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Dylematy moralne i logika deontyczna

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Drofiszyn M.

Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia

2019

tom 14

nr 3

125-132

In the paper I discuss an argument of deontic logic concerning the problem of the existence of moral dilemmas. First, I draw attention to the philosophical context of this argument and present three proofs which reveal an inconsistency in the nature of moral dilemmas. These proofs, however, are philosophically and logically controversial. Accordingly, I provide an alternative proof, based on the LP-system of deontic logic. The system is described from syntactic and semantic point of view. Assuming only the noncontroversial axiom K and a certain formulation of Elzenberg’s principle, I argue that, from the point of view of the LP-system, there is an inconsistency in the definition of moral dilemmas.

Formal Relations between Ought and Good: Some Reflections in the Margins of Henryk Elzenberg’s Works

100%

Drofiszyn M.

Filozofia Nauki

2020

tom 28

nr 4

5-23

The paper presents a relative preference semantics for multimodal logic of good and ought inspired by the axiological writings of Henryk Elzenberg. Its central concept is the act of preference between alternative possibilities performed by a metaempirical will, guided only by pure reasons. In semantics, the act of a metaempirical will is modeled using an orderly relation between possible worlds. Using this logic, I formalize some relationships between good and ought posited by Elzenberg.

Obowiązek oparty na preferencji

100%

Drofiszyn M.

Filozofia Nauki

2022

tom 30

nr 3

101-130

The paper presents a formalization of Henryk Elzenberg’s system of axiology, which features the notions of value, ought, and obligation. The formalization I propose is constructed in the language of sentential modal logic. However, as Elzenberg was well aware, his system of axiology had several difficulties. To avoid them, I propose a modification of the system’s foundations and show that it preserves the formal properties of ought and obligation postulated by Elzenberg. To show this, I express in the proposed formal language a certain theory of the logic of preference that I describe from the syntactical as well as the semantical point of view.

Zasada aglomeracji i dylematy moralne

100%

Drofiszyn M.

Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia

2019

tom 14

nr 4

89 - 104

Standard deontic logic does not tolerate normative conflicts. If we assume that one ought to do A and ought to do B, but cannot do them both, we get a contradiction within deontic logic. Philosophers who deny that there could be genuine moral dilemmas treat this fact as the proof that dilemmas are logically impossible. At the same time, the advocates of the possibility of moral dilemmas propose to reject or restrict standard deontic principles. What consequences does it have for the resulting logic? Some of them are too strong because they contain the theorem of normative triviality or “deontic explosion,” which says that if there is any case of normative conflict, then everything is obligatory. On the other hand, some of them are too weak, since they are not able to validate more important deontic inferences (especially the Smith Argument). Lou Goble introduces three criteria of adequacy that any deontic logic should meet if it is to accommodate normative conflicts successfully. First, I present these conditions and then I introduce a new logic of ought that fully meets all of them.