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1

Materia pierwsza substancji materialnych

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Smolak M.

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nr 2

57-81

EN

The present article attempts to explain what Aristotle’s prime matter of the material substances is. On the basis of the analysis several parts chosen from Metaphysics, Physics, On the Generation of Animals and On the Generation and Corruption the author comes to the conclusion that the prime matter in the sense of the universal material is the abstract. However, the analogue of the prime matter in ontological order is the proper (oikeia) matter of the particular material substance that is the proximate (engytaton) material cause of such substance. An example of such a matter is the bronze. But not any bronze is the analogue of the prime matter, but only that which actually manifests potentiality as potentiality that is the bronze which participates in the process of casting and forming of the particular bronze substance, e.g. the statue of the Discobolus. Therefore, in the first place among the material principles Aristotle does not mention the prime matter in the sense of the universal material opened to the generation of any body falling under the senses, but the body falling under the senses in the mode of the potentiality.

2

O sprawcy działania i odpowiedzialnym działaniu u Arystotelesa

100%

Smolak M.

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tom 38

67-88

EN

At EN III.1 1109b31-32 Aristotle says we praise and censure voluntary actions and we feel sympathy for involuntary actions, and sometimes even pity. Next he examines which actions are voluntary and involuntary. This examination is connected with determination of the conditions under which the person is auctor agendi and thus can respond for the action. But it is not right to say, when somebody is auctor agendi his action is responsible. Hence, to answer to the question which action is responsible action in Aristotle, the author considers the issue in two stages. The first stage is devoted to clarification what does it mean to be the agent of action. The second stage gives the explanation of what does it mean “to decide for the action accordance with virtue because of it”. As the result, the author demonstrates that the responsible action is taken on the basis of decision and for the sake of fine. He shows such action is fine because: a) the realized end is fine; b) it is choiceworthy in itself; c) the motive of the agent is the fine.

3

Good, Pleasure and Types of Friendships in Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics

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Smolak M.

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tom 7

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nr 1

183-204

EN

In EE H 2 Aristotle presents a typology of friendship starting from the puzzle whether the good or the pleasure is the object of love. But after indicating the reasons for loving and identifying three types of friendships he raises three important questions (1237a19–21): (1) whether there is any friendship without pleasure; (2) how the hedonical friendship differs from the ethically friendship; (3) on which of the two things the loving depends: do we love somebody because he is good, even if he is not pleasant, at any rate not for his pleasantness? The present article attempts to give answers to questions 1–3 and show that despite the coincidence of good and pleasure and the important role of pleasure in the hedonical and ethical friendship the typology does not lose its validity.

PL

In EE H 2 Aristotle presents a typology of friendship starting from the puzzle whether the good or the pleasure is the object of love. But after indicating the reasons for loving and identifying three types of friendships he raises three important questions (1237a19–21): (1) whether there is any friendship without pleasure; (2) how the hedonical friendship differs from the ethically friendship; (3) on which of the two things the loving depends: do we love somebody because he is good, even if he is not pleasant, at any rate not for his pleasantness? The present article attempts to give answers to questions 1–3 and show that despite the coincidence of good and pleasure and the important role of pleasure in the hedonical and ethical friendship the typology does not lose its validity

4

O odpowiedzialności materialnej u Arystotelesa

100%

Smolak M.

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tom 41

43-57

EN

It may seem that Aristotle considers the problem of responsibility from perspective of formal responsibility. It should, however, to bear in mind that practical philosophy of Aristotle has teleological dimension. The human being has the task to do which consist of fulfill the proper function of the man. Thus, he is responsible for entrusted role. In this sense, material responsibility is also present in ethical considerations of Aristotle. The article is devoted to demonstrating that talking about material responsibility in Aristotle is not unfounded.