance for the security of Poland and the whole European Union. After 1 May 2004, Warsaw has better possibilities to conduct security policy that concentrates on improving the relations with the eastern neighbours but without any clear perspective of their membership in the EU. The author defines the notions of the Eastern Dimension, main assumptions and proposed mechanisms of EU co-operation with its eastern neighbours. She analyses the chances of EU Eastern Dimension’s success basing on present relations between the EU and Russia, Ukraine, Byelorus and also Polish experiences in contacts with these countries. A particular attention should be drawn to Polish - Ukrainian strategic partnership that may be the basis to develop similar relations with Russia and Byelorus on a larger European forum.
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