Heidegger claimed that traditional understanding of the truth as correspondence of the proposition with the entity is grounded in more primordial phenomena. He called them “the more fundamental truth”. Heidegger pointed out that the latter also comprise of such phenomena as Entdeckend-sein der Aussage and Erschlossenheit of the human Dasein. However, Heidegger’s attempt to call these phenomena as “the fundamental truths” can be justified only when they possessed so key character as the traditional concept of the truth. The latter understands its content as a basic regulative idea which is binding for all our thinking and talking about anything real. That is why the truth is considered as a necessary condition of possibility of any authentic bond among people. This key character of the truth does not exist in the mentioned-above phenomena. Hence, the attempt to call them “the truth” seems to be unjustified and mistaken.
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