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6 Furman M.

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Obowiązywanie jako wyraz deontologizacji wiedzy w koncepcji Lotzego i Windelbanda

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Furman M.

IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych

2013

tom 25

69- 84

In this article I present the genesis and the problem of determining the notion of validity (Geltung). Here R. H. Lotze and W. Windelband, who in their philosophical concepts underline the fundamental importance of validity, deserve particular attention. Lotze may be said to have created idealism with- out the subject, while Windelband continued his thoughts and brought them to a conclusion. According to Windelbad, knowledge is both subjective and planted in the object comprehended as a value.

Stanowisko Friedricha Trendelenburga wobec heglowskiej dialektyki

100%

Furman M.

Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia

2012

tom 7

nr 2

43-56

According to G.W.F. Hegel, being is to be equated with pure thinking. This Hegelian assertion has been questioned by F.A. Trendelenburg in his work Logische Untersuchungen where he claimed that from the point of view of the dialectical method this identity is unacceptable. In this context he formulated a criticism of Hegel by arguing that the dialectical thinking generates logical categories which do not appeal to vision (Anschauung); consequently, these categories suffer from a lack of experiential meaning. In the paper I present Trandelenburg’s argument according to which the dialectical method may have a scientific value only in correlation with experience. He also claims that knowledge without experience situates itself outside life; in this sense the scientific method cannot but accept experience as the principle of cognition.

Etyka Immenuela Kanta versus etyka Maxa Schelera

100%

Furman M.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

2019

tom 48

43-63

The article presents the principles on which the ethics of Kant and Scheler are built. Kant formulates declarative ethics, which is based on the ontology of reason. This level is unattainable formal and is the unattainable standard of our actions. On the other hand, Scheler formulates an ethics of values which can be realized by each of us. The paper examines two different ethical standpoints that can never be brought to each other.

Sobość jako najbardziej źródłowy warunek doświadczenia siebie i innych. Recenzja książki Barbary Skargi Tożsamość i różnica. Eseje metafizyczne. Kraków: Wydawnictwo ZNAK, 2009

100%

Furman M.

Folia Philosophica

2011

tom 29

377-383

Epistemologia Rudolfa Hermanna Lotzego. Obiektywność jako epistemiczna ważność

100%

Furman M.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

2013

nr nr 23

143-168

In the article I am describing epistemology R.H. Lotze’s, which as first entered comprehending the value into language of philosophy. He emphasized the limitation of the human mind in his project. He thought that metaphysics was insufficient as a base for science to arise. Therefore the sphere of the human cognition is supposed to be limited to a system of the importance and its confirmation in experience. As a result of such a thinking, it is necessary to express the cognition through the validity. Namely through the awareness of stretching it what detailed and general.

Stanowisko Eduarda von Hartmanna wobec pojęcia rzeczy samej w sobie Immanuela Kanta

100%

Furman M.

Filo-Sofija

2012

tom 12

nr 3(18)

125-144

Immanuel Kant argues that recognition of the object of knowledge must be limited to the cognitive capacities of the subject. Hartmann takes the view that such an approach to the object of knowledge cannot lead to objectivity. He stated the necessity of the cognition referring to the thing in itself. The thing in itself, despite its fundamental unknowability, must be the basis of all cognition. Thus, our cognition can be achieved only secondarily on the basis of the thing in itself.