The aim of the paper is to discuss the ersatz theory of Lewis’s impossible worlds, point out its undeniable benefits and demonstrate its costs. Firstly, the author presents two approaches to Lewis’s impossible worlds taken as constructions out of possibilia. Secondly, he evaluates the proposals using the Lewisian criteria of success concerning the well-defined conception of analysis. Although appealing, he does not find the proposals fully persuasive. Thirdly, the author discusses the objection from an ad hoc distinction between possible and impossible worlds. He concludes that the objection does not present a special problem for the Lewisian theory. Finally, he motivates a theory of extended modal realism, to wit, modal realism enriched with concrete impossibilia.
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