Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

Ten serwis zostanie wyłączony 2025-02-11.

Nowa wersja platformy, zawierająca wyłącznie zasoby pełnotekstowe, jest już dostępna.
Przejdź na https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Ograniczanie wyników

Znaleziono wyników: 4

Liczba wyników na stronie

Wyniki wyszukiwania

Wyszukiwano:
w słowach kluczowych: COGITO

Sortuj według:

Ogranicz wyniki do:

Sartre: 'We are what we dare to be'

100%

Tuzova T.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

2005

tom 14

nr 4(56)

165-177

Sartre's philosophy is analyzed against the background of the philosophical tradition of the cogito. His contributions seem most impressive in the area covered by such concepts as the subject, consciousness, self-awareness, liberty, otherness and human responsibility. Although these topics seem to have attracted his undiminished attention all the time, one should be aware that his views on these matters gradually changed in his lifetime. In social questions his main interests shifted from the role of consciousness to the ontology of practical activity. In the philosophy of the individual they shifted from individual conscience to the appreciation of individual past experience. But despite these changes he consistently retained the structure of 'présence-a-soi', first, as a specific indication of human experience, and secondly, as an idea underlying being, history and philosophy. 'Présence-a-soi', and the manner in which its pragmatic aspect is introduced into phenomenology to explain the constitutive activity of the empirical consciousness are essential factors used in the explanation of socially widespread images, thoughts and practices that flourish without having a discernible author.

Spór o szaleństwo

88%

Drabarek A.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

2011

tom 47

nr 4(190)

647-657

In the paper, the analysis of M. Foucault’s account of madness is presented on the background of Descartes’ views on rationality. In contradiction to M. Foucault, J. Derrida argues that Descartes did not exclude the mad from thinking persons since – according to him – “the act of cogito is valid even when I am mad.” However, the important advantage of Foucault is proving that analytical approach to madness, so attempt at its objectification, leads as a consequence to many contradictions which cannot be solved even by the development of medicine, psychology and psychiatry. At the present time, some cultural permission to a kind of madness is present. A. Breton may be seen as an example of an artist who transformed madness into main subject and source of inspiration. Mad and shocking art of surrealists, due to focusing on special interrelation of opposites, shown in new light and in new way, presents different, new, and perhaps more true aspects of reality.

Twórczość z punktu widzenia teorii czynności. Twórca czy szaleniec? Demiurg czy bricoleur?

75%

Bobryk J.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

2011

tom 47

nr 4(190)

533-541

The main aim of the paper is rethinking Descartes’s concept of cogito in the framework of the theory of actions and products and the general theory of human creativity. The final conclusion is that Descartes’s cogito is not a subject but an act. It is the act (or the string of acts) connecting the subject with the object. This conclusion is a bridge between Cartesian methodological skepticism and Brentano’s theory of intentional acts.

ĽUDSKÁ DUŠA A MIMOĽUDSKÝ INTELEKT

75%

Karul R.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

2014

tom 69

nr 7

613 – 622

In the contribution two Plotinus´ treatises are scrutinized in order to unveil the possible self-givens of soul on one side and intellect on the other. Plotinus´ concept of soul borders on the definition of a human being (whose constitution depends on the soul descending into him), while the intellect is divine, non-human. In Plotinus self-givens means self-knowledge, self-reflection or self-awareness. The question is, whether self-knowledge as the highest knowledge is related to the soul, or to the intellect alone. Even though the author outlines what could be regarded as the self-knowledge of soul, he questions the independent existence of this self of soul. Soul is not self-given in knowledge, it is rather self-given by intellect. This, strangely enough, corresponds with M. Henry’s conception of the relationship between the Self (i.e. soul in Plotinus) and Life (i.e. Intellect in Plotinus).