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1

Rational vs. Mystical Readings of Aristotle’s Nous Poietikos Introduction to the Subject and Overview of Central Positions

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Kamińska S.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2017

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tom 39

19-35

EN

In my paper, I will give an overview of the readings of nous poietikos, the active intellect from De Anima. Sadly, Aristotle describes it in a cryptic way, which resulted in many different theories. I will order them by introducing a division into “mystical” and “rational”. The mystical ones are rooted in a view that nous poietikos does not belong to particular human beings, but is identical with Deity or a divine sphere. According to the rational readings it is our cognitive tool and through its activity we can learn about the Deity and emulate it. The mystics are: Eudemus, Avicenna, Averroes, from the newer philosophers E. Zeller and from the contemporary ones – V. Caston. The rationalists are: Theophrastus, Thomas Aquinas, the XIXth century Aristotelian revival and from the contemporary thinkers – A. Kosman.

2

Philosopher’s Theoretical Life vs. Auto-deification? Possible readings of Aristotle’s “Nicomachean Ethics”, book X.

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Kamińska S.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2017

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tom 39

37-47

EN

This is a continuation of “Rational vs. Mystical Readings of Aristotle’s Nous Poietikos. Introduction to the Subject and Overview of Central Positions” where I gave a synopsis of the readings of nous poietikos. I ordered them by introducing a division into “mystical” and “rational”. The mystical ones are rooted in a view that nous poietikos does not belong to particular human beings, but is identical with Deity/divine sphere. According to the rational readings nous poietikos is our cognitive tool and through its activity we can learn about the Deity and emulate it. In this paper, I aim to check which of these models is better suited for Aristotle, in other words: would Aristotle approve of any of them? By comparing the ways of life appointed by them I wish to put theory into practice. In order to solve a mystery from De Anima, I refer to Nicomachean Ethics.

3

Franz Brentano and His Competing World Views. A Philosopher’s Choice between Science and Religion

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Kamińska S.

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nr 4

PL

There are two types of philosophy of mind in Brentano: (A) Aristotelian, and (B) genuinely Brentanian. The former (A) is to be found in the Aristotelica series; and by (B) I understand the content of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. The manuscripts for its unwritten parts and Brentano’s lectures on God and immortality of the soul surprisingly fall into A . These lines of thought are so different that it can be astonishing that they were authored by one person. In my paper I will try to show the roots of this dichotomy as well as to check whether there is a conflict between these theories, and, if so, whether they can be reconciled. These are not only two different philosophical theories, but at least one of them is a manifestation of a world view, and a key to it can be found in Brentano’s biography.

4

De Anima Arystotelesa oczami Franza Brentano. Budowa ludzkiej duszy na podstawie Die Psychologiedes Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom nous poietikos oraz w kontekście pozostałych prac ze zbioru Aristotelica

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Kamińska S.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2016

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tom 33

31-50

EN

This paper is a part of a project devoted to Brentano’s Aristotelian writings. I concentrate on his habilitation about Aristotle’s psychology, and especially on how he understood Aristotle’s division of mental life into three levels as well as the functions typical for these levels. I analyze two notions that Brentano introduces in his account: Zwischenglieder, meaning intermediary “levels” within the soul enabling smooth passages between the vegetative soul and sensory soul and between the latter and intellectual soul; and Gottverwandtschaft, i.e. human kinship with God, which is possible thanks to the noblest part of the soul. I also introduce two metaphors of the soul: cake-metaphor and fabric-metaphor.

5

The alleged activity of active intellect: A wild goose chase or a puzzle to be solved?

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Kamińska S.

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

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2014

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nr 54

79-126

EN

Trying to describe the activity of Aristotle’s active intellect, we will sooner or later realize that we cannot find its right description, because Aristotle did not provide for one. He left us with many irreconcilable statements and questions with no answers. In the famous text Aristotle’s Two Intellects: a Modest Proposal Victor Caston claims that Aristotle did not describe the activity, because there simply is no such activity and we should therefore identify nous poietikos with God, because God too does nothing. Trying to find this lacking description is like going on a wild goose chase – Caston argues. In my text I will show that his solution, albeit tempting, is in fact a kind of “dissolution” and that a wild goose chase, although for many doomed to failure, can be fruitful. I will do so by presenting three groups or clusters of views on active intellect which – I believe – are philosophically significant. Caston’s proposal will be one of them, but not the privileged one. These three types of interpretations will hopefully provide us with an imagery that will help us somewhat come to terms with Aristotle’s succinctness.

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Aristotelian Strands in Franz Brentano's Psychology and Philosophy of Mind

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Kamińska S.

Filozofia Nauki

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2016

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tom 24

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nr 1

101-122

PL

This paper revolves around some crucial Aristotelian traces in Franz Brentano's philosophy of mind and psychology. I describe the distinction between the intellectual soul understood, on the one hand, as a substratum for mental phenomena and, on the other, as a "stream" or "bundle" of mental phenomena. I take into consideration Brentano's opus magnum, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint as well as his Aristotelica series. I translate into Polish and analyse his notes for the unpublished parts of Psychology (Ps 62/54011-54012, Ps 50/52143-147) and give an account of what some Brentanian (Rollinger) and Aristotelian (Macfarlane and Polansky) scholars have to say about the ontological status of the intellectual soul.