Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Fenomenologia innego. Paul Ricœur i Emmanuel Lévinas wobec ontologii całości

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Warmbier A.

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2018

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tom 48

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nr 2

EN

The aim of this paper is to present Ricœur’s and Lévinas’s approach to the concept of selfhood (French soi) as a response to the dispute over subjectivity which was initiated by the critics of modern tradition of the absolutization of Cartesian cogito. The debate on the notion of selfhood has not been closed yet. The author analyses two different approaches to the problem. One appeals to the Hegelian dialectic, adjusting it to the formula “oneself as another” (discounting that part of the dialectical movement in which Hegel jumps to a vision of absolute knowledge). The other refers to the category of substitution. Both Ricœur and Lévinas point to the Platonic opposition of the notions of “the Same” and “the Other.” Ricœur’s initial claim breaks with the established language of ontology. Moving beyond the circle of sameness-identity towards the dialectic of sameness- and selfhood-identity entails the transformation of the notion of otherness: it is no longer an antonym of “same,” but it is a kind of otherness that is constitutive of selfhood.

PL

Artykuł ten jest próbą krytycznego omówienia sporu Ricœura z Lévinasem dotyczącego rozumienia etyki, ściśle rzecz biorąc koncepcji „podmiotu” etycznego. Wychodząc od przeprowadzonej przez obu filozofów krytyki nowożytnej absolutyzacji cogito, poddaję analizie rozwijane przez Ricœura dialektyczne ujęcie podmiotu (fr. soi) wyrażonego w formule „ten-który-jest-sobą-samym-jak-i-innym” oraz opisany przez Lévinasa fenomen „radykalnej inności”. Następnie staram się odpowiedzieć na pytanie, czy możliwe jest intelektualne porozumienie między Ricœurem i Lévinasem, polegające na wyznaczeniu wspólnego horyzontu dla koncepcji podmiotu otwartej dialektyki i podmiotu ukonstytuowanego przez źródłowe „wyznaczenie” do odpowiedzialności, w granicach którego można mówić o fenomenologii siebie, tj. fenomenologii podmiotu, który rozpoznaje się dzięki innemu niż on sam.

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Phenomenology of the Other. Paul Ricœur and Emmanuel Lévinas’ attitude towards the ontology of Totality

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Warmbier A.

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tom 54

29-49

EN

The aim of this paper is to present Ricœur’s and Lé vinas’s approach to the concept of selfhood (French soi) as a response to the dispute over subjectivity which was initiated by the critics of modern tradition of the absolutization of Cartesian cogito. The debate on the notion of selfhood has not been closed yet. The author analyses two diff erent approaches to the problem. One appeals to the Hegelian dialectic, adjusting it to the formula “oneself as another” (discounting that part of the dialectical movement in which Hegel jumps to a vision of absolute knowledge). The other refers to the category of substitution. Both Ricœur and Lé vinas point to the Platonic opposition of the notions of “the Same” and “the Other.” Ricœur’s initial claim breaks with the established language of ontology. Moving beyond the circle of sameness-identity towards the dialectic of sameness- and selfhood-identity entails the transformation of the notion of otherness: it is no longer an antonym of “same,” but it is a kind of otherness that is constitutive of selfhood.

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Refleksja jako źródło autorytetu. Podmiotowość moralna w świetle argumentu konstytutywizmu Korsgaard

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Warmbier A.

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nr 2

373-392

EN

The authority of reflection. Moral agency in the light of Korsgaard’s constitutive arguments: In this paper I address the question as to whether Christine Korsgaard’s account of normative relations between the moral agent and the ends of her actions which constitutes her practical identity avoids falling into the trap of being just another abstract theory in moral philosophy. Proponents of constitutive arguments for the normative authority of reasons for action offer a promising approach to this meta‐ethical question by arguing that the normative authority of reasons is found within the practice of reasoning itself (in agency itself). In two constitutive arguments for the normativity of rational requirements, Korsgaard attempts first to argue that “the normative question” does not consist in looking merely for an explanation of moral practices but in asking “What justifies the claims that morality makes on us?”, and secondly to establish that the reason why ethical standards make claims on us is that they represent commands which are constitutive of having a self (the cost of violating ethical standards is the loss of practical identity). Korsgaard deals with these two arguments using her own modified version of the reflective endorsement method. She claims that the reflective structure of human consciousness establishes the normative relation we have to ourselves and that this is a relation of authority (that is the source of obligation). I argue that Korsgaard’s account of action as self‐constitution (the constitution of a practical sense of identity) fails to arrive at establishing the authority of reflection. I draw on the discussed claim that reasoned authority for our actions comes from reflective scrutiny (the test of reflection). Viewing the Kantian model of practical reason which lies at the basis of Korsgaard’s approach, I suggest the possibility of applying the Aristotelian model of practical reason as an useful framework for the reflective endorsement strategy.

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Moral Perfection and the Demand for Human Enhancement

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Warmbier A.

Ethics in Progress

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2015

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tom 6

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nr 1

23-37

EN

In this article I discuss one of the most significant areas of bioethical interest, which is the problem of moral enhancement. Since I claim that the crucial issue in the current debate on human bioenhancement is the problem of agency, I bring out and examine the conditions of possibility of selfunderstanding, acting subjects attributing responsible authorship for their actions to themselves. I shall argue that the very idea of moral enhancement, properly understood, fails to justify the claims that enhancing the “biological” factor that plays a part in the process of making moral choices, whether through biomedical or genetic interventions, will actually increase the probability of having “morally better future motives”.

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Preface

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Soniewicka M. , Warmbier A.

Ethics in Progress

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2015

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tom 6

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nr 1

6-11

EN

The hereby introduction gives an insight into the topics and themes discussed in the hereby presented issue of the journal Ethics in Progress, devoted to the topic of transhumanism in its numerous contexts.