Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

On Nonfoundational Reasoning

100%

Brożek B.

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

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2014

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nr 56

5-32

EN

The goal of the paper is to describe the role and structure of nonfoundational reasoning, i.e. a kind of argumentation that meets the revisability, the feedback, the background stability and the disputability conditions. I begin by observing that any nonfoundational reasoning has two components: the deductive and the hermeneutic. Next, against the background of Gadamer’s insightful, although somewhat vague, observations I attempt to uncover aspects of the hermeneutic component. I then proceed to reconstruct nonfoundational argumentation with the help of formal theory of belief revision, defeasible logic, and logical conception of coherence. Finally, I argue that nonfoundational reasoning is the backbone of both scientific endeavours and philosophical inquiry.

2

Legal Interpretation: Towards a New Paradigm?

100%

Brożek B.

Teoria Polityki

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2020

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tom 4

79-92

EN

This paper considers the foundations of legal interpretation against the background of the theory of embodied cognition and mental simulation. It is argued that interpretation has a double, concrete-abstract nature. The understanding of concrete language is made possible by the mechanism of mental simulation. In turn, the interpretation of abstract language (and hence of most of legal language) requires to apply the procedures of exemplification, paraphrase and embedding. The relationship between these two modes of language comprehension is analyzed and the thesis is defended that they represent two extremes of a continuous spectrum rather than isolated mechanisms. Finally, the significance of such a conception of interpretation for legal methodology is considered. It is argued that the conception provides a unifying, foundational framework for any theory of legal interpretation, as well as generates fresh insights into the nature of understanding legal statutes. cancelcancel

3

Language as a Tool. An Insight From Cognitive Science

63%

Brożek B. , Hohol M.

Studia Humana

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2015

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tom 4

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nr 2

16-25

EN

In this paper it has been argued that the theory of conceptual maps developed recently by Paul M. Churchland provides support for Wittgenstein’s claim that language is a tool for acting in the world. The role of language is to coordinate and shape the conceptual maps of the members of the given language community, reducing the cross-individual cognitive idiosyncrasies and paving the way for joint cognitive enterprises. Moreover, Churchland’s theory also explains our tendency to speak of language as consisting of concepts which correspond to things we encounter in the world. The puzzle of common sense reference is no longer a puzzle: while at the fundamental level language remains a tool for orchestrating conceptual maps, the fact that the maps encode some communally shared categorization of experience fuels our talk of concepts capturing the essences of things, natural kinds, prototypes, etc.

4

Podmiot matematyczny Hilberta

63%

Brożek B. , Olszewski A.

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

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2013

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nr 53

93-132

PL

The aim of this paper is threefold. First, on the basis of Gordan’s problem and Hilbert’s basis theorem we want to say a few words about the formation of Hilbert’s philosophy of mathematics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Second, we attempt to reconstruct Hilbert’s Program highlighting the role of reasoning which is not conducted within the axiomatic system. Third, we formulate and try to justify the claim that Hilbert’s Program assumes some metaphysics of the subject that – in general terms – is identical with Kant’s transcendental subject.

5

Some Remarks on Quine's Criterion

63%

Brożek B. , Olszewski A.

Filozofia Nauki

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2010

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tom 18

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nr 1

5-15

PL

The aim of the paper is to evaluate the usefulness of W.V.O. Quine's criterion for establishing the ontological commitments of a theory. At the outset, Quine's conception is reconstructed. It is argued that Quine does not provide a particularly clear exposition of the procedure of establishing ontological commitments. It is further maintained that - on a persuasive interpretation - one should distinguish several concepts associated with Quine's conception. These are: ontology, domain tolerated by an ontology, ontological commitments type 1 (categorical), ontological commitments type 2 (individual). Then, the procedure itself is reconstructed. It is argued that it consists of three stages: (1) the reduction of the analyzed theory to so-called basic existential propositions; (2) the paraphrase of the basic existential propositions into the formulae of the I order logic; (3) the reconstruction of the ontology presupposed by the given theory as well as of the ontological commitments type 1 and type 2. The final part of the paper contains three objections against Quine's conception. It is argued, first, that it is impossible to reconstruct the ontology presupposed by the given theory as it requires that the same or a richer ontology is already in use. Second, Quine's procedure is based on a vicious circle: one needs to know the ontological commitments in order to reconstruct them. Third, if one assumes that Quine's procedure is applicable to uninterpreted theories, it is impossible to determine the domain of these theories. The conclusion of the paper is that Quine's criterion seem useless.