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Sú fyzické indivíduá kontingentné entity?

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Cmorej P.

nr 6

883-899

In his article “An Approach to Intensional Analysis” (published in Noûs 1971), Pavel Tichý defended the view that individuals in the universe of discourse should be testable physical objects and all possible worlds should have the same universe of discourse. This entails that physical individuals are necessary entities and in the case of temporal worlds it entails the conclusion that they are eternal entities. In this article the reasons leading P. Tichý to this view are analysed, and the conclusion is reached that his argumentation holds only in a narrower sense of existence test.

OD DESKRIPCII K ICH REFERENTOM

100%

Cmorej P.

tom 68

nr 10

825 – 848

The paper deals with the logical analysis of empirical descriptions from the perspective of temporal modal semantics. After general introductory remarks concerning the structure of descriptions and temporally conceived possible worlds, the author’s attention turns to the reference of descriptions and the properties ascribed to individuals by descriptions. A reference is an empirical relation between a description (ιx)Φ(x) and its referent relative to possible world w and time t. A description (ιx)Φ(x) refers to an object O in world w at time t (at world-time couple (w, t)) if O has the property (λx)Φ(x) at (w, t). The core of the article is investigating non-standard descriptions containing the so-called closure. The purpose of the closure is restricting the set of properties ascribed to an individual by description either to those that are explicitly ascribed or to those that are entailed by explicitly ascribed ones. It is argued that if a description (ιx)Φ(x) refers to an individual O at (w, t) then (ιx)(Φ(x)  Cl(x)), where Cl(x) is a closure, cannot have a referent. It is suggested that the closure descriptions can be used in the analysis of Meinongian and fictitious objects.

Ideálne jazykové znaky a ich fyzické realizácie

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Cmorej P.

nr 1

57-74

The article is a reaction to the criticism of the conception of ideal and physical sings (types and tokens) presented in the author's bookÚvod do logickej syntaxe a sémantiky(2001). This conception was severely criticized in the paper by K. Sekvent (2006) who rejected it as "theoretically and methodologically inappropriate". The author tries to show that there is no inconsistency in the criticized conception and that Sekvent misconceived the basic ideas of it.

MOŽNÉ INDIVÍDUÁ A POSIBÍLIE (I)

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Cmorej P.

nr 8

585 – 600

The present paper offers (i) a logic-semantic analysis of sentences of the form „(ιx)Φ(x) is C“, where C stands for „possible“ (LP) or „merely possible“ (MP) or „really possible“ (Re) or „impossible“ (NP) and (ii) an explication of intuitive meanings of these expressions using modal temporal semantics. The crucial question concerning this analysis runs: What are the items to which modality C is attributed in these sentences? Is it an individual that is the referent of the description „(ιx)Φ(x)“ or an intension generated by the meaning of the description or the meaning of the description itself? It is argued that the most suitable response is the last one. Unlike some other positions, the present view has it that possibilia are not individuals but meanings of individual descriptions that have referents only at world-time couples where w is not the actual world. Being a possibilium amounts to being the meaning of a description having the property MP that is defined as follows: (ιx)Φ(x) is MP if (ιx)Φ(x) is possible, but there is not exactly one individual having the property (λx)Φ(x) at some world-time couple where a w is the actual world. Apart from the concept of possibilium, another concept of semipossibilium (SP) is introduced namely the meaning of a description which except some referents in the actual world has also at least one referential pause in this world. The first part introduces (i) the notions of semantic reference and user’s intentional reference, (ii) the difference between the actual world and the real world and (iii) the definitions of LP, MP, Re and NP modalities. The second part tries to answer the question whether the intension or meaning of a description is a suitable subject of predication in sentences which have the form „(ιx)Φ(x) is C“. The rest of this part deals with possibilia and semipossibilia.