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JEDNOZNAČNOSŤ POJMU SÚCNA A MOŽNOSŤ POZNANIA BOHA

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Chabada M.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2007

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tom 62

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nr 1

26-43

EN

Given the state of naturalness in his time Scotus rejects the intuitive knowledge of God as a singular and existing essential totality. There is, however, another way of knowing God: 'per rationes communes seu univoca'. Here the notion of being, which overarches the gap between God and creation, plays an important role. The notion of being is embodied in all essential concepts: in the order of differentiated knowledge it is 'the first clearly knowable concept', while in the order of the origin of knowledge it is the last one; it is an entirely simple concept; it is conceivable only clearly and with certainty, or not at all; it is the most imperfect concept, its imperfectness being its advantage: it opens the horizon of the possible knowing of the 'first' or 'infinite' reality; it is predicable about every reality either 'in quid' (about all essential contents) or 'in quale' (about convertible transcendentalia and the ultimate differences). In comparison to any proper concept the concept of being is 'conceptus imperfectus deminutus et non-adaequatus'; nevertheless, it is a real concept due to its denotating the real beings and due to its being effected by an abstraction; in the latter the object cooperates with the knowing power, therefore the concept is not a sort of rational fiction. Last, but not least, together with other transcendentalia it is the subject of metaphysics and it makes the philosophical knowing of God and thus also the meaningful theological language possible.

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INTERNALISTICKÉ ZNAKY V KONCEPCII INTUITÍVNEHO POZNANIA PODĽA DUNSA SCOTA

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Chabada M.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2016

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tom 71

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nr 9

721 – 732

EN

The paper deals with internalist features of the conception of intuitive cognition according to Duns Scotus. Its first part is concerned with strong and weak internalism, the latter being compatible with externalism. In its second part attention is paid to Duns Scotus’ theory of intuitive cognition including internal states of the soul, acts of recollection and contingent truth propositions. The goal of the third part is to show the manner in which the internalist features are present in Scotus’ theory of intuition. In conclusion the author suggests that Scotus’ theory of intuition resembles the access internalism in its weak form and as such doesn´t contradict externalism.

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Základné znaky metafyziky podľa Jána Dunsa Scota

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Chabada M.

Studia theologica

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2007

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tom 9

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nr 4

1-13

EN

Scotus describes his conception of metaphysics as the transcendental science which subject is the trans-categorial concept of being together with other necessary attributes. This subject makes the philosophical knowing of God possible and constitutes the foundation for Scotus's metaphysics. The univocal concept of being in his modal explication is top of Scotus's metaphysics and also the bridge between natural and supernatural knowing of God.

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ZAKOTVENIE ETIKY V PRIRODZENOM ZÁKONE PODĽA JÁNA DUNSA SCOTA

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Chabada M.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2008

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tom 63

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nr 3

240-251

EN

Duns Scotus argues that the will has a bent for the pleasant, by the help of which the humans want to reach some benefits for them, as well as a bent for justice, on the ground of which humans are able to love independently of their own benefits. It is the objective justice, which establishes the moral good of a practical act. The moral good is in full accordance with the true judgment of reason, which sets the necessary conditions for a morally good action. According to Duns Scotus there are two kinds of the moral norms, whose validity and obligation can be known naturally. The first kind is equal to natural law in the strict sense of the word. Its truth results from the formal contents of the concepts. The second kind is equal to natural law in the full sense of the word, i.e. to the norms of human relationships and the relationships of men to themselves. These norms can be syllogistically deduced from the first practical principles.

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PROBLÉM VZŤAHU ROZUMU / FILOZOFIE A VIERY / NÁBOŽENSTVA V STREDOVEKEJ FILOZOFII (AVERROES, BOETHIUS Z DÁCIE A TOMÁŠ AKVINSKÝ) A PARALELY SO SÚČASNÝMI PRÍSTUPMI

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Chabada M.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2018

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tom 73

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nr 4

282 – 293

EN

The paper deals with the relationship between reason/philosophy and faith/religion with some medieval authors (Averroes, Boethius of Dacia and Thomas Aquinas). Its first objective is to emphasize the key approaches such as the subordination of philosophy to religion or vice versa, which is based on the difference between the “absolute and relative” aspects. Its second objective is to identify the parallels and differences between the medieval and current strategies of addressing this issue (forms of conflict, independence, dialogue and integration). The author's opinion is that the relationship between reason/philosophy and faith/religion is primary methodological. The conflict between reason/philosophy and faith/religion is the result of a broad generalization of one of the two terms. The best form of the coexistence of science and religion is their mutual independence in those cases where we do not feel competent in any other than our own scientific discipline, or some form of a dialogue/integration (if we do have the necessary expertise).

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SELECTED METAETHICAL ASPECTS OF PHILIPPA FOOT’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY

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Chabada M.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2023

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tom 78

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nr 1

1 – 13

EN

There are two main positions in metaethical discussions. The first, cognitivist, position is that moral evaluations may be true or untrue, and the second, internalist, position is that these evaluations guide actions such that the agent is internally motivated to act based on the content of that evaluation. These two positions conflict. Cognitivism has to deal with the problem of moral motivation, and internalism has to explain the relevance of moral evaluations. In this article we will explore the moral philosophy of Philippa Foot as presented in her Natural Goodness. Our aim is to reconstruct and explain Foot’s arguments in favour of cognitivist and externalist views. Hence the final part proffers a summary of the metaethical aspects of Foot’s moral philosophy, and thereby highlights both the originality and contribution it makes to contemporary ethical thinking, and sketches a constructivist interpretation of Foot’s moral philosophy that emphasises the function of practical reason in constituting moral normativity.

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RECEPCIA A MODIFIKÁCIA ARISTOTELIZMU VO VYBRANÝCH ASPEKTOCH MYSLENIA JANA DUNSA SCOTA

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Chabada M.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2009

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tom 64

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nr 1

9-17

EN

The paper deals with the reception and modifications of aristotelism in the epistemology, metaphysics and theology of John Duns Scotus. As a consequence of these modifications Scotus became the founder of a new philosophical-theological vocabulary. In the first part of the contribution the history of aristotelism in the Hellenic period is outlined; the second part examines two lines of aristotelism: that developed in the Latin European West on one hand and that of the Greek-Arabic East on the other hand. The reception and modification of aristotelism in the considerations of J. D. Scotus is examined in more detail on the historical-philosophical background in the third part: rational intuition, ontological conception of metaphysics as 'scientia transcendens', theology as a practical science. In conclusion the author shows how Scotus' modification of aristotelism influenced the rise of modern science.

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Problém vedeckosti teológie u Jána Dunsa Scota

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Chabada M.

Studia theologica

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2007

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tom 9

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nr 1

68-80

EN

In the light of Aristotle's criteria for scientific knowledge, Duns Scotus maintains theology is not a science, but a specific and independent (autonomous) type of knowledge that is neither subordinated to any other type of knowledge, nor makes any other type of knowledge subordinated to itself. At the same time, Scotus modifies Aristotle's understanding of science: certainty and evidence are not based upon the necessity of a subject, but rather upon the perfection of knowing mind. Even though 'our theology' is not a science, it has more dignity compared to other sciences, since it offers 'more', i.e. it offers knowledge aiming at making man more perfect. At the same time, it demonstrates the fact that the goal of man is not theory, but rather practice in the sense of love.

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KOMPLEMENTARITA METAFYZIKY A TEOLÓGIE PODĽA JÁNA DUNSA SCOTA

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Chabada M.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2008

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tom 63

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nr 5

433-443

EN

For Duns Scotus the relationship between metaphysics and theology is the one between 'the natural' and 'the supra-natural'. 'The theology in itself' as well as 'the metaphysics in itself' are the examples of a perfect cognition of their subjects: they grasp all truths embodied in their subjects 'proper quiddity'. 'Our theology' and 'our metaphysics'', however, grasp their subjects as limited by present conditions. The complementarity of theology and metaphysics is based on the concept of being and its modal explication. In the concept of infinite being the metaphysical questioning reaches its most; our theology fills this naturally achieved concept with contents coming from Revelation, while in metaphysics the concept of 'infinite being' remains relatively empty. In this way both sciences, i.e. theology and metaphysics, are at the same time autonomous and complementary.

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Teológia ako praktická veda podľa Jána Dunsa Scota

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Chabada M.

Studia theologica

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2006

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tom 8

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nr 1

62-70

EN

John Duns Scotus' (c. 1266-1308) understanding of theology as a practical science is based on the new meaning of practice. Practice is an elicited act of will (actus elicitus voluntatis), even in such a case when followed by a commanded act of will (actus imperatus voluntatis). There is a relation of priority and identity between a practical cognition that is based on intellect and practice that is a mater of will. Cognition is practical when it precedes an act of will. If will acts in agreement with this cognition, then will is correct. From the cognition of God as the object of theology and as the ultimate goal of man, conclusions or practical rules are derived that allow the existence of caused practice. The nature of the object of theology is the reason that allows the expansion of practical cognition towards practice. Practice is contingent since it is caused especially by will that is preceded by an act of intellect. According to Scotus, theoretical and practical sciences do not have a different object of inquiry - that is why practical science is not less noble. Unlike geometry, where instruction on triangles can be given without triangles being worthy of love, theology cannot be taught without God being an object of love. God is not only cognoscibile, but at the same time, operabile. The goal of theology is love towards God and love towards neighbor. Theology indicates ways of this love, indicates the rules for the correctness of loving. In simple words, love without rules is blind, and rules without love are empty.

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BOETHIUS Z DÁCIE, JEHO PROJEKT BLAŽENÉHO ŽIVOTA V DIELE O NAJVYŠŠOM DOBRE A ODSÚDENIA Z ROKU 1277

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Chabada M.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2011

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tom 66

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nr 1

1-10

EN

Boethius's short treatise On the Highest Good represents one of the remarkable and important variants of ethical aristotelianism, enriched in Boethius by neo-platonic and augustinian themes. The idea of the 'philosophical way', which exclusively can lead to blissfulness, encompassing theory as well as practice, was dismissed by theologians - counsellors of Bishop Tempier. The result was an edict published in 1277, which among others condemned the ideas articulated in the treatise On the Highest Good. On closer view it appears, however, that the 'philosophical way' does not contradict the Christian way. Contrary to Thomas Aquinas or Bonaventura Boethius as a 'professional philosopher' did not manage to include philosophy into the theology. However, this is not to conceive the two contradicting disciplines, but rather as two different perspectives on one and the same thing. Therefore they can not be in conflict.

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PRIRODZENÉ A MORÁLNE DOBRO ALEBO ZLO: PRÍSTUP PHILIPPY FOOTOVEJ

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Chabada M.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2020

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tom 75

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nr 9

747 – 759

EN

The paper deals with the understanding of the concept of natural and moral goodness / evil according to Philippa Foot. The aim of the paper is to analyse and reconstruct the main line of her argument in the work Natural Goodness. Special attention is paid to her understanding of moral goodness / evil as a natural quality / defect, which allows her to avoid the dichotomy between facts and values. The author tries to incorporate Foot’s understanding of natural and moral goodness / evil into the framework of virtue ethics. The virtue of love is presented as the main feature of a good person and as a virtue which is in a way present in other moral virtues and which connects practical rationality and sensitivity to basic human needs. In conclusion, the author summarizes and briefly responds to the main criticisms of neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism and the particular ethical project of Philippa Foot.

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ĽUDSKÁ PRIRODZENOSŤ, ROZUM A EMÓCIE: POHĽAD T. AKVINSKÉHO A D. HUMA

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Chabada M. , Szapuová M.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2017

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tom 72

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nr 9

698 – 710

EN

The paper deals with the understanding of human nature in the philosophy of T. Aquinas and D. Hume. Its aim is to highlight some of the naturalistic tendencies in the writings of both authors. Naturalism is conceived as a position which in the explanation of human nature underlines the role of natural dispositions, inclinations and capacities operating in human mind, which are out of the control of reason. Aquinas and Hume are presented as philosophers of human nature. This view is supported by their understanding of the role of natural propensities of human beings as well as the relationship between reason and emotions (passions) and also their respective explanations of moral actions.