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nr 1
79-94
EN
The paper considers the issue of constitutional and conventional sources of one of the objectives in criminal proceedings, namely taking into account the legally protected interests of the victim (injured party). The author defines the notion of legally protected interests of the victim and distinguishes substantive-law and procedural interests. Both have constitutional and conventional sources as proven by the analysis of the European Court of Human Rights and the Polish Constitutional Tribunal case law. Effective protection of human rights and freedoms requires establishing provisions of substantive law, including criminal law, while their implementation should be guaranteed by introducing appropriate procedural mechanisms, in particular the victim’s right to court, including the right to a fair trial. The conclusion was therefore that the objective of criminal proceedings indicated in Article 2 § 1 para. 3 CPC is constitutionally and conventionally defined.
PL
W artykule rozważono zagadnienie istnienia konstytucyjnych i konwencyjnych źródeł celu procesu karnego w postaci uwzględnienia prawnie chronionych interesów pokrzywdzonego. Zdefiniowano pojęcie prawnie chronionych interesów pokrzywdzonego oraz wyróżniono interesy o charakterze materialnoprawnym i procesowym. Jedne i drugie mają źródła konstytucyjne i konwencyjne, co wynika z przeprowadzonej analizy orzecznictwa Trybunału Konstytucyjnego i Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka. Efektywna ochrona praw i wolności jednostki wymaga bowiem ustanowienia norm prawa materialnego, w tym karnego, a z kolei ich realizacja winna być zagwarantowana wprowadzeniem odpowiednich mechanizmów proceduralnych, w szczególności prawa pokrzywdzonego do sądu, w tym do sprawiedliwości proceduralnej. W konkluzji stwierdzono zatem, że cel procesu karnego wskazany w art. 2 § 1 pkt 3 k.p.k. jest konstytucyjnie i konwencyjnie określony
EN
The article discusses the regulation of identity checks in Poland and their practice. First, the article examines the constitutional and international law standards concerning identity checks. It is followed by the analysis of statutory and sub-statutory regulations relating to identifying a person focusing on conditions under which ID checks may be undertaken, agencies authorized to carry on the ID checks and the ways in which it must be carried on. The study underlines the important role of the case law in shaping the boundaries of the legality of ID checks. It is emphasised by the courts that the citizen’s duty to show their ID is predetermined by conducting a proper procedure by police officers, as well as by the existence of sufficient legal and factual grounds for checking one’s identity. The criteria of distinguishing between an ID check and a stop and arrest were also developed in the case law. In conclusions, it was pointed out that at the constitutional and international level there are no specific provisions relating to the identity checks. However, the Constitution of the Republic of Poland requires statutory regulation of the prerequisites and key issues of the procedure for carrying out an ID check. Analysis of the statutory regulation leads to the conclusion that the former element has not been met. The courts try to fill this with their case law, clearly indicating that and ID check may only be conducted if justified by sufficient legal and factual grounds. Nevertheless, the legislator’s intervention would be desirable. The authors also draw attention to the fact that the courts present a strict and well-grounded approach towards the distinction between identifying documents and detaining. The criterion in this case is not the purpose of the activities undertaken by the authorized body, but the degree and duration of the interference with the rights of the individual.
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