Humility is enjoying an upsurge of interest among contemporary virtue theorists. Unfortunately, many of these discussions have cast humility as inconsistent with social activism. Humility is assumed to consist of quiet and unobtrusive traits which seem inconsistent with the assertiveness and outspokenness required for social activism. Paul Bloomfield argues that this aspect of humility – being inconsistent with social activism – prevents it from counting as a virtue at all as a virtue must be the kind of thing that is always appropriate to possess and display. Here I attempt to present an account of humility that is not inconsistent with social activism and that can, and should, be considered a virtue where virtue is loosely understood to mean a generally desirable trait of character.
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