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O możliwości antyredukcjonizmu: uwagi polemiczne

100%

Strawiński W.

Diametros

2008

nr 17

70-81

Recenzja książki: Katarzyna Paprzycka, O możliwości antyredukcjonizmu, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, Warszawa 2005.

Theory Reduction and Structural Assumptions

100%

Strawiński W.

nr 4

77-83

in the article different kinds of theory reduction are distinguished and discussed with respect to additional assumptions which are usually added to the reducing theory. A particular kind of so-called geometrical structural assumptions are analysed, and some outline of their possible classification is presented.

On Quantum Non-locality and Possible Worlds. Critical Remarks

100%

Strawiński W.

Filozofia Nauki

2008

tom 16

nr 1

83-99

In 2006 Tomasz F. Bigaj published in English a book "Non-locality and the Possible Worlds. A Counterfactual Perspective on Quantum Entanglement". He considered the question whether a satisfactory interpretation of quantum mechanics in the standard form should include the assumption of a non-local, immediate influence of one part of a specific quantum system (like two electrons in the singlet state) on the other, spatially separated part of that system. Bigaj - following H. Stapp - chooses as conceptual instruments of his analysis counterfactual conditional statements and possible-worlds semantics of such statements. After thorough examination of different Stapp's arguments, he reaches the conclusion "that no matter what available interpretation of counterfactuals we decide to follow, there is no need in standard quantum mechanics for measurement-included non-locality". My critique concerns mainly Bigaj's selection of conceptual tools: the counterfactuals and possible-worlds semantics. I point to the fact that such selection assumes the "necessitarian" interpretation of laws of nature in the domain of micro-objects (e.g. for systems like two electrons in the singlet state). The different, "regularist" interpretation of physical laws in that domain is possible as well, and counterfactual arguments are not valid for such interpretation.

Popper and Emergence

44%

Strawiński W.

Filozofia Nauki

2003

tom 11

nr 2

109-115