he paper analyses the interpretations of the Italian Fascism’s economic policy which were presented by the Polish economists of the interwar period. The economists who wrote in detail about the Fascist economy were impressed by the impetus of the investments realized by the State in Mussolini’s Italy and also positively evaluated the introduction of the social peace by the Mussolini’s government, though they sometimes noticed the economic costs connected with the Fascist policy — especially the expansion of bureaucracy and the growth of the fiscal burdens imposed on the society. One of the most enthusiastic commentators, Jan Zdzitowiecki, did not notice the symptoms of the aggravation of the economic situation in Italy in the final years before the World War II. The majority of the economists ignored the consequences of the intensive investment in the heavy industry during the 1930s for the standard of life. Only Henryk Kurt Hendrikson emphasized that these investments exerted the signifi cant infl uence on the drop in the level of consumption in the society. Roman Rybarski was surely the only Polish economist of the period who fully perceived and understood the evolution of the Fascist economic policy — from the remarkably liberal policy (until about 1926) to the progressively larger State control over the economy in the 30s. The author submits the thesis that the attitude of Polish economists towards the Fascist economic policies was the derivative of their general attitude towards the conception of State control over and direct management of economy. Especially those economists who, like, for instance, Lvov university professor Leopold Caro, searched for “the third way” between the liberal capitalism and socialism, expressed the positive or even enthusiastic opinions on that economic policy.
The article deals with an empiric analysis of behaviour of contracting authorities when tendering public contracts. In the context of theories dealing with rational, imperfectly rational and rationally inattentive behaviour of agents, it tries to describe the problem of avoiding risk by the contracting authorities in further detail. Theories observing behaviour of bureaucracy – no matter how well they are reasoned – mostly meet the problem of empiric verifiability. In this case, the authors try to fill the gap using an empiric analysis where it is worked with real data of public contracts from 2010 – 2014. We can consider the main findings to be the fact that public contracting authorities prefer strategies that are based on a reduction of risk of conflicts with the regulator. These strategies are chosen mainly based on signals of behaviour of central authorities, rather than based on the effort of gaining the most informative strategy. However, the final result is the same. In the authors’ opinion, the aversion to risk by the contracting authorities, which is enforced by the public policy in this field, plays the major role.
The aim of this paper is to discuss the problem of bureaucracy in the public sector, and also to identify ways to improve public administration. The author claims that in order to rationalise bureaucracy it is necessary to use several market mechanisms and to increase transparency. Moreover, the paper depicts e-administration as an effective tool that makes public administration more efficient. Another important issue presented in the article is the principal-agent problem and its implications for the public sector.
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This article puts forward the concept of street-level bureaucrats and their role in public policy in its full complexity. In the first two parts the authors define street-level bureaucrats and the roots of the basic ideologies that determine their behaviour (principles of bureaucracy, professionalism, bureau-professionalism and managerialism). They draw on previous analytical studies they conducted on this theme and present the latest empirical findings on the behavior of street-level bureaucrats who work with unemployed people. In this way they try to demonstrate the importance of principles of bureaucracy, professionalism, and bureau-professionalism in contemporary public policy.
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