The paper presents and discusses Roman Ingarden's solution to the problem of free will vs. determinism. The solution is placed in the context of various philosophical positions related to the dilemma of determinism (hard determinism, libertarianism, compatibilism). Ingarden's position can be characterized as a non-revisionist compatibilism: the act of free will is understood as an event that is causally determined, but solely by internal causes. Freedom is thus conceived as a subject's independence from external causal determination. Real freedom (juxtaposed to the phenomenon of freedom) is ontologically possible in a moderately deterministic world containing relatively isolated systems. This theory does not require any revision of social practices based on the conviction of the existence of free will.
JavaScript jest wyłączony w Twojej przeglądarce internetowej. Włącz go, a następnie odśwież stronę, aby móc w pełni z niej korzystać.