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Dogmatism and Criticism in the Conception of Phenomenological Reduction

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Łaciak P.

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2015

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tom 34

PL

The author presents his own interpretation of phenomenological reduction taking as a starting point two motives of phenomenology identified by Ernst Tugendhat: the dogmatic motive and the critical motive. In the dogmatic interpretation, phenomenological reduction is driven by the need to meet the criterion of apodictic certainty and means excluding the world from the scope of phenomenological research and limiting it to the realm of transcendental awareness. It is only transcendental awareness that can be apodictically certain; the existence of the world never is. In the critical interpretation, the starting point for philosophizing is not apodictic certainty but a minimum amount of cognitive dogmatism attained through radical criticism. Phenomenological reduction itself no longer entails a subjectivist narrowing down of the field of study, but its expansion into a new domain: the domain of awareness in which the world is being constituted, awareness freed from anonymity. The aim of this critically interpreted reduction is the uncovering of the correlation between awareness and the world, which remains invisible in the natural approach. Reduction brings this correlation to light, suspending prejudices (Vorurteile), which result from the natural approach. The fact that prejudices are suspended means that one refrains from following them blindly, since a characteristic feature of all prejudices is that they do not admit reflection. It is important to distinguish between two types of prejudices: those which enable cognition and those which distort the picture of reality. The author demonstrates that phenomenological reduction may be understood as a postulate of criticism: to suspend prejudices in order to recognize their validity (legitimacy) in their claims to truth or to expose them as false awareness.

2

Fenomenologia Husserla - filozofia podejrzenia czy pewności?

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Łaciak P.

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2015

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tom 33

PL

The aim of the article is to question the Cartesian interpretation of Husserl’s philosophy. In that interpretation Husserl is regarded as a representative of epistemological fundamentalism characterized by searching for the foundations of cognition in the transcendental consciousness given in the absolute and adequate evidence. The thesis of this article states that the essential anonymity which Husserl ascribes to consciousness is the crucial argument for his questioning of the Cartesian myth of the self-transparency of consciousness and thus allows for regarding him as the master of suspicion in a meaning which Paul Ricoeur has endowed this concept with. According to Husserl, consciousness, at the beginning of philosophical thinking, appears to be unknown, hidden, since a human being living in a natural disposition, is immersed in anonymity and forgets about his own subjectivity. Though this anonymity may be overcome by means of phenomenological reduction, the transcendental consciousness, uncovered due to that reduction, in its deepest layers will remain anonymous and will not present itself adequately in self-reflection.

3

Husserl a problem istnienia świata

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Łaciak P.

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2014

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tom 32

PL

In my paper I discuss Husserl’s standpoint on the existence of world. Addressing this issue the philosopher thinks of the kind of being, outer of consciousness, which is realized in the general thesis of natural attitude. The aim of phenomenological research is to reveal correlation of consciousness and the world, which according to Husserl, becomes transcendental constitution. In the course of explaining this correlation Husserl reveals that the existence of world might be recognized as a correlate of the general thesis of natural attitude, which after phenomenological reduction becomes recognised as the constitutive achievement of consciousness. Transcendental idealism is interpreted in the paper as transcendental monism. Husserl not only questions the possibility of non-cognizable things-in-themselves, but also he uses some broad concept of transcendental subjectivity. The transcendental subjectivity is not opposed to the world, but it includes the world as the subjectivity’s correlate. Strictly speaking, the world is conceived as structure transcendental subjectivity, and the natural attitude might be taken as anonymous modus of transcendental life.

4

Redukcja transcendentalno-fenomenologiczna a modyfikacja neutralnościowa

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Łaciak P.

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2013

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tom 31

PL

The paper addresses the relation between transcendental-phenomenological reduction and neutral modification in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. According to Husserl, there is both essential kinship and fundamental difference between them. What makes them akin is that they both are characterised as disconnection or bracketing judgement about natural world. What differs them, however, is that neutral modification is a kind of transformation of conviction of existence of the world into neutral consciousness, which does not constitute the world, whereas the transcendental-phenomenological reduction disconnects the world in a way which leads to uncovering the subjectivity that does constitute the world (and subjectivity that constitutes the world is not the neutral consciousness, but a thetic consciousness - positionales Bewusstsein). Hence, the transcendental-phenomenological disconnection of the world does not mean its neutralisation, but rather recognition of being of the world as a result of constitutive performances of transcendental subjectivity.

5

Eugena Finka rozumienie Ja transcendentalnego

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Łaciak P.

Folia Philosophica

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2011

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tom 29

205-223

EN

The paper deals with Eugen Fink’s interpretation of transcendental I. Fink does not make do with traditional phenomenological distinction between natural I and transcendental I, but within transcendental I he looks for the distinction between constitutive I (konstituierendes Ich) i phenomenologizing I. Hence, according to Fink, we should distinguish three kinds of I: natural I (trapped in the world), transcendental I which constitutes the world and transcendental-phenomenologizing I (transzendental-phänomenologisierendes Ich) as theoretical spectator, who meets the conditions of phenomenological reduction but does not contribute to the constitution of the world. Finks interpretation of transcendental I aims at overcoming difficulties related to Husserlian phenomenological reduction, and the distinction of constitutive I and phenomenologizing I was accepted by Husserl himself.

DE

Der Gegenstand des Artikels ist die Eugen Finks Interpretation des transzendentalen Ichs. Fink begnügt sich nicht mit tradierter phänomenologischer Unterscheidung zwischen dem natürlichen und transzendentalen Ich, sondern im Bereich des transzendentalen Ichs selbst sucht er nach einem Unterschied zwischen dem konstituierenden und phänomenologisierenden Ich. Deshalb sollte man, seiner Meinung nach, drei Ich-Arten unterscheiden: natürliches (weltbefangenes) Ich, transzendentales Ich, das die Welt konstituiert und transzendental-phänomenologisierendes Ich als theoretischer Zuschauer, der zwar die phänomenologische Reduktion erfüllt, doch an der Konstitution der Welt nicht teilnimmt. Finks Interpretation vom transzendentalen Ich ist ein Versuch, die mit Husserls phänomenologischer Reduktion verbundenen Schwierigkeiten zu überwinden; und die von Fink vorgeschlagene Unterscheidung zwischen dem konstituierenden und phänomenologisierenden Ich wurde von Husserl selbst akzeptiert.