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2 Ekonomický časopis (Journal of Economics)

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VEDOU VYŠŠÍ VÝDAJE NA ÚŘEDNÍKA K NIŽŠÍMU RIZIKU KORUPCE? ANALÝZA ČESKÝCH KRAJŮ

100%

Půček M.

Ekonomický časopis (Journal of Economics)

2014

tom 62

nr 2

150 – 166

This paper has two objectives: (1) to propose an approach to corruption risk assessment with the FMEA (Fault Mode and Effect Analysis) method and verify it on a case study (taking decisions on monument protection in the Czech Republic), and (2) to find out whether higher salary expenditures per civil servant reduce corruption risk. The paper works with the principal-agent theory and the NPM (New Public Management) concept. Results of the research point out that an increase in staff expenditures does not automatically reduce corruption. What needs to go side by side is also higher quality of institutions themselves. Correlation between resistance against corruption and higher salary has not been proven.

AVOIDANCE OF RISK FROM THE CONTRACTING AUTHORITIES: PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CASE STUDY

44%

Plaček M. , Ochrana F. , Schmidt M. , Křápek M. , Půček M.

Ekonomický časopis (Journal of Economics)

2017

tom 65

nr 7

587 – 601

The article deals with an empiric analysis of behaviour of contracting authorities when tendering public contracts. In the context of theories dealing with rational, imperfectly rational and rationally inattentive behaviour of agents, it tries to describe the problem of avoiding risk by the contracting authorities in further detail. Theories observing behaviour of bureaucracy – no matter how well they are reasoned – mostly meet the problem of empiric verifiability. In this case, the authors try to fill the gap using an empiric analysis where it is worked with real data of public contracts from 2010 – 2014. We can consider the main findings to be the fact that public contracting authorities prefer strategies that are based on a reduction of risk of conflicts with the regulator. These strategies are chosen mainly based on signals of behaviour of central authorities, rather than based on the effort of gaining the most informative strategy. However, the final result is the same. In the authors’ opinion, the aversion to risk by the contracting authorities, which is enforced by the public policy in this field, plays the major role.