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EN
The text attempts to present the wartime and post-war fate of the Polish intelligentsia who took a direct part in uncovering the Katyn massacre, using the example of Dr Marian Wodziński, a medical doctor. As a forensic doctor, he was appointed (against his will), to examine the exhumation of the victims buried in the Katyn forest. As a forensic expert, he believed that it was not up to him to determine the perpetrators, but to the court that would one day hear the murder case. He remained under pressure from the Germans, and after his return from Katyn to Poland, he was intensively searched by the NKVD and the UB, as an inconvenient, muchknowing witness. Arrested by the NKVD, he was freed thanks to influential people, and when he started to go into hiding, an APB was issued for him. In December 1945, he managed to escape from Poland under the name Marian Cich. He settled in the United Kingdom. The security apparatus recruited his brother Stanislaw to collaborate with him for many years. Despite many attempts, Dr M. Wodziński did not succumb to persuasion and pressure and did not return to Poland, although he missed his homeland very much. He returned to Tarnów after his death, in an urn which was buried in the family grave. Despite his many merits, as well as his patriotic attitude, until recently the figure of Dr M. Wodziński was forgotten. Also in his home town of Tarnów. The text about Dr Marian Wodziński should be – in the author’s assumption – a memento of this luminous figure for contemporary and future generations of Poles, especially the Polish intelligentsia, of which Dr Wodziński was a representative.
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2021
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tom 24
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nr 1
96-113
EN
In the study we present and interpret the activities of the Romanian diplomat Nicolae Eric Lahovary, who served as an ambassador to the Slovak Republic from March 1940 to March 1941. Although he was ambassador until March 1941, we focus only at his perception of the internal and foreign policy of the Slovak Republic, as well as the form of mutual relations between Slovakia and Romania until September 1940. This perception is based mainly on his diplomatic reports that have been sent regularly to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Romania.
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tom 5
169-184
EN
The Soviet occupation of Latvia in 1940 was “legitimized” by “People’s Saeima” which was “elected” on July 14–15, 1940. A significant role in these “elections” was carried out by The Communist Party of Latvia, which at that time was a branch of Comintern and therefore acted as a Soviet agency in Latvia. Some two dozens of candidates for MP of the “Working People’s Bloc” (which was openly backed by USSR officials) were at the same time members of various electoral commissions. “People’s Government”, which was appointed after the occupation of Latvia, Central Election Commission, local communists and their supporters were just executors in these “elections”. The real “master of puppets” who supervised whole process was Deputy Chairman of the Soviet government Andrey Vyshinsky and some other Soviet officials. These “elections” had nothing to do with elections in the common, democratic sense of that word. In fact, it was an affair of misleading, intimidation and fraud on a large scale. These events had grave consequences for Latvia – the loss of independence and establishment of extremely repressive regime in all three Baltic states.
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nr 48
EN
The research problem addressed in this paper is the issue of the process of the accession of the Republic of Lithuania to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1940 and the political context of this event. There is much historical and political controversy nowadays around the history of Kremlin politics in 1939–1941, but recently the subject of annexation of Lithuania has not been discussed, and the issue of relations and diplomatic relations between the two countries has not been described in detail so far in Polish historiography. The research question was formulated as follows: why, in spite of the October 1939 Mutual Assistance Treaty, did Moscow decide to change the status quo and directly annex the neighbouring country, disregarding the considerable number of alternative scenarios and extensive possibilities of controlling Lithuania's policy? The research was conducted by analysing the documents of the diplomatic services of both countries (among which diplomatic correspondence occupies a special place), the then Soviet press from the point of view of the propaganda message used, as well as using memoiristic sources. As a result of the conducted research, no definite reasons for initiating the process of annexation of Lithuania by the USSR were defined, but a number of factors that may have a significant impact on the Kremlin's move were revealed. These include the successes of the Third Reich in the Second World War at that time, which, according to Moscow, could threaten the position of the USSR in the Baltic States and the achievements made, as well as the Kremlin's far-reaching imperial plans and the search for borders in the region.
PL
Problemem badawczym poruszonym w niniejszej pracy jest zagadnienie procesu przyłączenia Republiki Litewskiej do Związku Radzieckiego latem 1940 r. oraz kontekst polityczny tego wydarzenia. Współcześnie wokół historii polityki Kremla w latach 1939–1941 istnieje dużo kontrowersji historycznych i politycznych, niemniej w ostatnim czasie w polskiej historiografii temat aneksji Litwy nie był poruszany, a zagadnienie relacji i zależności dyplomatycznych między obydwoma państwami nie było dotąd wyczerpująco opisane. Pytanie badawcze sformułowano następująco: dlaczego, mimo obowiązywania Układu o przyjaźni, współpracy i pomocy wzajemnej z października 1939 r., Moskwa zdecydowała się na zmianę status quo i bezpośrednią aneksję sąsiedniego państwa mimo znacznych alternatywnych szerokich możliwości kontroli polityki Litwy? Badanie przeprowadzono analizując opracowane dokumenty służb dyplomatycznych obydwu państw (wśród których szczególne miejsce zajmuje korespondencja dyplomatyczna), ówczesną prasę radziecką pod kątem stosowanego przekazu propagandowego, a także wykorzystano źródła memuarystyczne. W wyniku przeprowadzonych badań nie zdefiniowano jednoznacznych przyczyn zapoczątkowania procesu aneksji Litwy przez ZSRR, natomiast ujawniono szereg czynników mogących mieć znaczący wpływ na takie posunięcie Kremla. Należą do nich zarówno sukcesy III Rzeszy w II wojnie światowej w tym czasie co, zdaniem Moskwy, mogłoby zagrozić pozycji ZSRR w krajach bałtyckich i osiągniętym zdobyczom, jak również dalekosiężne plany imperialne Kremla i dążenie do rewizji granic w regionie.
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