Polish Code of Obligations which became binding law in 1934 has been called by Rannieri in 2009 the “first truly European codification of civil law”. This Code introduced to the Polish territories – in place of German, Austrian, French, Russian and Hungarian laws that were in force in different parts of the country – unified law of obligations. The method of comparative law was essential for the drafters of Polish Code of Obligations. Taking these facts into consideration two questions will be answered in the paper: - What does the experience of preparatory works of Polish Code of Obligations teach us about the method of comparative law; - How can this legal experience make Polish legal culture more attractive for the current European debate about the law of obligations. What is essential for this analysis is the rationale of the Code prepared by its main reporter in the Codifications Commission Roman Longchamps de Berier and foreign jurists opinions provoked by the promulgation of the Code ( e.g. Capitant, Mazeaud, Josserand). This paper focuses on three issues relevant for the method of comparative law on the basis of the rationale of the Code: relation between the method of comparative law and national identity of private law; the role of historical arguments for the method of comparative law and the impact of values on the method of comparative law. The successful unification of law of obligations in the interwar Poland and involving this experience in 20th century thirties into discussion about unification of private law in Slavonic countries can inspire modern legal debate in all these points. Firstly, the national identity of private law call for the distinguishing between national and international unification or modernization of the law of obligations. In the first case the identity of law is an argument supported the protection of interests of national economy. The best way for the international unification of law of obligations leads however through evolutionary growth of harmonization capability of national nation orders. Secondly, the role and style of historical arguments in the rationale of Polish Code of Obligations shows the weakness of the faith into the linear progress of law, argues for of the widening of historical reflection in the comparative debate beyond the codified law. Thirdly, the intuitive valuation is a natural feature of method of the comparative law. Reasonable choice of deeply analyzed local judicial practices supported by other historical arguments can make this method more transparent. The experience of Polish unification of the law of obligations, forgotten for decades, offers many specific solutions that clarify the three principles expressed above. By this reason the learning of this experience should be recommended as a good lecture for the participants of modern European debate about law of obligations.
The title of the paper is a paraphrase of Jhering’s sentence “Through the Roman law but above the Roman law”. Putting this statement into the context of Savigny’s and Windscheid’s opinions on the future role of the Roman law the author has explained the Jhering’s dictum as an expression of the realistic approach to the workability of the Roman law for the jurisprudence. Essential for bringing about the aforementioned workability is – according to the author – the link between Roman law and legal methods. In this perspective the author discussed waning authority of Roman law at the faculties of law and little success of recent proposals to bring Roman law and comparative law closer. The main message of the paper is that Roman law can be useful for modern jurisprudence if we revive the tie between Roman law and legal methods, a connection which, as it is submitted it may be reasonably argued, may be revived due to significant potential of comparative reasoning for judicial practice in the time of globalization. The crux of any formative steps to that end shall be forging changes in legal education, which predominant focus should be rested upon legal problems. Inasmuch as systematic digitalization of these problems, subject to initial detection and centuries-long discussion within the civil law tradition, and assimilation of modern judgments from different jurisdictions can be put together in a uniform database, these developments are capable of bringing this legal experience closer to the practical legal debates.
The Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education made public a new evaluation of legal journals at the end of 2015. How much algorithmic and quantitative criteria of the evaluation are relevant to what is expected from legal journals? The answer could be tendered only by a resolution of the dispute on the essence of law. In order to start with the general criteria concerning the evaluation of legal science, the authors focus on two issues. They present how productive the tradition of Roman law is as against contemporary continental legal systems, and how autonomy and pragmatism dominated the development of the tradition of American common law. They prove how irrelevant declarations of journals founders are to the actual discussion in the journals: they are never to be an instrument of research policy as observed in longer periods of time. Bibliometric success of American journals, e.g. “Harvard Law Review” and “Yale Law Journal”, proves that the autonomy of legal science always prevails over dreams of treating legal journals in a purely instrumental way. The conclusions concentrate on how the journals make participants of disputes on the essence of law moderate and better instructed. The article is written for the fifth anniversary of “Forum Prawnicze”.
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