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High Confirmation and Inductive Validity

100%

Botting D.

tom 46

nr 1

119-142

Does a high degree of confirmation make an inductive argument valid? I will argue that it depends on the kind of question to which the argument is meant to be providing an answer. We should distinguish inductive generalization from inductive extrapolation even in cases where they might appear to have the same answer, and also from confirmation of a hypothesis.

EXPLODING ‘OUGHT’

100%

Botting D.

nr 3

338 – 362

In this paper the author wishes to discuss so-called principles of inheritance and the familiar claim that it leads to deontic paradoxes. By combining two such paradoxes it will be shown that inheritance amounts to a principle of explosion: supposing that in the actual world there is at least one thing that one ought to do, almost anything is something one ought to do. He will then attempt to qualify the principle of inheritance so as to avoid this and other paradoxical results.

DISTINCTIVE RATIONALITY OF INTENTIONS

100%

Botting D.

2013

tom 20

nr 4

507 – 526

In this paper the author intend to defend Broome’s cognitivist view that reduces practical normativity to theoretical normativity, but argue that this leaves unaccounted for distinctively practical norms that the author seeks to capture as a system of local obligations to have particular intentions. The krasia requirement dictates what obligations we have relative to the normative beliefs that we have but does not tell us what intentions it is rational to have all-things-considered.

NARROWNESS OF WIDE-SCOPE PRINCIPLES

100%

Botting D.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

2016

tom 23

nr 2

177 – 203

In this paper the author will propose that the unpalatable consequences of narrow-scope principles are not avoided by altering the scope of the principle but by changing the kind of conditional. He argues that a counterfactual conditional should do the trick and that the rational requirement of modus ponens can be understood as something like a “Ramsey test” on this conditional.

Being Reasonable

100%

Botting D.

nr 1

17-36

Where do the rules of critical discussion get their normative force? What kinds of norms are involved? Unreasonable behaviour in the critical discussion - e.g., continuing to assert the contradictory of a proven standpoint, performing some action pragmatically inconsistent with a proven standpoint, or the same with regard to the starting-points agreed to in the opening stage - is liable to moral sanction. Thus, a moral/ethical norm is involved and the rules must have a moral force. Pragma-dialectics as it stands does not seem to account for this moral force. I will attempt to fill this gap in pragma-dialectical theory.

Without Qualification: An Inquiry Into the Secundum Quid

100%

Botting D.

Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric

2014

tom 36

nr 1

161-170

In this paper I will consider several interpretations of the fallacy of secundum quid as it is given by Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations and argue that they do not work, one reason for which is that they all imply that the fallacy depends on language and thus fail to explain why Aristotle lists this fallacy among the fallacies not depending on language (extra dictione), amounting often to a claim that Aristotle miscategorises this fallacy. I will argue for a reading that preserves Aristotle’s categorization by a quite different account of how qualifications function.