While expressing his innovative theory of existence (esse) as an act of being in many his texts Thomas Aqunas recalls different historical sources to support his thesis: Aristotle’s views, Arabic philosophers’ depictions, mainly of Avicenna, Boethius’ distinction entia quo od entia quod and some theses of Liber de causis. In earlier subject literature, mainly Gilson’s influence (in Poland it was under Krąpiec’s influence) adopted a view about religious inspirations of Thomas’ thesis and that the only philosophical way to his thesis is an analysis of Avicenna’s depictions which are contained mainly in work De ente et essentia. Every other Thomas’recalls should be treated as some earlier ploy for a protection against possible reservations. The first statement which arises during the analysis of historical sources which Thomas refer to expressing his theory of existence (esse) as an act of being is ascertaining that reasoning is a crucial argument to accept esse as an act of being. It should be emphasized that in his theory of esse Thomas Aquinas does not refer to argument of Revelation. The result is that Thomas expressed this thesis only in a philosophical area within the analysis of structure of real being. The attitudes which are recalled sometimes are used by Thomas Aquinas as a background or context by which he states his view. Recalled statements sometimes are a reference to the authority. It seems that the erudition recalled by Thomas in a matter which is interesting for us appears in a different aspects. That is why it should be make a fuss of that the issue of existence (esse) did not appear with Thomas Aquinas’ metaphysics or Avicenna’s metaphysics. It seems that it was on the contrary: the issue of existence (esse) was worrying Plato and earlier philosophers, Aristotle, and Neoplatonists, Boethius and Arabic philosophers. So Thomas’ thesis about existence (esse) as an act of being is a result of the analysis of the issue which is existed in the history of philosophy
The first of these ‘layers’ is hellenistic Neoplatonism of Proclus which is specifically deepened in Aquinas expositio by referring to ‘Stoichéiosis Theologiké’. The second ‘layer’ is monotheistic and creationist neoplatonism of the author of The Book which is sometimes corrected by Thomas Aquinas through depictions of Pseudo-Dionysius. The third and clearly separated doctrinal ‘layer’ of lecture is veritas rerum in which should be seek Aquinas’ views. In this perspective it is easier to unravel terminological difficulties which are in Thomas Aquinas’ text. It seems that many technical terms, such as esse, essentia, existentia, even substantia and ens should be ‘read’ in the ‘layer’ perspective which they located in. The article analyze first of the issue of esse. If we consider this ‘layered’ construction Commentary of Thomas Aquinas recognizing that in veritatis rerum there are the Aquinas own views, without difficulty we will find in it the most important thesis of his own metaphysics: about being as an arrangement from esse, about the esse and essentia, about essentia as an arrangement form and some type of potency, about God as a Ipsum Esse Subsistens, about creation as a giving esse.
Text De ente et essentia was written together with "De principis naturae" in Thomas’ first years of teaching activities and accounted philosophical “exercises” for the brothers at the convent of St. James in Paris. There is commonly noted, that Aquinas had already established the most important theses of his philosophy, the existential metaphysics of being above all, in which the act was the existence of this being, and the form with the matter constituted its essence. In this situation, the source of all existence, God appeared as only existence. Analysis of existential themes in "De ente et essentia" confirms these opinions. In later texts, especially in the "Summa Contra Gentiles", "Summa theologiae" and "Quaestiones disputatae", Thomas deepens his concepts; he introduces extended topic of transcendentals - property of being which manifest its existence. However, the bulk of his existential metaphysics of existence has been outlined already in "De ente et essentia", and it was never corrected in the basic theses.
Odpowiedź na tytułowe tylko pozornie wydaje się być prosta, bo to pytanie implikuje cały szereg kwestii pochodnych, dotyczących tekstów samego Tomasza, jego znaczenia, sposobów kontynuacji jego myśli, a przede wszystkim tego, co w tej myśli warte jest kontynuowania. Nasza odpowiedź jest następująca: tomizmem jest filozofia realnego bytu jednostkowego, ujętego jako istnienie i istota, gdzie akt istnienia stanowi przyczynę tego, że ten byt jest, a istota stanowi przyczynę tego, czym jest. Ta odpowiedź od razu powoduje eliminację wielu innych koncepcji tomizmu Np. to że jest on wyłącznie interpretacją tekstów Tomasza z Akwinu, że stanowi syntezę patrystyki i filozofii greckiej, że jest zareagowaniem na nowinki filozoficzne swoich czasów, że jest tym systemem myślowym, który zaleca Kościół katolicki, że jest ideologią np. feudalizmu. Tomasza z Akwinu uważamy za autora nowatorskiej filozofii bytu. Jako pierwszy w dziejach filozofii zaproponował, aby istnienie bytu, z którym już od Arystotelesa filozofowie mieli kłopot (bo nie jest prawdą, że Tomasz w ogóle „wymyślił” istnienie), ująć jako akt bytu. Ta teza przebudowuje radykalnie metafizykę Arystotelesa, w ramach której – należy to zawsze uczciwie podkreślać – jest formułowana. Filozofia Tomasza więc nie jest arystotelizmem – jest nową metafizyką bytu, jest więc tomizmem. Tak sformułowane postrzeganie tomizmu różni się także od modnych dziś interpretacji tomizmu jako zreformowanego neoplatonizmu lub jako chrystianizacji arystotelizmu. Uprawianie tomizmu dziś nie ma w sobie nic z postawy wyznawcy. Tomista nie tylko nie musi, ale i nie może, przyjmować wypowiedzi Tomasza jako ostatecznego argumentu w sprawie. Można powiedzieć krótko: tomista jest naukowcem a nie ideologiem To uprawianie musi więc sytuować się na terenie wyznaczonym przez dwie granice. Po pierwsze - nie jest bezrefleksyjnym wyznawaniem poglądów Tomasza. Po drugie jednak – nie ma tomizmu bez Tomasza. Na tak określonym terenie mieszczą się zarówno pracy historyczne, stanowiące analizę problematyki zawartej w tekstach Akwinaty, jak i ujęcia systematyczne, rozwijające ujęcia Tomasza lub interpretujące współczesne tematy filozoficzne i teologiczne „ad mentem fratri Thomam”, co dziś znaczy: w ramach Tomaszowej metafizyki „esse”, rozumianego jako akt bytu.
EN
The answer to the title question only superficially seems to be simple, because it implies a number of the derivatives, the texts of the same Thomas, its importance, how to follow his thoughts, and above all what in Aquinas’ legacy is worth continuing. Our response is as follows: Thomism is the philosophy of being as s real individual, recognized as the existence and nature of which act there is a reason that the being is, and the reason what it is. This answer eliminates a number of other concepts of Thomism. For example, it is only the interpretation of the texts of Thomas Aquinas that is a synthesis of patristics and Greek philosophy, that is to respond to the news philosophy of his time, that is the system of thought, which advocates the Catholic Church it is an ideology such as feudalism. Thomas Aquinas' is regarded as an author of the philosophy of being. As the first in the history of philosophy he suggested that the existence of being, which philosophers since Aristotle had troubled (because it is not true at all that Thomas ‛invented’ existence), is recognized as an act of being. This thesis radically modifies Aristotle’s metaphysics, in which – to be honest it's always emphasized – is formulated. Philosophy of Thomas is not Aristotelianism – rather, it is a new metaphysics of being, so it is Thomism. Such formulated perception of Thomism also differs from the fashionable interpretation of Thomism today as a reformed neo-Platonism or Aristotelianism as a Christianization. Doing Thomism today has nothing to do with attitude of the followers. Not only Thomist does not have, but also it can not take the statements of Thomas as the final argument in the case. We can say briefly: Thomist is a scientist and not an ideologue. This practice must therefore be situated within the two boundaries. First , it is not mindless confessing Thomas views. Secondly, however – there is no Thomism without Thomas. This specific field of work comprises both historical analysis of the issues which are contained in the texts of Aquinas, as well as a systematic approach, developing and interpreting Thomas by contemporary philosophical and theological ad mentem fratri Thomam, which today is in the framework of Thomas' metaphysics of esse, defined as the act of being.
W artykule proponuje się zwrócenie uwagi na egzystencjalną perspektywę rozważań metafizycznych Al-Farabiego. Uważa się, że jest to przekroczenie Arystotelesowskiego esencjalizmu w kierunku ujęć bardziej egzystencjalnych. Nie oznacza to jednak, że Al-Farabi dystansuje się od platonizmu i neoplatonizmu: jego neoplatonizm jest ewidentny w postaci Plotyńskiego emanacjonizmu, choć połączonego z systemem planetarnym Ptolemeusza i Arystostelesowską teorią przyczynowania. Państwo doskonałe Al-Farabiego zdradza – z kolei – inspiracje platońskie. Bardziej Arystotelesowska jest antropologia Drugiego Nauczyciela, ale już jego teoria poznania rodzi się wyraźnie z interpretacji Aleksandra z Afrodyzji. Ten aleksandrynizm jest w myśli Drugiego Nauczyciela wyraźnie rozwinięty i wpisany w antropologię i eschatologię. Wszystkie wymienione elementy myśli Al-Farabiego tworzą w jego ujęciu spójny system, który on sam nazywa „harmonizacją”. System też ma zdecydowanie neoplatoński szkielet: zaczyna od pierwszej przyczyny, przez emanację kolejnych hipostaz dochodzi do sfery lunarnej, w której kompozycje z materii i formy tworzą znany nam świat bytów możliwych, znajdujących się cały czas na granicy istnienia i nieistnienia. Uwieńczeniem tego schematu i swoistym w nim reditio jest wynikający z Farabiańskiej noetyki postulat doskonalenia się „zwierzęcia rozumnego” pod względem moralnym przez kontakt z inteligencją czynną, który powoduje, że po rozpadzie ludzkiego wehikułu z materii i formy sam człowiek będzie trwał na podobieństwo niematerialnej inteligencji oddzielonej. Doprowadzić ludzi ma do tego odpowiednia organizacja społeczna, którą Al-Farabi określił jako państwo cnoty (doskonałe).
EN
In this paper, we turn our attention to the existential perspective of the al-Farabi’s metaphysical thought, which is considered to represent a transcendence of aristotelian essentialism toward a more existential approach. Nonetheless, it does not mean that al-Farabi distances himself from platonism and neoplatonism: neoplatonism of his works is present in a shape of plotinian emanationism even it is joined with the solar system of Ptolemy and the aristotelian causal theory. Next, there are platonic inspirations in the Farabian perfect state. Anthropology of the Second Teacher is more aristotelian, but his theory of knowledge is distinctly rooted in the interpretation of Alexander of Aphrodisias. This alexandrianism is clearly developed in the thought of the Second Teacher and implemented in its anthropology and eschatology. All the ennumerated elements of the al-Farabi thought create, according to him, a coherent system he calls a „harmonisation”. The aforementioned system has also a neo-platonic construction: it starts with the first cause and continues through emanation of subsequent hypostases to finally reach a lunar sphere in which compositions of matter and form create the world we know, of possible beings which remain constantly on the border of existence and non-existence. The culmination of this scheme and a specific reditio in it, is the postulate of moral perfection of man – „rational animal”– deriving directly from the Farabian noetics. A moment of conjunction with active intellect enables human being to continue to exist in the shape of immaterial detached intelligence (intellect) after disintegration of human vehicle of matter and form. Towards this goal citizens are to be guided by the perfect society described by al-Farabi as the state of virtue (the Perfect State).
Love-dilectio, which is the proper love of rational beings, is related in Thomas’s Aquinas texts to the problem of acts of will, which are analogical to feelings. Thomas call them affectiones. In this way, he distinguishes them from feelings – passiones – which are reactions of sensitive appetite to the image of sensitive good or evil. Affections are reactions of the will to the good or privation of the good, i.e. evil, intellectually grasped. However, in accordance with basic thesis of Thomas’s anthoplogy concerning spiritual and corporeal unity (both functional and structural) of personal human being, affectiones usually accompany passiones and – as it might seem – they carry with senses, or senses make the will follow the perceived good. Affections – in Thomas’s Aquinas – are simpler than feelings just like the will is simper appetitive power than senstivie appetite.
Ethics of person protection has been based on theory of person and emerging from it concept of personal relations. Thus, it should be recognized as personalistic ethics, if we understand personalism as a theory based on an account of a person. Such an ethics is an example of inferring conclusions from Thomistic metaphysics of person and human being – thus, it is Thomistic ethics par excellence. There could be question posed, in what extent proposed by Mieczysław Gogacz and his followers version of Thomistic ethics refers to classical Aristotelian and Thomistic eudaimonism? It seems that the core of the proposition relies on inferring conclusions from Thomas’ theory of love, in which love is the source of every human acts, is the principle of habituation and virtues as well as the most desired interpersonal relation. All these aspects Aquinas poses in his modifications of the Greek eudaimonism. For Thomas, the only good which results in happiness relies on relations with person – God or people. Mieczysław Gogacz continues this thread, but he does not concentrate only on problems of aims and happiness, because protection of person is an proper aim for him and protection is accomplished within relating with person through faith, hope and mainly love, and results in human happiness. We could therefore say, that ethics of protection of person is a modification of Aristotle’s ethics inasmuch as Thomism is modification of his metaphysics: Thomas Aquinas pays attention on the basic role of love in ethics and life, Mieczysław Gogacz has established love the basic pivot of his ethical and pedagogical theories.