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EN
The paper presents the hypothesis of the mathematical rationality of the world put forward by Polish Platonist Michael Heller. There are to obstacles which make it difficult to understand this hypothesis. These are: (1) a conviction that mathematical entities are causally powerless and (2) a suspicion that mathematical objects, understood as ontological beings, are unintelligible.
EN
The paper discusses the regularity account of causation but finds it insufficient as a complete account of our notion of causality. The attractiveness of the regularity account is its attempt to understand causation in terms of empirically accessible features of the world. However, this account does not match our intuition that singular causality is prior in normal epistemic situations and that there is more to causation than mere succession. Apart from succession and regularity, the concept of causality also contains a modal feature which allows us to engage in counterfactual discourses about singular causal events and to claim that a particular cause is both sufficient and necessary for its effect in the circumstances. However, we may directly observe singular causes, but the modal element is not something we can possibly observe. Rather, this element is something we add to our perception of succession. Thus, the paper suggests that the modal feature of causality is a mental construction which was originally formed by our knowledge of certain structural features of similar events in other situations. It stems not from what we actually observe but from what we have observed or may observe under different but relevant circumstances. So the concept of causation has partly an empirical content and partly a constructed one.
EN
The subject of this article is the ontological theory of causality presented in Roman Ingarden's 'Controversy over the Existence of the World'. The peculiarity of this theory is discussed, and some differences between it and Hume's and Kant's theories are shown. The article presents Ingarden's definition of cause, the principles of causality, and rarely discussed problems connected with the analysis and division of events. The changes in the method of inquiry which occur in the third part of the 'Controversy over the Existence of the World' and which are related to the problem of causality are also examined.
EN
The article deals with some questions that are closely connected with clarifying the meaning of causal claims and understanding their distinctive features. It presents a perspectival view of causation that regards both the asymmetry of causation and its temporal orientation as products of our own perspective that we all share. The authoress argues against one of the basic thesis of causal perspectivalism according to which the notion of causation arises from our experience of success as agents, and she asserts that the distinction between causes and effects can also be relevant to practical or epistemic behaviour of creatures who are mere observers.
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Content available remote PROCESS TRACING: ZKOUMÁNÍ KAUZALITY V PŘÍPADOVÝCH STUDIÍCH
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EN
This paper addresses process tracing as a tool for studying causality in case studies. The method of process tracing, which is based on explicit specification of a causal mechanism and formalized treatment of empirical evidence, is intensively developed in political science. However, sociology and other social sciences seem to be turning a blind eye to the method. Therefore, the paper strives to familiarize the Czech and Slovak sociological community with this method and to outline the ongoing discussions about its application. The value of process tracing dwells not only in the elaborate frame for standardization of case studies, but also in the related debates reflecting upon a whole range of general methodological issues. This makes process tracing a valuable lesson in contemporary social science methodology and possibilities in non-experimental analysis of causality.
EN
The article explains the meaning of the cause and effect relation in Hegel’s thought. It explains what Hegel understands by freedom and what it has to do with causality. Hegel is trying convince us that this issue is insufficient to grasp the absolute with one’s mind, which, in Hegel’s opinion, is the one and only task of philosophy as a whole.
EN
A key concept in medicine is that rational therapy rests on accurate diagnosis; quite simply, therapy that is not tuned to the cause of the disease will not cure the patient. I do not mean to say that effective treatments cannot emerge from faulty diagnoses. In truth, much of our therapeutic ensemble is composed of drugs developed as a result of chance observation, random, screening, intuition, or pre-scientific tradition. Nevertheless, the way to effective therapy is best paved by understanding. Effects are inherent in their causes; so if we want to cure autoimmune diseases using the scientific method, we are obliged to inquire into their causes. By reducing the discordant complexity of the disease to the single cause that underlies it, we can hope to learn the most efficient way to manipulate the disease process. How do we identify a cause when we see one? Quite simply, a single cause is that which is both necessary and sufficient to produce the effect. Here, I explore the general paradigm of autoimmune causality, using multiple sclerosis as a specific example.
EN
The paper focuses on the problem of identification of laws of nature and their demarcation from other kinds of regularities. The problem is approached from the viewpoint of several metaphysical, epistemological, logical and methodological criteria. Firstly, several dominant approaches to the problem are introduced. Secondly, the logical and semantic explicatory framework - Transparent Intensional Logic - is presented for the sake of clarification of logical forms of sentences that are supposed to express the laws of nature. Finally, a complementary strategy to the demarcation problem is proposed, including reconsideration of relevant metaphysical, epistemological, logical and methodological requirements and principles behind the former conceptions.
EN
First, this paper examines the causal relationship between the current account and financial account then the current account and the main components of financial account and finally the financial account, saving, and investment in Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovenia. In this context we employ Toda-Yamamoto approach to Granger causality test by using the quarterly data. We find a causal relation running from the financial (current) account to the current (financial) account in Croatia (Poland) and Slovenia (Romania) while a bi-directional causality exists in the case of Hungary. We conclude that at least one component of financial account balance Granger causes current account in Croatia, Poland, Romania and Slovenia while the causality running from the current account to at least one component of financial account in Poland, Romania and Hungary. It seems that the financial account Granger causes the saving in Hungary and investment in Croatia while the causality running from the saving in Romania and investment in both Croatia and Poland to the financial account.
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Content available remote ANALYTICKÁ SOCIOLÓGIA: NIEKOĽKO METODOLOGICKÝCH INŠPIRÁCIÍ
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Sociológia (Sociology)
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2014
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tom 46
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nr 2
130 – 145
EN
In the article, the fundamental principles of analytical sociology are briefly introduced. As underlined, the contemporary analytical sociology based on social mechanism concept is closely connected to multi-agent (or agent-based) modelling. Three methodological inspirations which can be found in contemporary analytical sociology are discussed. The first one is dealing with Merton´s interpretation of Middle range theory. According to Hedström and Udehn, there are two basic dimensions of MRT: dimension of generality (explanandum) and dimension of isolation (explanans). In the next part, the model construction of theory is discussed and compared to the strategy of hypothetic-deductive theory construction. Finally, the issue of explanation based upon social mechanism is analysed. There are two fundamental approaches to solve the issue which can be found in the analytical sociology. Bunge´s approach (How does it work?) is compared to Boudon´s one (Why does it work?). The social mechanism underlying the social control process is introduced to demonstrate the idea that the answer to the question “how does it work?” can provide a non-trivial though not final explanation of social phenomena.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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tom 73
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nr 1
36 – 50
EN
The paper proposes a solution to the problem of counterfactuals building on both Rescher’s epistemic and Tichy’s semantic approaches. The core of the latter is the thesis that a speaker when expressing a true counterfactual assumes a set of background indicative premises as an implicit parameter. When added tacitly to an unreal antecedent, these premises entail the consequent logically or analytically. We argue against Pollock’s impossibility objection concerning revision of the producer’s beliefs. In accordance with the linguistic solution we distinguish between a relative and an absolute unreality of a course of events described in the consequent. Likewise, we draw a distinction between a potentially unreal and an absolutely unreal condition expressed in the antecedent. Drawing on our previous paper, Deductive and abductive retro dictions and predictions, we take counterfactuals with a positive time vector and an absolute unreal condition to be elided deductive judgements, i.e. deductive retro dictions, without any appeal to a special non-classical logic. Similarly, we consider counterfactuals with a positive time vector and a potentially unreal condition to be elided deductive predictions.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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tom 73
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nr 5
400 – 407
EN
The article discusses the enigmatic backtracking counterfactuals. It offers an explanation according to which in the case of the latter the negative time direction is due to their being abductive retrodictions, i.e. explanations of unreal effects by introducing possible causes while the conditions remain tacit or unexpressed. The counterfactual abductive retrodictions´ backtracking time direction is in accordance with the postulating the positive time direction from cause to effect. Thus we demonstrate that in order to explain backtracking counterfactuals there is no need to consider the backtracking impact of the present on the past. Further, there is no need to violate natural laws or to have a special logic. What we need is to take into account the third parameter, i.e. a set of tacit or unexpressed additional propositions, as well as the principle of ceteris paribus as our background. When the power of logic is not overestimated, there is no need to change the direction of causality. And a correct analysis does not require any special logic. Last, but not least, we showed, how to correctly make the abductive retrodiction by the contraposition of the deductive retrodiction.
EN
The aim of this article is to analyze the main contributions of Wesley C. Salmon to the philosophy of science, that is, his concepts of causation, common cause, and theoretical explanation, and to provide a critique of them. This critique will be based on a comparison of Salmon's concepts with categories developed by Hegel in his 'Science of Logic' and which can be applied to issues treated by Salmon by means of the above given three concepts. It is the author's contention that by means of Hegelian categories it becomes possible to provide a critique of Salmon's philosophy of science and at the same time to enlarge the concept framework of philosophy of science.
EN
The paper tries to analyze critically what is usually taken for granted - the causal relation between empirical knowledge about external world and the world which is (supposedly) known. The aim is neither to propose a new definition of knowledge nor to restate an old one but rather to take a closer look at the claim that knowledge is a true belief caused in a proper way by facts, events, etc. of the external world. This claim is a core of the epistemological approach usually labelled as a 'causal theory of knowledge', but there are many causal theories distinct from each other. The paper therefore sketches the causal components of D. Davidson's epistemology and the roles they play in the process of cognizing, first. Then it exposes more details of Davidson's approach and pushes some of them further critically.
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