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Boží vědění, svoboda a nejlepší možný svět: dominikáni, jezuité a G. W. Leibniz

100%

Svoboda D.

Studia theologica

2008

tom 10

nr 1

9-31

The paper deals with three different concepts of Divine knowledge (Dominican's, Jesuits', Leibniz's), as well as with the relationships of these doctrines to the problem of self-determination and to the Divine choice of the best possible worlds. Firstly, three different concepts of Divine knowledge are explained and the emphasis is put on the impact of the scholastic's tradition on Leibniz's conception of Divine knowledge. Secondly, some relations and links among the three different concepts of Divine knowledge and the doctrine of self-determination are brought to light and evaluated. Thirdly, the author shows how strongly was Leibniz's concept of the 'necessitas moralis Dei ad optimum' inuenced by the the Sevillian Jesuits' school.

Czy wiedzy Boga nie da się pogodzić z wolnością człowieka? Analiza wybranych argumentów

75%

Pepliński M.

nr 4(19)

175-192

The problem that divine omniscience or divine foreknowledge makes free will impossible belongs to notoriously difficult to solve. In XX century one of the most important interpretation of this difficulty was provided by Nelson Pike. If God believes infallibly and in advance how Smith will act, this fact about the past excludes out all alternatives for Smith. But libertarian account of free will requires alternatives possibilities, so, it could be argue that God’s foreknowledge is incompatible with our free will. This paper carefully criticizes Pike’s argumentation and suggests that because God’s foreknowledge doesn’t eliminate future alternatives through causal means, it is compatible with free will and that Pike’s argument and two briefly analyzed standard arguments for fatalism presented by Zagzebski failed.