Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Translation in the Most Reverent Theory of Truth: A Self-Translative Act as an Illusion of Correspondence

100%

Cirillo G.

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nr 3

155-181

PL

Choć niewątpliwie najbardziej intuicyjna, a jednocześnie prawdopodobnie najbardziej sporna teoria korespondencyjna stanowi nadal oś, wokół której toczą się nieustające spory filozoficzne na temat pojęcia prawdy, a ich zasadnicza nierozstrzygalność wydaje się je napędzać. Niniejsza praca stanowi kolejną próbę wyjaśnienia problematycznej relacji korespondencji. Celem autorki jest obrona tezy, iż niemal każde z klasycznych, współczesnych ujęć owej teorii zawiera w sobie element procesu tłumaczenia. Na początku zatem zostało sprecyzowane samo pojęcie przekładu i sposób użycia go w niniejszym artykule. Wymienione są więc główne cechy pozwalające sklasyfikować daną czynność jako translację. Następnie analizie zostały poddane trzy modele zaproponowane przez Russella, Moore’a oraz Austina, w taki sposób, aby wyeksponować rolę przekładu w każdym z nich. Ostatecznie został wskazany element łączący owe interpretacje, jak również podkreślono wagę procesu przekładu w filozoficznej refleksji nad ideą prawdy.

EN

Being the most intuitive and yet perhaps most contestable of all, the correspondence theory remains an axis around which the philosophical debate on truth incessantly spins, with indefiniteness remaining as its main propelling force. The following work presents one more interpretative attempt; it will be argued that each classical contemporary version of the theory incorporates an idea of translation process. For this purpose, initially one was specified what notion of translation should be applied here by enumerating its key features. Next, three classical models were examined-those proposed by Russell, Moore and Austin-in such a way as to expose the place of translation in each analysis. Consequently, the research both provide an element which unifies them and highlight the significance of translation for the philosophical inquiry into the concept of truth.

2

Performative Utterances: Seven Puzzles

99%

Harnish R.

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nr -1

3-21

EN

It was John Austin who introduced the word "performative" (which he called "a new and ugly word") into the philosophy of language and linguistics. His original idea was that there are utterances which are more correctly characterized as doing something rather than stating something. Austin wrote: "when I say ‘I do’ (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife), I am not reporting on a marriage, I am indulging in it." As is well known, Austin went on to work out this notion of a performative utterance (and of a performative expression) in a number of directions, but in the end the attempt to isolate performatives (doings) from constatives (true or false) failed dramatically, and the idea of viewing language use in terms of the performative-constative dichotomy gave way to the study of speech acts: "The total speech act in the total speech situation is the only actual phenomena which, in the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating." But giving up the performative-constative distinction does not mean giving up theorizing about performatives, and there is a cottage industry in the theory of language devoted to them. We identify seven puzzles for theorizing about performatives. We consider how Austin might have dealt with some of them. Finding his answers problematic, we then survey recent theories of performatives and zoom in on the major contenders, identifying one theory in particular for scrutiny and seeing how it fares with the seven puzzles. The upshot is that there is still work to be done understanding performatives.

3

Performatyw: suwerenna władza zamiast subwersji? (Austin, Derrida, Butler)

74%

Vatsov D.

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nr 23

EN

In contrast to Derrida and Butler, who overemphasized the subversive force of performatives, here the focus is on the immanent (micro-)sovereign power of performative utterances. Hence, what is proposed here is a search for the basic concept of power at the micro-level of speech acts. Before being codified with reference to certain stable power relations or contexts and before being objectified in different forms of domination and/or violence, power must be analyzed at the level of immediate performatives, where the struggle for power-codification could be followed in vivo. A task like this requires a conceptual shift: the illocutionary force of speech acts must be reinterpreted as their immediate evaluative force, i.e. as illocutionary power. Taking into account Derrida’s critique of Austin’s theory of speech acts, we should recognize that performatives arenot singular or atomistic speech acts, nor are they pre-determined by certain already given contexts or procedures. They are embedded in a citation and trace signs, without any final or autonomous signification. And yet, performatives have a specific kind of sovereignty. It is not the sovereignty of the ‘act’ itself but of the act’s performance. The actual (in the sense of ‘ongoing’) performance has an immediate force that is irreversible and also non-citable. Even in the case ofa direct citation, a citing performance sediments into an irreversible arrow, thus immediately reordering and re-evaluating all points in its trajectory. This performance does not fulfill a perspective, but it irreversibly forms a perspective. This effect of the virtuosity of an immediate performance could be called the power effect since it not only demonstrates how we make things with words, but also how we re-evaluate the things that were made through words. If an ongoing performance is such an immediate source of micro-power, then its role is not only to be ironically subversive and resistant to the already existing macro-codifications of power and domination. Performatives have their own sovereign power and are therefore capable of a direct affirmation and re-affirmation of the intersubjective frames of our experience.

PL

In contrast to Derrida and Butler, who overemphasized the subversive force of performatives, here the focus is on the immanent (micro-)sovereign power of performative utterances. Hence, what is proposed here is a search for the basic concept of power at the micro-level of speech acts. Before being codified with reference to certain stable power relations or contexts and before being objectified in different forms of domination and/or violence, power must be analyzed at the level of immediate performatives, where the struggle for power-codification could be followed in vivo. A task like this requires a conceptual shift: the illocutionary force of speech acts must be reinterpreted as their immediate evaluative force, i.e. as illocutionary power. Taking into account Derrida’s critique of Austin’s theory of speech acts, we should recognize that performatives are not singular or atomistic speech acts, nor are they pre-determined by certain already given contexts or procedures. They are embedded in a citation and trace signs, without any final or autonomous signification. And yet, performatives have a specific kind of sovereignty. It is not the sovereignty of the ‘act’ itself but of the act’s performance. The actual (in the sense of ‘ongoing’) performance has an immediate force that is irreversible and also non-citable. Even in the case of a direct citation, a citing performance sediments into an irreversible arrow, thus immediately reordering and re-evaluating all points in its trajectory. This performance does not fulfill a perspective, but it irreversibly forms a perspective. This effect of the virtuosity of an immediate performance could be called the power effect since it not only demonstrates how we make things with words, but also how we re-evaluate the things that were made through words. If an ongoing performance is such an immediate source of micro-power, then its role is not only to be ironically subversive and resistant to the already existing macro-codifications of power and domination. Performatives have their own sovereign power and are therefore capable of a direct affirmation and re-affirmation of the intersubjective frames of our experience.