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Epistemological Foundationalism

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Chrudzimski A.

nr 2

77-94

Chisholm’s theory of knowledge is a classical formulation of the contemporary epistemological foundationalism. The theory consists of the formal part, where the hierarchy of the basic epistemic values is formulated and of the material part, containing the material rules that allow to correlate the epistemic values with the particular mental states.In the paper Chisholm’s hierarchy of the epistemic values and his material rules are discussed. Chisholm’s thesis of the priviledged access to the private mental states and the so called adverbial theory of sense data which is a characteristic feature of Chisholm’s approach are analyzed. His foundationalism proves to be an iterative foundationalism in Alston’s sense and his adverbial theory of the sense data allows toavoid some philosophical misconceptions.

Deskrypcje określone i przedmioty nieistniejące

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Chrudzimski A.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

2022

nr 4

191-211

According to the usual, simplified picture of the Meinong‑Russell controversy, Meinong’s semantics is structurally amazingly simple but ontologically very expensive, while Russell’s theory contains some counter‑intuitive syntactic complications, but to make up for this expense it releases us from almost all ontological troubles. Now the reality is much more complex. On the one hand it appears that the alleged ontological innocence of Russell’s solution has been highly exaggerated. In particular it assumes a Platonic ontology of universal properties. At the same time, if we look a bit closer, also Meinong’s theory turns out to be much more complicated than it looks at the first sight. It involves a hierarchy of objects exhibiting different degrees of completeness and in the later period of Meinong’s thought the structure of intentional reference takes a form very similar to that which has been proposed by Russell in his On Denoting.