Skepticism is a doctrine which holds the possibilities of knowledge to be limited. There are many types of skepticism (practical /theoretical, partial/total, moderate/ radical, etc). Scepticism as a philosophy began with Pyrrho of Elis (365–275 BC). The rediscovery of the skeptical texts during Renaissance affected the development of modern sceptical currents. In France philosophical statements of skepticism were offered by Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592). Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) great French mathematician, scientist, inventor an religious thinker was familiar with Montaigne sceptical ideas. Pascal refers to Montaigne as the most illustrious defender of skepticism. Blaise Pascal point of view is original. Whenever he insists that no proof is ever certain but simultaneously he adds that skepticism is untenable because we have reasons to believe.
Traditional theism (in Christianity, Judaism and Islam) understands God as possessing certain attributes including omnipotence. God is omnipotent in the sense that God possesses unlimited (maximal) power. For some classical philosophers and theologians (Petrus Damiani, René Descartes) God’s omnipotence requires his being able to do absolutely anything, including the logically impossible. But in Thomas Aquinas’ opinion, to do what is logically impossible is not an act of power but is self-contradictory action. For Aquinas, a logically impossible action is not an action. The contemporary British philosopher of religion, Richard Swinburne, considers omnipotence from an analytic perspective and, partially, within Aquinas’ tradition. For Swinburne, omnipotence includes the power to perform only logically possible and consistent tasks. In this paper, I discuss systematically (§§ 3-6) the philosophical and logical problems of omnipotence and the relation between God and logic from the perspective of Jan Łukasiewicz’s logical investigations.
According to the author of this paper, the analytical philosophy of religion should not be closed to other spheres of culture and ignore or disregard the achievements of others, both past and contemporary philosophical currents. An analytical philosopher, including an analytical philosopher of religion, can therefore seek inspiration also outside the sphere of analytical philosophy. At the same time, this does not mean that an analytical philosopher is to disregard natural sciences or not to care about the precision of language and the right arguments. The concern for linguistic precision and the application of appropriate argumentation are crucial for the identity of the analytical philosophy. This article, taking into account the indicated metaphilosophical attitude, is devoted to a critical discussion about some of the problems raised by Professor Dariusz Łukasiewicz, in his outstanding work in the field of philosophy of religion published in Polish as Opatrzność Boża, wolność, przypadek. Studium z analitycznej filozofii religii.
PL
Przypadek i Opatrzność Boża. Uwagi metodologiczne z Pascalem w dalszym tle Wedle autora tego artykułu, analityczna filozofia religii nie powinna być zamknięta dla innych sfer kultury i ignorować lub lekceważyć osiągnięć innych, zarówno przeszłych, jak i współczesnych prądów filozoficznych. Filozof analityczny, w tym analityczny filozof religii, może zatem szukać inspiracji również poza sferą filozofii analitycznej. Jednocześnie nie oznacza to, że filozof analityczny ma lekceważyć nauki przyrodnicze lub nie troszczyć się o precyzję języka i właściwe argumenty. Troska o precyzję językową i stosowanie odpowiedniej argumentacji ma kluczowe znaczenie dla tożsamości filozofii analitycznej. Ten artykuł, biorąc pod uwagę wskazane nastawienie metafilozoficzne, poświęcony jest krytycznej dyskusji na temat niektórych problemów poruszonych przez prof. Dariusza Łukasiewicza, w jego wybitnej pracy w dziedzinie filozofii religii, noszącej tytuł Opatrzność Boża, wolność, przypadek. Studium z analitycznej filozofii religii.
In the article I indicate and synthetically discuss issues that can be found in the achievements of Bertrand Russell, and which can be included in the domain of metaphilosophy. I point to Russell’s philosophical inspirations and to his views on philosophy. His views are intertwined with the threads of the traditional understanding of philosophy and innovative elements. These innovative elements include assigning a special role to mathematical logic, of which Russell is one of the founders, and emphasizing the role of analysis in philosophical research. It is also characteristic of him to emphasize the role of science for philosophical reflection. At the same time, however, Russell rejects the radical slogans of logical positivism. This justifies the thesis that in his oeuvre there are threads of both traditional and innovative understanding of philosophy and its tasks.
The study is devoted to the general characteristics of philosophy. So it has a metaphilosophical character. This characteristic, however, is not a descriptive presentation of what philosophical authors (philosophers, both ancient and modern) think about the subject of their research. In the author’s view, this study is a proposal to understand philosophy, its methods, and its relationship to science and worldview. The role of logic in the philosopher’s work is emphasized, but at the same time it is considered indispensable for a specifically understood speculative element.
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Skepticism is a doctrine which holds the possibilities of knowledge to be limited. There are many types of skepticism (practical /theoretical, partial/total, moderate/ radical, etc). Scepticism as a philosophy began with Pyrrho of Elis (365–275 BC). The rediscovery of the skeptical texts during Renaissance affected the development of modern sceptical currents. In France philosophical statements of skepticism were offered by Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592). Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) great French mathematician, scientist, inventor an religious thinker was familiar with Montaigne sceptical ideas. Pascal refers to Montaigne as the most illustrious defender of skepticism. Blaise Pascal point of view is original. Whenever he insists that no proof is ever certain but simultaneously he adds that skepticism is untenable because we have reasons to believe.
The article is a discussion text. In my response to the text dealing with semiotic problems (polysemy, vagueness, contextual dependence), I discuss the objections directed at semiotics as a tool for shaping appropriate language skills, in the context of the postulate of criticism. I accept the author’s opinions about limited possibilities in this regard. In my response to the texts on the philosophy of religion, I defend its status as a legitimate philosophical sub-discipline. Detailed issues in the field of philosophy of religion (including the problem of omnipotence) are also discussed. I defend the nature of the philosophy of religion as a discipline other than theology and not reducible to metaphysics.
PL
Artykuł jest tekstem dyskusyjnym. W dyskusji z tekstem poruszającym problemy semiotyczne (polisemia, nieostrość, zależność kontekstowa) omawiam i dyskutuję zarzuty kierowane pod adresem semiotyki jako narzędzia pozwalającego kształtować odpowiednie sprawności językowe, w kontekście postulatu krytycyzmu. Akceptuję opinie autorki tekstu o ograniczonych możliwościach w tym zakresie. W dyskusji z tekstami dotyczącymi filozofii religii bronię jej statusu jako uprawnionej subdyscypliny filozoficznej. Poddawane są także dyskusji szczegółowe kwestie z zakresu filozofii religii (m.in. problem wszechmocy). Bronię charakteru filozofii religii jako dyscypliny innej niż teologia i nie dającej się zredukować do metafizyki.
The author presents an argument that the notion of rationality of beliefs must not be so restrictive as it is according to usual definitions. I.a. The postulate of effective elimination of all contradictory beliefs should be qithdrawn because nobody had the pssibility to derive and examine all the consequences of his beliefs. The final author's proposal is to enclose a kind of merely potential mechanism of elimination of contradictory beliefs into the notion concerned.
The standard model of rationality points to the following criteria of rationality: appropriate articulation, obeying the rules of logic, and proper justification. These criteria however cause troubles, when they are used in particular cases. In the article it is proposed two-level model of rationality. The first level would comprise four metaprinciples: linguistic exactness, obeying the rules of logic, criticism, and ability to solving the problems. The second level would refer to certain types of beliefs, building models for them.
The article examines the concept of anti-irrationalism coined by the members of the Lvov-Warsaw School. The term “anti-irrationalism” comes from Ajdukiewicz, who used it to define the specificity of the School as a whole. For Ajdukiewicz, anti-irrationalism, which values cognition with intersubjective qualities, is contrasted with irrationalism. The article discusses Twardowski’s tripartite division of beliefs into rational, “irrational,” and “non-rational.” Against this background, the article explores Dąmbska’s view on irrationalism, which is divided by her into several subcategories.Finally, the author considers the question of anti-irrationalism as a metaphilosophical standpoint in the context of the question of a worldview.
The paper presents three essential meanings of the notion of „justice”: (1) justice as a feature of human acts, (2) justice as a feature of human beings, and (3) justice as a feature of the structure of distribution. The second part of the paper shows that justice as value may be in conflict with other values such as benevolence or honesty.