Purpose: The article presents business models developed in organizations of the “new cooperativism” trend, whose application leads to a bottom-up solution of important social problems at the local level and, in a broader perspective, stimulation of sustainable development. Methodology: The adopted methodology uses a qualitative approach. The research was conducted in the form of case studies of four organizations following “new cooperativism,” based on in-depth interviews, observations, and analyses of organizational documents and various types of publicly available materials. Findings: The study showed that “new cooperativism” organizations use in their business models the old practices developed by classical cooperatives, which work well in today’s conditions and have the potential to provide a positive impact on important socioeconomic dysfunctions, which can be fully implemented through modern technologies. Research Limitations: The limitations typical of the case study method entail the uncertainty of results replication, which disallows their broad generalization. However, the obtained results indicate the need to conduct a scientific diagnosis of emerging collaborative grassroots organizations and the importance of their participation in the three-sector economic concept of the state. Originality: The article and its conclusions are based on empirical research of the practical effectiveness of business models used in organizations of the “new cooperativism” trend.
The aim of this paper is to present the results of experiments relating to voting methods based on the bounded rationality theory. The research demonstrated that a positive nudge changes the voting results. The study focused on three methods of voting: the Borda Count method, the Condorcet winner method and the anti-manipulation method. In a laboratory experiment, the subjects were asked to select the best musician. They were to manipulate their voting so that a predetermined winner is chosen. In the first voting, the subjects did not receive any a priori information, while in the second voting, some a priori information was provided, i.e. the true, objective ranking of the musicians. What followed was another voting. It was initially assumed that the participants would manipulate their voting the same way as in the first voting. The results, however, were different. The obtained second ranking of musicians was closest to the true, objective ranking, thus proving that the manipulation effect was neutralised by the a priori positive information about the true, objective order.
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