The paper is an attempt to draw attention to some of the most important aspects of the problem of terrorist crimes, a problem that is complex both in criminological sense and in terms of the legal dogma. The starting point for the reflections in Part I of the article is a historical analysis of the origins and evolution of the dogmatic and normative perception of and approach to the concept of terrorist crime — beginning with the legislation of the interwar period, through post-war provisions and ending with the regulations of the 1969 Criminal Code. The Central question of this part is an analysis of the normative form of the terrorist crime construct under Article 115 § 20 of the Criminal Code, its legal nature as well as consequences of the application of the analysed norms. The reflection of Part II of the paper encompasses issues concerning the consequences of a terrorist crime in terms of statutory and judicial penalties as well as other penal measures. In this part the author analyses, in particular, the question of extraordinary enhancement of punishment for terrorist crimes, including doubts that can be aroused in practice by the regulations concerning punishment progression applied to terrorists as well as the possibility and rules of applying other measures having an impact on the legal situation of the perpetrators of terrorist crimes.
The article considers the problem of punishment for the series of crimes. It raises the legal character of the rule of tightening the criminal responsibility as a consequence of committing crimes remaining in a confl uence of events connected with the buckle of continuity. The main doubt accompanying such evaluation is connected with the answer to the question if the legal eff ects within the scope of punishment resulting from the art. 91 § 1 of the Penal Code express ordinary or extraordinary punishment. The dispute about the legal nature of the consequences resulting from that regulation has not only the theoretical-legal dimension. Accepting one of those options causes far-reaching legal consequences within the sphere of the law practice application. It decides about the scope of the legal responsibility and determines the relations with other statutory premises that modify its limits. In this context there are also the remarks considering the conditions of accepting the set of principles, resulting from art. 57 of the Penal Code, reforming those limits with the rule of punishment for the series of crimes. The analysis takes up the problem of the punishment for the continuous act defi ned in art. 12 of the Penal Code. We have to take into consideration that this institution derives from the same as the series of crimes structure of the continuous act of crime that was in the Penal Code from 1969, which is the basis of the extraordinary tightening the punishment. Thus there comes the question — whether resigning from modifying the principles of legal responsibility for the continuous act of crime can lead to impression of the dissymmetry of penalty of both structures, and is that the reasonable and rational solution.
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The study contains an analysis and evaluation of some legal solutions proposed in the draft amendment to criminal law of 25 January 2019, especially regarding the sentence, both statutory and judicial. Attention was paid to changes that constitute the most vivid manifestations of the tendency clearly outlined in the draft — expressed explicitly in the assumptions of the postulated changes — towards increasing the repressive norms of the Penal Code of 1997. This is carried out on three main levels — 1 increasing the severity of sanctions for individual, selected types of crimes, 2 extending the application of the extraordinary institution to tighten the penalties and 3 changes to the court directive on the sentence. The study focuses on changes concerning the foundations and rules of the extraordinary progression of punishment, in particular on the modification referring to criminal liability for an offense committed in the conditions of a continuous act covered by the formula of Article 12 § 1 of the Penal Code. In this case, the project provides for mandatory toughening of the penalty by raising the lower liability threshold by half, and the upper one by two. In this regard, both the arguments of the position approving such a solution and the views of the part of the criminal law doctrine which fully accepts the law adopted in the Penal Code of 1997 and which are binding in this respect are presented.
The study attempts to draw attention to some, the most important complex threads — both in the criminological and the dogmatic legal sense — problems of crime of terrorist character. The starting point of considerations conducted in part I of the article is the historical analysis referring to genesis and evolution of dogmatic and normative perception and understanding of the concept of terrorist offense — from the legislation of the interwar period through post-war regulations, until the regulation of the Penal Code of 1969. The central thread of this part of the study is the analysis of the normative shape of a terrorist offense construction in terms of art. 115 § 20 of the Penal Code, legal nature of this institution as well as the consequences at the level of application of the discussed regulations. Considerations taken in part II of the study cover issues regarding the consequences of committing a crime of a terrorist character in the sphere of statutory and judicial punishment and other penal measures. In this part of the analysis, the issue of extraordinary tightening of punishment was subjected in particular to a terrorist crime including doubts that in practice the provisions relating to the rule of progression of punishment of terrorists can cause, as well as the possibility and rules of using other institutions shaping the legal situation of the perpetrator of a terrorist offense.
The article (part one) raises the issue of evaluation, under criminal law, of the failure to provide assistance to a person in immediate danger of death or serious injury. It presents the origins and development of Polish criminal law regulations in this regard. The study focuses on the controversy around interpretations of the statutory definition of crime pursuant to Article 162 of the Polish Criminal Code. When discussing the polarity of views concerning the statutory approach, the author presents not only the position of the criminal law, but also numerous examples from the case law. The article highlights the legal nature of the obligation under Article 162 and the limits of its applicability. In this context, it refers to the liability of persons with a legal duty of prevention as well as entities without such a status. The study also provides comments on accessory and principal liability for the offence of failing to render assistance and possible overlapping of regulations and types of offences.
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The article presents the problem of a hooligan type of behaviour and its criminal law assessment. It presents the general image of the origin and the evolution of hooligan behaviour in the Polish legal system. It also makes an attempt at explaining the features of this subject, which are included in its definition (Art. 115 § 21 Criminal Code). The article also refers generally to the common doubts and dilemmas on the grounds of doctrine and judicial decision, which are caused by the ambiguities of sources and assessments. This in practice leads to the serious risk associated with making a uniform decision in the hooligan-type offences. The author also mentions the hooligan behaviour in the foreign legal systems, pointing out different functions which this behaviour can have. As an added bonus, the analysis also pays attention to some consequences of the hooligan-type offences within the criminal system, mentioning the changes that took place with the amendment of the Criminal Code of 1997, as of the 1st of July 2015.
The article concerns the problem of the legal structure of the so-called series of crimes. The attention is concentrated on the changes in terms of evidence of this institution introduced by the amendment to the Penal Code of February 20, 2015. The previous statutory formula of Art. 91 § 1 of the Penal Code was recalled, especially the annulled premise of the “similar way” of committing crimes bounded together in series, remembering at the same time the doubts and interpretative arguments which accompanied that interpretation. In the circle of interests remains also the issue of the statutory understanding of the requirement of identity of “the regulation whose criteria each of those crimes fully fulfill”, which forms the basis for the punishment given for the series of crimes. The arguments of the ideas competing in this matter were also recalled as well as the effects that might have been caused while implementing such practice. Taking the above into consideration the modifications within the statutory formula of the series of crimes were discussed. A special attention was drawn to the new premise of “using the same opportunity” and the consequences that are caused by introducing this premise for the scope of using this structure. The article also discusses the issue of the identity of the legal rule, required by the act, the reference to which in the amended legal state became the rule which was the basis for the punishment, and not, as it was commonly previously believed, the rule stating the basis for punishing for each of the crimes remaining in the series. In the margin of the analysis of the new shape of the premises of series there are remarks devoted to the punishment for the multiplicity of crimes embraced with the feature of continuity.
The article concerns the criminal law assessment of participation in suicide, based on the statutory offense model of regulation concerning driving to killing oneself adopted in the Polish Criminal Code of 1997. This deliberation starts with the social and normative perceptions of suicidal behaviour. Arguments covering the position of the modern legal system, which presumes that suicide is not acriminal act, are presented. The article pays attention to the multiplicity of motivations, starting with arguments on the rights and freedom of an individual, next analysing points of a praxeological, political and criminal character and finishing with elements of ahumanitarian nature. Stopping the punishment of suicide in the causative form leads to the exclusion of a possibility of prosecution, which is based on the general rule of the non-causative form of involvement in another person’s suicide. This shows that there is aneed to criminalise these types of behaviour within the limits of an automatic type of crime. The central subject of this article is the analysis of the ratio legis of criminalisation of driving the other person to committing suicide, discussing the form of its implementation and the dogmatic interpretation of its statutory definition, despite there being alot of doubt found in the legal literature about its interpretation. The article makes an attempt to explain the main points. There are also selected elements of this crime found in foreign regulations based on the construction of certain features of Art. 151 of the Criminal Code. Comparison of the legal status of the incitement to suicide regulations in Polish law with their equivalent in foreign legal systems allowed the definition of the main rules shaping the crime in modern criminal law and pointed out those rules which appear to be universal. There is also mention of the conclusions de lege ferenda. In the literature there is a very strong emphasis on the lack of a statutory definition of the crime in Art. 151 of the Criminal Code. This elaboration makes an attempt to indicate the possible directions of modification of the current shape of the definition of this crime.
The elaboration looks into the problems of aggravated murder in the context of the latest project of changes within the Penal Code. In view of the content of the expected amendment, which aims at eliminating such akind of crime from the domestic legal order and at returning to a“traditional” model of criminal law protection of life, this is not, however, the analysis or judgment of the proposed, “new” legal solutions, but rather an attempt to settle accounts with those currently in force and remonstrated the legal state, its advantages and disadvantages which have revealed themselves for several years of its functioning within the legal area. The article focuses on searching for the answer to the question about the justification and the purposefulness of the proposed direction of modification. It is interesting and because of this — apart from the significance of the matter which the change concerns — that the attempt to “return to the past” is not being taken for the first time. The distance towards this crime of the major part of the Polish criminal law scientific environment is commonly known. It is worthwhile to refer to the causes of such astate of affairs, recapitulating the argumentation of the opponents of this form of crime. In order to objectify the judgments, the arguments of the opponent side were also presented, the side which notices rational reasons for maintaining the status quo.
The article (part two) raises the issue of evaluation, under criminal law, of the failure to provide assistance to a person in immediate danger of death or serious injury. It refers to the catalogue issue and legal character of the circumstances defined in Article 162 of the Polish Criminal Code excluding the legal liability in case of failure to provide such assistance. The article analyzes such circumstances and approaches the view of the doctrine and judicature for their interpretation. According to general rules, exemption from legal liability for failing to render assistance draws the line for the entities non-liability, on whom rests that particular, legal duty of concern about the good of the ones in danger (guarantor).
This article covers the criminal law assessment of participation in suicide, based on the statutory offense model of regulation concerning driving someone to killing themselves adopted in the Polish Criminal Code of 1997. This deliberation starts with the social and normative perceptions of suicidal behaviour. Arguments concerning the position of the modern legal system, which presumes that suicide is not a criminal act, are presented. The article pays attention to the multiplicity of motivations, starting with arguments on the rights and freedom of an individual, next analysing points of the praxeological, political and criminal character and finishing with elements of a humanitarian nature. Stopping the punishment of suicide in the causative form leads to the exclusion of the possibility of prosecution, which is based on the general rule of the non-causative form of involvement in another person’s suicide. This shows there is a need to criminalise these types of behaviour within the limits of an automatic type of crime. The central theme of this article is the analysis of the ratio legis of criminalisation of driving other person to committing suicide, discussing the form of its implementation and the dogmatic interpretation of its statutory definition, despite there being a lot of doubt found in the legal literature about its interpretation. This article makes an attempt to explain the main points. There are also selected elements of this crime found in foreign regulations based on the construction of certain features of Art. 151 of the Criminal Code. Comparison of the legal status of the incitement to suicide regulations in Polish Law with its equivalent in foreign legal systems allowed the definition of the main rules shaping the crime in modern criminal law and pointed out those rules which appear to be universal. There is also mention of the conclusions de lege ferenda. In the literature there is a very strong emphasis on the lack of statutory definition of the crime in Art. 151 of the Criminal Code. This elaboration makes an attempt to indicate the possible directions of modification of the current shape of the definition of this crime.
On the grounds of criminal-law research, the article tries to conduct a dispute analysis of the issues of a legal evaluation of “the fleeing” of a road traffic participant from the scene of the communication event. The subject of the analysis is not only the concept of “the escape” — its subjective aspect — but also its perception on the grounds of the past and the presently applicable legal solutions. Attention was drawn to the change in function that these circumstances fulfilled and to how, within years, its influence on justice in cases of communication crimes — from the circumstances restricting the dimension of punishment in the phase of judicial substantiation, via creation of the marks of the qualified type of forbidden act, to a general (cumulative) premise of extraordinary restriction of punishment. One of the leading ideas of this work is the case of the ratio legis regulation of the fleeing of the road traffic participant from the scene of the communication event. In light of the accepted legal solutions it is unclear what determines its object of protection, and so the protection of which legal goods this regulation serves.
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Artykuł podejmuje problematykę przygotowania zabójstwa, jego istoty i zasadności penalizacji. Takie zachowania w systemie prawa karnego pod rządami kolejnych jego kodyfikacji pozostawały bezkarne. Zmiana w tym zakresie nastąpiła wraz z nowelizacją kodeksu karnego z 13 czerwca 2019 roku. Przyjęta modyfikacja zasad odpowiedzialności karnej na „przedpolu przedpola” dokonania zabójstwa rodzi liczne wątpliwości i kontrowersje. Przedmiotem opracowania jest więc próba uzasadnienia wprowadzonej zmiany oraz odpowiedzi na pytanie, w jaki sposób w ciągu bez mała wieku motywowano obowiązujący stan prawny w tym zakresie i czy zasadnie ustawodawca odszedł od tradycyjnego modelu bezkarności przygotowania zabójstwa.
EN
The article addresses the issue of murder preparation, its essence and legitimacy of penalisation. Such behaviour in the criminal law system under the government’s subsequent codifications has remained unpunished. The change in this respect occurred along with the amendment to the Penal Code of 13th June 2019. The adopted modification of the principles of criminal liability on the “foreground of the foreground” of murder raises numerous doubts and controversies. The subject of the study is an attempt to justify the introduced change and answer the question of how the applicable legal status was motivated over the space of almost a century and whether the legislator reasonably departed from the traditional model of impunity for homicide preparation.
The article presents the issues of criminallaw protection of life and health of the conceived child de lege lata and de lege ferenda. It brings closer the current rules of criminal responsibility for the attacks directed at this good and discusses the state of dogmatic theology and jurisprudence in this area. It presents the most important controversies at the level of science of law and jurisprudence and dilemmas of interpretation. The leading theme of this paper is the presentation and analysis of the changes to the Cryminal Code proposed by the Codification Commission in the draft of 2013. It draws attention to their wide scope and substantive significance. They represent modifications of systemic character and of fundamental significance to the very idea of protection of human life.
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