We discuss here the so-called 'deflationary conception of truth'. After sketching the basic ideas of the deflationists, we concentrate on the issue of conservativeness, presented in the literature as an important requirement for deflationary truth theories. It's the deflationist's intuition that truth is in some sense 'innocent' or 'metaphysically neutral'. The truth predicate is just a 'logical device' permitting us to formulate (and perhaps to prove) useful generalizations, but it doesn't by itself add any new content to our non - semantical base theory. Conservativeness comes as a handy explication of these intuitions: the deflationist should adopt a theory of truth which is conservative over its base theory. In the paper we try to assess the merits and demerits of conservative truth theories.
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