Classic epistemology is under manifold changes; its categories loose their traditional meanings and gain new ones. Civilization and cultural changes, especially in mass communication and scientific knowledge, make impossible to insist on the concept of knowledge entirely as a true and justified belief. Traditional concepts of individual and subjectivistically conceived agent as well as concept of objects (areas and domains) of human knowledge are to much restrictive and at the same time controversial. Epistemological (pure philosophical) meaning of them is constantly confronted and changed by the scientific discoveries and definitions, coming especially from natural and social sciences (biology, neural sciences, psychology and social sciences). It is long-lasting and manifold process of naturalization that regards not only cognitive phenomena but epistemic categories and epistemological theories as well. The papers presents the concise model of the naturalized theory of human knowledge one can eliminate from different positions and theories. Today types of naturalized epistemology try to go beyond the strict and limited concept of naturalism (Quine’s naturalized epistemology) and go toward anti-scientific, more liberal understanding of it. Naturalizing epistemology opens, as it is argued in the paper, the new perspectives and prospects on human cognition and knowledge that are far from the classic concepts.
Introduction to thematic block edited by Marek Hetmański: "What Does it Mean that Science Seeks the Truth? A Debate on the Pragmatic Account of Scientific Truth".
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Wprowadzenie do bloku tematycznego pod redakcją Marka Hetmańskiego: "What Does it Mean that Science Seeks the Truth? A Debate on the Pragmatic Account of Scientific Truth".
The aim of the paper is to determine how metaphors tackle the probable nature of information and uncertainty in the structure of the communication process. Since the cognitive theory of conceptual metaphors holds that metaphoric thinking and doing are unavoidable, they are employed often in explaining the communicating domains. The metaphorical conceptualizing is recognized in Shannon and Weaver’s Mathematical Theory of Communication where such abstract concepts as freedom of choice, choosing probabilities (possibilities), and uncertainty ware conceived in that way. It is described in accord with Reddy’s conduit metaphor and Ritchie’s toolmakers paradigm. In the paper the issue of both the advantages and disadvantages of metaphors is considered: mainly, how they can explain and predict ways in which people communicate their expectations or uncertainties as well as, more practically, how the probable/informational metaphors enable the management of knowledge in libraries or databases.
The article is devoted the problem of artificial intelligence. The main thesis is that a computer is able to simulate some of human activity, e.g. cognitive activity, but a computer is not substitute for brain (or mind). It can never become an autonomous subject.
The paper analyzes the cognitive functions of metaphors present in both colloquial and scientific discourse. First, presented is the history of research into linguistic metaphors, followed by a discussion of the psycholinguistic turn towards metaphors as thought schemas (George Lakoff and Mark Johnson), as well as metaphoricality embodied in gestures, images and behaviors and their socio-cultural contexts. Based on the analysis of metaphors in the natural sciences, mainly in physics (Max Black, Mary Hesse, Thomas Kuhn) as well as in psychology (Douwe Draaisma), the heuristic and methodological functions of metaphors in science are discussed. Finally, on this basis, a general model of the cognitive functions of metaphor is constructed in which, apart from the cognitive communicative functions, emphasized are also the pragmatic aspects of metaphorical thinking.
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The article presents conceptions and theories of expert knowledge, as well as discussions on the epistemological status of expert knowledge, cognitive competences falling within the scope of expertise and expert authority. They are treated as a kind of extra-institutional knowledge, referring only to a small extent to the scientific knowledge and academic circles. The positions of Alvin Goldman, Harry Collins and R. Evans, Z. Majdik and W. Keith, T. Burge and J. Shanteau on the validity of expert knowledge and methods of its justification are presented. The paper points to the problematic nature and certain limitations of the traditional perspective on the credibility of expert knowledge and expert authority. On the example of the phenomenon of the autism spectrum and traditional judgments about it-in particular, expert opinions issued about people covered by it, as well as common opinions and stereotypes- the discussion on the changes taking place in this field of knowledge and social practice is presented. Conceptions of expertise by experience in the subject of autism are discussed, including the so-called self-advocacy and self-advocacy scientists. These new cognitive attitudes and social functions of autism spectrum experts are also analyzed from the point of view of the epistemological credibility of this type of knowledge and competence.
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W artykule przedstawione są koncepcje i teorie wiedzy eksperckiej, a także dyskusje nad epistemologicznym statusem wiedzy eksperckiej, kompetencji poznawczych wchodzących w zakres eksperckości oraz autorytetu eksperta. Są one traktowane jako rodzaj wiedzy pozainstytucjonalnej, tylko w niewielkim stopniu nawiązującej do wiedzy naukowej i akademickich środowisk. Zreferowane zostają stanowiska A. Goldmana, H. Collinsa i R. Evansa, Z. Majdika i W. Keitha, T. Burge’a oraz J. Shanteau w kwestii prawomocności wiedzy eksperckiej oraz sposobów jej uzasadniania. Wskazuje się na problematyczność i pewne ograniczenia tradycyjnych stanowisk w sprawie wiarygodności wiedzy eksperckiej i autorytetu eksperta. Na przykładzie zjawiska spektrum autyzmu i tradycyjnych sądów na jego temat – w szczególności ekspertyz wydawanych o osobach nim objętych oraz potocznych opinii i stereotypów – przedstawiona zostaje dyskusja nad zmianami zachodzącymi w tej dziedzinie wiedzy i społecznej praktyki. Omawiane są koncepcje eksperckości przez doświadczenie w temacie autyzmu, w tym również tzw. samorzecznictwa i samorzecznictwa-naukowców. Te nowe postawy poznawcze i społeczne funkcje ekspertów ds. spektrum autyzmu analizowane są również od strony epistemologicznej wiarygodności tego rodzaju wiedzy i kompetencji.
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