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1
Content available O lukach w prawie rzadko spotykanych słów kilka
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tom 1(6)
109-122
PL
The article addresses the issue of legal gaps (lacunas). Specifically, the author puts forward the general definition of legal gap which uses the concept of ‘automatically applicable’ legal rule as well as presupposes specific understanding of law – namely, that it is consisted solely of the rules of the mentioned type. Next, basing upon that definition, he defines three kinds of lacunas that are commonly distinguished in Polish and international scholarly literature, i.e. extra, intra and contra legem. As it is demonstrated, the merits of proffered definitions are manifold. First of all, they reduce the dependence of the notion of legal gap on value judgment. Secondly, they fairly well fit into the structure of contemporary legal orders. Thirdly, owing to them, the filling of legal gaps is not pointless. And lastly, the other kinds of lacunas one may encounter in academic literature are not at odds with the proffered theory, at least not by definition. At the end of the article, in the light of the main idea of the author’s conception, the Anglo -Saxon notion of the case of first impression is discussed, taking into account different models of (approaches to) the phenomenon of a binding judicial precedent.
2
Content available Rola i etyka prawnika u Karla Nickersona Llewellyna
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PL
Poza krótkim wprowadzeniem na temat filozofii prawa, jaką jest amerykański realizm prawny, w pracy zostały przedstawione rola i etyka prawnika w ujęciu Karla Nickersona Llewellyna. Poglądy tego amerykańskiego realisty prawnego opatrzone są komentarzem autora wraz z próbą ich przeniesienia na grunt polski. Przy tym szczególnie osobliwe jest to, iż zgodnie z obowiązującym w Polsce prawem prawnik nie ma możliwości odmowy podjęcia się obrony sprawy, w której słuszność nie wierzy. Prawo każdego człowieka do uczciwego procesu wydaje się tutaj mieć bezwzględne pierwszeństwo nad tym, co adwokatom i radcom prawnym dyktuje sumienie i to nawet przy założeniu, że w praktyce będzie się to czasem odbywało kosztem tego, iż poszczególne sprawy, z powodu braku wiary w ich słuszność, będą prowadzone przez pełnomocników procesowych w sposób nie do końca optymalny.
EN
Apart from a short introduction to the movement known as American Legal Realism, this paper describes the role and ethics of the lawyer as viewed by Karl Nickerson Llewellyn. The author invokes some of Llewellyn’s outlooks and comments upon them, revealing their timeless character and highlighting the pertinent Polish peculiarities. Some of these peculiarities may seem slightly astonishing, particularly the lack in Poland of the ethical principle which prescribes that a lawyer should believe in his or her client’s case. According to Polish law, the principle that everyone should be assured a fair trial (hearing) appears to be second to none and someone’s conscience is no argument against denying the defense of a case that seems unworthy of being won.
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2012
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nr 1 (190)
57-67
EN
The article addresses the issue of the concept of the non-conformity of the product with the contract in the context of consumer sale. Specifically, it brings up the question whether the directive no. 1999/44/WE and the Polish statutes regarding consumer sale introduce the strict definition or the rebuttable presumption of the conformity of the product with the contract. That question is of paramount importance since the definition means here that in the circumstances outlined in the directive/statute acquired goods are in conformity with the contract and the consumer cannot prove the contrary. The presumption, in turn, is tantamount to the assertion that the occurrence of these circumstances indicates the state of the conformity with the contract, but not in the definite way. That is, the interested party may nonetheless make an effort to establish that the product does not conform to the contract. Despite the clear meaning of the pertinent provisions of the statute and directive, most of Polish scholars maintain that, in consumer sale, we deal with the definition of the non-conformity of the product with the contract. The Author strongly disagrees with them, arguing for the concept of the rebuttable presumption. However, according to him, due to the need of legal certainty and efficacy, the rebuttal should be possible here only in exceptional cases. Incidentally, the same concerns the proving of the conformity of contract when not all of the circumstances mentioned in the presumption are present.
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2016
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tom 2(13)
5-13
EN
In this paper, the author has undertaken an attempt to adjust Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s conception of analogy to the province of law. He thus sketches out a pertinent scheme of legal analogy based upon the similarity of proportions and indulges in a consideration of the merits and demerits of such a proposition. To this aim, as the proportions that are compared in such an account of analogy, the relations between the facts of the cases and their legal outcomes were chosen: one such outcome already known and one tentatively posited. Finally, however, the author’s analyses lead to the conclusion that despite its considerable theoretical attractiveness and some mystical charm, legal analogy consisting of the comparison of two proportions is either quite similar to orthodox approaches to analogical reasoning in law or too obscure for one to employ it credibly in the legal setting. In consequence, until its proponents have elucidated the workings of proportional analogy in more detail, the potential use of such a form of analogy in the province of law does not seem promising and cannot be recommended.
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