The article focuses on the question of the problem of moral responsibility in the context of John Martin Fischer semicompatibilism. The issue of the article includes Aristotle, Harry Gordon Frankfurt and others, within which Fischer and Mark Ravizza formulate a counterexample to solve Frankfurt-style case of “Counterfactual Interventer”. The purpose of this article is to show the relationship between the principle of alternative possibilities and the legitimacy of assigning moral responsibility for the decision, act, omission and their consequences. Originality of Fischer and Ravizza solution situates the position of the two philosophers as a particular manifestation of contemporary compatibilism dispute concerning the freedom of the will and the relationship between determinism and autonomy of the person.
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