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PL
The Dispute about Trieste in Polish-Italian Relations in 1945–1947The recognition of Poland as a signatory of the peace treaty signed with the satellite states of the Third Reich was the reason why Warsaw became a member of a political-territorial and economic commission dealing with Italy at the Paris conference (29 July–15 October 1946). Hence, i.a. the efforts made in Rome involving Poland and its support for Italian postulates concerning a priority question, i.e. the administration of Trieste by Italy. Despite promises of backing the Italian proposals, Polish diplomacy, embroiled in the games played by the Kremlin with the great powers, was compelled to withdraw and in the course of preparations for the Paris conference and subsequently in its course it assumed a stand favourable towards Yugoslavia. The dependence of Polish diplomacy on Moscow and the subjugation of Italian policies to Washington meant that Cold War relations between Rome and Warsaw were of secondary importance for both countries.
EN
The fact that Polish People’s Republic belonged to the Communist Bloc and was subordinated to Kremlin caused that initiatives taken by the Polish diplomacy had to be approved and coordinated by Moscow, and the changing and usually narrow field of activity did not leave much space for independence. An example of this was the attempt at starting cooperation between Poland (a member of the International Control Commission) and the Republic of Italy aimed at ending the Vietnam war in the years 1965–1967. Mutual diplomatic and political contacts between Warsaw and Rome were to enable Polish-Italian mediation between USA and Democratic Republic of Vietnam that could end the long-lasting Vietnam conflict. The lack of good will of both sides of the conflict as well as the lack of approval for the Polish-Italian initiative in this matter doomed it to failure despite the involvement of the politicians of PPR and Italy.
RU
Вхождение Польской Народной Республики в социалистический лагерь и ее подчинение Кремлю привело к тому, что инициативы, предпринятые польской дипломатией, должны были быть согласованы с Москвой и координированы ею, а нестабильное и, как правило, узкое поле деятельности не оставляло места самостоятельности. Примером тому была попытка наладить сотрудничество между Польшей (членом Межсоюзнической надзорной и контрольной комиссии) и Итальянской республикой с целью завершения вьетнамской войны в 1965–1967 гг. Взаимные дипломатические и политические отношения между Варшавой и Римом должны были обеспечить итальянско-польское посредничество между США и Демократической Республикой Вьетнам, которое должно было завершить многолетний вьетнамский конфликт. Из-за отсутствия доброй воли со стороны обеих сторон конфликта и отсутствия одобрения польско-итальянской инициативы в этом вопросе ситуация была обречена на поражение, несмотря на вовлеченность политиков ПНР и Италии.
PL
Przynależność PRL do obozu socjalistycznego oraz podporządkowanie Kremlowi sprawiły, iż inicjatywy podejmowane przez polską dyplomację musiały być uzgadniane i koordynowane z Moskwą, a zmienny i na ogół wąski margines działania nie pozostawiał wiele miejsca na samodzielność. Przykładem tego była próba nawiązania współpracy między Polską (członkiem Międzynarodowej Komisji Nadzoru i Kontroli) a Republiką Włoską w celu zakończenia wojny wietnamskiej w latach 1965–1967. Wzajemne kontakty dyplomatyczne i polityczne między Warszawą a Rzymem miały umożliwić włosko-polskie pośrednictwo między USA i DRW, które zakończyłoby długoletni konflikt wietnamski. Brak dobrej woli obydwu stron konfliktu oraz brak akceptacji dla polsko-włoskiej inicjatywy w tej kwestii skazały ją na fiasko mimo zaangażowania polityków PRL oraz Włoch.
PL
Apogeum zimnej wojny w Europie początków lat 50. XX wieku objawiało się nie tylko zamrożeniem kontaktów politycznych i gospodarczych między krajami pozostającymi po obu stronach „żelaznej kurtyny”. Oznaczało ono również konfrontację obejmującą relacje na polu kultury, która coraz częściej była podporządkowana „wielkiej polityce”. Epizodem tej zimnej wojny jest sprawa wystawy „Al di là”, otwartej w 1953 r. we Włoszech i wzbudzającej kontrowersje nie tylko w polityce wewnętrznej tego kraju, jak też w stosunkach Rzymu z krajami bloku wschodniego, w tym z Polską. Niniejszy artykuł skupia się na tych wewnątrz włoskich kontekstach oraz na roli wystawy w relacjach polsko-włoskich. 
EN
The climax of the Cold War in Europe at the beginning of the 1950s was manifested by more than just the suspension of political and economic contacts between countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain. It also involved a confrontation in the field of culture, which was increasingly subordinated to “great politics.” One of the incidents of this cold war was the exhibition “Al di là,” which opened in Italy in 1953 and brought controversy not only to the country’s internal politics, but also to Rome’s relations with the countries of the Eastern Bloc, including Poland. The present article focuses on these internal Italian contexts and the role of the exhibition in Polish-Italian relations.
4
Content available Polsko-belgijska „wojna” o Kongo (1960–1963)
100%
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2019
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nr 17
PL
W artykule przedstawiono relacje polsko-belgijskie w latach 1960–1963 wpisujące się w zimnowojenne zmagania między dwoma blokami. Na kontaktach między Warszawą a Brukselą w tym okresie zdecydowanie zaważył największy powojenny konflikt na kontynencie afrykańskim, jakim była „wojna o Kongo”. Rozgorzała ona po zrzuceniu belgijskiego jarzma kolonialnego i ogłoszeniu formalnej niepodległości (30 czerwca 1960 r.) przez ten kraj. Poparcie polityczne udzielane przez ZSRR i inne kraje obozu (w tym PRL) nacjonaliście Patrice’owi Lumumbie, a po jego śmierci jego komunistycznym poplecznikom, zaopatrywanym w przemycaną przez te państwa broń, doprowadziło nie tylko do wzmożenia wojny domowej w Kongu, ale też przyczyniło się do pogorszenia atmosfery na arenie międzynarodowej. Jej efektem był m.in. impas w relacjach polsko-belgijskich i praktyczne zamrożenie kontaktów nie tylko politycznych, ale gospodarczych i kulturalnych, trwające aż do roku 1963.
EN
The article presents the Polish-Belgian relations in 1960–1963 being part of the Cold War struggle between the two blocks. The contacts between Warsaw and Brussels in this period were definitely influenced by the largest post-war conflict on the African continent, which was the “war for Congo” which broke out after the fall of the Belgian colonial yoke and the declaration of formal independence (30 June 1960) by this country. Political support provided by the USSR and other countries of the communist block (including the Polish People’s Republic) for nationalist Patrice Lumumba, and after his death for his communist henchmen who were supplied with weapons smuggled through the camp countries, not only intensified the civil war in Congo, but also contributed to deterioration of international relations. Its effect was, among others, the deadlock in Polish-Belgian relations and the practical freezing of not only political but economic and cultural contacts lasting until 1963.
PL
The article is an analysis of the attitude within the circles of the Italian Republic to Poland’s disarmament plans in 1958–69, that is the Rapacki Plan (1958) and the Gomułka Plan (1963). Drawing on Italian documents the author examines the attitude of the Italian government to these proposals. She presents the determinants and contexts of both proposals (the bipolar division of the world during the Cold War, Italy’s membership of NATO and subordination to Washington’s policy, the country’s economic and financial problems). The article also contains opinions on Moscow’s role in and attitude towards the Polish peace initiatives.
6
63%
EN
The outline is based mainly on source materials earlier unused by researchers, stored in central archives in Warsaw: Archives of New Records (units of the Committee of Cultural Co-operation with Abroad of the Ministry of Higher Education) and the Archives of the Foreign Ministry, as well as in Rome: Ministero degli Affari Esteri. The outline presents how the ease in tension in East-West relations, resulted from the political "thaw" in the Soviet Union, influenced renewing cultural and scientific relations between Poland and Italy, broken before because of Cold War confrontation. Important elements of this process were: invitations to perform lectures for prominent Polish scientists, mathematicians, Professors: Kazimierz Kuratowski and Wacław Sierpiński and physicist - Prof. Leopold Infeld (1955). At the end of 1955 Prof. Kazimierz Wyka went to Italy and established contacts with Italian Slavists and specialists in Polish studies. In fine arts, the exhibition of Canaletto and Aleksander Gierymski, organized in Venice in September that year, assumed paramount importance. After a long break delegations of Polish musicians and architects went to Italy. First delegations of Italian Slavists arrived in Poland. An important effect of this revival in mutual relations was activation of the Station of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Rome and its library, the merit of its head since 1956, Prof. Bronisław Biliński. Roman Station started organising lectures of distinguished Polish scientists already in 1957, issued its own publishing series, considerably increased its library. Polish scientists, mainly lawyers and philologists, went on training and received grants in Italy. Italian officials, as opposed to the French, did not attach much importance to cultural and scientific relations with Poland. That is why until the end of the analysed period no convention was signed, although the Polish side was quite concerned about it.
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2023
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nr 20
43-80
EN
The article presents the results of research into Polish-Belgian relations between 1948 and 1956, based primarily on documents found in the archives of both countries. The study aimed to answer the following questions: What was the shape of mutual relations during the apogee of the Cold War (1948–1952) and the period of limited liberalisation in international relations between 1953 and 1956; Can it be proved that there were any important changes in relations between Warsaw and Brussels during these years?
PL
Artykuł przedstawia wyniki badań nad stosunkami polsko-belgijskimi w latach 1948–1956. Został oparty przede wszystkim o dokumenty odnalezione w archiwach obu krajów. Celem badawczym była odpowiedź na pytania: jak kształtowały się wzajemne relacje w okresie apogeum zimnej wojny (1948–1952) i w okresie ograniczonej liberalizacji w stosunkach międzynarodowych lat 1953–1956 oraz czy można udowodnić, że w relacjach Warszawy i Brukseli nastąpiły w tych latach jakieś istotne zmiany.
EN
The sketch is an attempt to present the main financial problems in the Polish-Italian relations from 1945 to 1956. It is based primarily on sources stored in Central Archives of Modern Records and Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw. The study showed that the main purpose of the Polish authorities was to avoid having to pay the pre-war debts to Italy, and compensation resulting from the adoption of the law on nationalization of industry, from 3 January 1946. For this purpose it was intended to take advantage of the provisions of a peace treaty with Italy, which was ratified by Poland in 1947. Polish-Italian talks on this subject led to a compromise: The Geneva Protocol was initialed on June 3, 1949, in which the Italian government renounced the pre-war debts in exchange for the surrender of the Polish government’s war reparations from Italy. As a result of the increased tension in the international situation, the protocol does not come into force, which increased the difficulties in Polish-Italian trade cooperation.
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