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EN
The Section 55 paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic stipulates a positive obligation of the State to protect competition. This obligation is imposed on all public authorities, i.e. both the legislator and the bodies applying legal regulations. The public authorities are obliged to provide free access to the market and equality of the rules of conduct of the competitors on the market. When assessing the fulfilment of the legislator´s obligation to ensure equality of the rules of conduct of competitors on the market, the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic has developed an interesting case-law on admissibility of the criteria for distinguishing among competitors. Activities without economic substance are fully excluded from the scope of application of Section 55 paragraph 2 of the Constitution. For some activities with economic substance the obligation to protect competition is limited or excluded by other public interest.
EN
Judicial protection of constitutionality leads to interference in the legislative powers of Parliament and represents an important element of protection of democratic and legal state. Its specific subject may be a law that regulates the internal relations of the Parliament as an expression of autonomous and sovereign vision of how it wants to have these conditions arranged. Judicial protection of constitutionality in this case is striking a balance between respecting parliamentary autonomy and the principles of democratic and legal state.
EN
The Constitutional Court is an independent judicial authority vested with the mandate to protect the constitution. It should be composed of thirteen judges. However, at the moment, the Constitutional Court consists of only ten judges, nine of which have already exceeded ten years of their twelve year term. Despite the fact, that parliament has already nominated eight candidates. The president has appointed only one of them. The president reasoned his respective decision with the existence of the constitutional guarantee of the right not to appoint a judge". The existence of such constitutional guarantee has been contested by both the candidates as well as by the third senate of the Constitutional Court. The essence of the claim is anchored in an interpretation of the president's power to appoint the judges and it could be expressed by the question of whether the president is unconditionally obliged to appoint half of the candidates nominated by parliament and if not, what are the limits of his discretion. In the light of this question we need to focus on the purport and assignment of this power and to distinguish its notarial, controlling (limited or extended) and correcting role.
EN
This article deals with constitutional courts when an object of judicial review is a political question. It presents arguments, for and against judicial review in such cases, which are divided into three sections – the competency issue, the legitimacy issue and the issue of arbitrariness. In the first section, there is a dispute whether deciding political questions breaches separation of powers, or rather fulfils the principle of checks and balances. In the second section is raised a question about legitimacy – does judicial review break the majority rule, or can we refer to citizens acceptance of constitutional standards. In the third section, the author think about vagueness of constitutional text and its consequences for judicial review – are judges’ considerations really arbitrary, or they are bound by a line of previous decisions and by necessity to find legal, not political answers. The author points to the fact case, which at first looks like a political question, may have potential to affect constitutional values and principles. Due to this fact, the author tries to outline a border between „political“ and „legal“ consideration, while she uses examples from existing decisions of constitutional court. The article is aimed to show that constitutional courts, in some point of view, ought to decide also political questions and for that reason is necessary to create clear rules and procedures.
EN
Polish legislator has determined a number of conditions of admissibility of initiating of constitutional review proceeding. In proceeding before the Constitutional Tribunal there are several prerequisites for court proceeding and one substantial prerequisite. Non-fulfilment of any of the positive prerequisites or appearance of even of one of negative prerequisite causes inadmissibility of proceeding. In every case it is necessary to point out a specific prerequisite of proceeding causing its inadmissibility. Superfluity of proceeding constitutes one of negative prerequisite for court proceeding which causes discontinuance. Research of jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal shows several different reasons causing superfluity of adjugment. Mainspring of superfluity is re-challenging of a provision which has already been reviewed by prior decision. If the Constitutional Tribunal find challenged regulation unconstitutional, re-adjugment of this regulation is superfluous because the main goal of constitutional review (i.e. removal of inconsistency of legal system) has already been achieved. In turn, if the Tribunal find challenged regulation constitutional and the petitioner does not indicate new argumentation, re-adjugment of this regulation is pointless due to lack of new ground for review. To sum up, if the proceeding does not serve restitution of constitutionality, it cannot be conducted due to superfluity. That situation takes place when the main goal of constitutional review has already been achieved.
EN
The author deals with the issue of compliance of the Special Court with the Constitution according to the ruling of the assembly of the Constitutional Court PL. US 17/08 - 238 on 20th May 2009 and its consequences for the prosecution of serious crimes in the conditions of reconstitution of this court in the form of the Specialised Criminal Court. It particularly refers to the insufficient rationale of the ruling of the Constitutional Court on non-compliance with the constitution of the whole Act in relation to the Article 143 of the Constitution regulating the system of courts.
EN
This post includes considerations of the application of the provisions of the ombudsman law in response to the articles of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic governing the circle of those entitled to initiate proceedings before the Constitutional Court, namely the locus standi of the ombudsman. The author in this issue focuses on examining the resolutions of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic in which the Constitutional Court decides on the adoption of the draft of the ombudsman to act because in recent months the application of these provisions and the Constitution regulating the locus standi of the ombudsman seems especially problematic in the context of petitions submitted to the Constitutional court by the ombudsman. The Constitutional Court in those cases dealt with the question of locus standi of the ombudsman to initiate proceedings about the unity of the legislation in the art. 125 paragraph. 1 of the Constitution.
EN
The article deals with the interpretation and application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in proceedings on the conformity of legal provisions before the Constitutional court of the Slovak Republic. The authors analyse the only findings of the Constitutional court concerning the Charter. They proceed from the existing theoretical basis of the problem and the case law of the court justice of the EU and some other constitutional courts. The important conclusion of the authors is that the Constitutional court have missed the opportunity to clarify several crucial questions, mainly the scope of application of the Charter in the national legal order and the relations between the Charter and the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental freedoms. The authors propose some points of departure for the Constitutional court in proceedings on the conformity of legal provisions which might lead to the better understanding of the position and the scope of application of the charter in these proceedings with specific regard of its capacity to be an independent basis of the judicial review.
EN
The protection of social rights is offered by general courts and by the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court offers this protection through the proceedings on compliance of the legal regulations, and in individual cases in proceedings on constitutional complaints. The constitutional limits of the protection of social rights are on one side given by the generally binding constitutional principles of the functioning of the state defined in the Constitution, by which the Slovak Republic is bound, on the other side they are also considered as the limits of the scope of social rights contained in legal regulations that govern social rights.
EN
The author deals in the article with the issue of gender equality and positive measures aimed to gender equality. She briefly describes the terms of sex, gender, equality, and in particular positive measure, whose content depends on the individual forms of equality. She pays special attention to the regulation of positive measures in the context of European law. In the context of Slovak law she concentrates on a definition of the term „provisional compensatory measure“, a brief analysis of the Ruling of the Constitutional Court of SR PL. ÚS 8/04 and, in particular, criticises the absence of embodiment of any gender-based positive measures in Slovak legislation.
EN
The article deals with the principle of proportionality, which, despite being very well-known and widely used in other European countries, has received quite a reluctant treatment in Slovakia. It was only in 2009 that the principle of proportionality was dealt with in an upto-date fashion by Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic in two cases concerning freedom of speech. The article uses these cases as an example through which it tries to explain the structure, origins and ideas underlying the principle of proportionality with special regard to Robert Alexy’s theory of balancing of constitutional rights.
EN
An accelerated legislative procedure is a special institute in the legislative process. Its use is often criticized. Article deals with the theoretical analysis of an accelerated legislative procedure, and justify its position in the legislative process, its relationship to the principles of law. Particular attention is paid to current legislation shortened legislative proceedings in Slovak law, the statutory conditions of use and procedure for its application. The article analyzed using a practical application of an accelerated legislative process in the National Council of the Slovak Republic. A separate section deals with the determination of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic from the perspective of the use of accelerated legislative procedures in the Slovak National Council. The conclusions are formulated some proposals that could eliminate several shortcomings and errors in the application of expedited legislative procedure in the legislative process.
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