Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

On the Alethic Nature of Knowledge

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Palczewski R.

Filozofia Nauki

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2015

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tom 23

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nr 1

99-145

PL

The paper is devoted to the alethic nature of knowledge, represented in the trad-itional epistemology by the truth condition (as a part of the so-called JTB definition of knowledge): one can only know what is true. The main motivation behind the art-icle is to show that, despite the recent criticism, the truth condition is adequate and well-justified from the linguistic point of view. I discuss two general types of objec-tions: one from the epistemological paradoxes (the Knower Paradox, the Knowability Paradox, and the Skeptic Paradox) and one from the would-be non factive uses of “to know”. The “paradoxical” path leads some authors (Grobler, Woleński) to a simple negation or to a more subtle restriction or modification of the truth condition. The “ordinary language” path leads other authors (Hazlett) to the thesis that the truth condition cannot be based on factivity of “to know”. I argue that both of these approaches are problematic, mainly because they are not well supported. In addition, I try to show that “to know” is factive in Stalnaker’s sense: a sentence of the form “s knows that p” both entails and pragmatically presupposes the truth of “p”. I treat this as the major premise in the argument for the alethic nature of knowledge.

2

On the Doxastic Nature of Knowledge

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Palczewski R.

Filozofia Nauki

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2018

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tom 26

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nr 2

55-94

PL

The paper is devoted to the doxastic nature of knowledge, represented in the traditional epistemology by the belief condition (part of the so-called JTB definition of knowledge) that one can only know what one believes. The article is divided into four parts, in which various arguments against the doxastic nature of knowledge are discussed and rejected. The first part starts with general linguistic and pragmatic reflections on the relation between knowledge and belief, and ends with a discussion of some problematic epistemic-doxastic conjunctions and implications. The second part deals with linguistic problems related to the difference between epistemic and doxastic attributions, e.g., in erotetic and evaluation contexts. The third part is concerned with the accuracy of thought experiments, i.e., descriptions of possible situations in which a person knows but does not believe. The fourth part focuses mainly on doxastic ambiguity (e.g., dispositional vs.occurrent belief, thin vs. thick belief), context sensitivity, and vagueness, including the notions of half-belief and in-between belief. The conclusion is that the belief condition is well-founded, but it should take a more precise form: one can know what one dispositionally and thinly believes.

3

O wiedzy i znajomości

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Palczewski R.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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2022

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nr 4

255-277

EN

The distinction introduced by Bertrand Russell between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description is the starting point for analyses related to the concept of acquaintance. I propose to assume that the following three concepts used by Russell are equivalent: knowledge of things, knowledge by acquaintance, and acquaintance. Then I present linguistic analyses concerning the construction of ‘know‑NP’ and ‘znać‑NP’, which lead to (i) division into a direct and indirect acquaintance and (ii) separation of knowledge from acquaintance, recognizing them as two different cognitive relations. Then, through the prism of knowledge, I describe the concept of acquaintance, pointing to the common properties of these concepts (aptness, non‑voluntariness, dispositiona-lity, contextual dependency), and postulate similar normative functions. This paper can be treated as an introduction to the concept of acquaintance and an elucidation of its role in epistemology.

4

O odwoływalności implikacji pragmatycznych

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Palczewski R.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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2016

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nr 2

5

Semantical Contextualism

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Palczewski R.

Filozofia Nauki

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2004

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tom 12

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nr 1

51-82

PL

Contextualism is an epistemological claim that truth-conditions of knowledge ascribing sentences depend on context in which they are uttered. The discussion concerned with its background and assumptions is predominant in recent epistemology. However, contextualism is known better as the suggested solution for skepticism about the external world. In this paper I present one of the most important contextualist theory which have been proposed in 90's by Keith DeRose. In what follows I outline this proposal's main sources, i.e. i) a relevant alternative theory, ii) Nozick's definition of knowledge and iii) two earlier contextualist ideas made by David Lewis and Gail Stine. Next, I consider some weak aspects of this theory that have been pointed out by critics.

6

Epistemic Contrastivism

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Palczewski R.

Filozofia Nauki

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2009

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tom 17

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nr 4

105-130

PL

According to contrastivism in epistemology - advocated chiefly by Jonathan Schaffer - the knowledge relation is not binary (s knows that p) but ternary (s knows that p rather than q). Thus knowledge ascriptions are contrast-sensitive. The aim of this paper is to portray, investigate and assess the details of this view. In the first three sections I focus mainly on arguments for contrastivism. Section fourth is devoted to the contrastivist solution to the skeptical puzzle. In the last three sections I present several problems for contrastivism as well as three main binary explanations for contrast-sensitivity.

7

Logic in Cognitive Science

63%

Malinowski J. , Palczewski R.

Logic and Logical Philosophy

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2011

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tom 20

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nr 1-2

3-5

8

Knowability as De Re Modality: A Certain Solution to Fitch Paradox

51%

Jarmużek T. , Krawczyk K. , Palczewski R.

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2020

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tom 68

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nr 4

291-313

EN

In the paper, we try to find a new, intuitive solution to the Fitch paradox. We claim that traditional expression of Knowability Principle (p → ◊Kp) is based on erroneous understanding of knowability as de dicto modality. Instead, we propose to understand knowability as de re modality. In the paper we present the minimal logic of knowability in which Knowability Principle is valid, but Fitch Paradox does not hold anymore. We characterize the logic semantically as well as by an axiomatic and tableaux procedure approach.

PL

Poznawalność jako modalność de re: pewne rozwiązanie paradoksu Fitcha W artykule staramy się znaleźć nowe, intuicyjne rozwiązanie paradoksu Fitcha. Twierdzimy, że tradycyjne wyrażenie zasady poznawalności (p → ◊Kp) opiera się na błędnym rozumieniu poznawalności jako modalności de dicto. Zamiast tego proponujemy rozumieć poznawalność jako modalność de re. W artykule przedstawiamy minimalną logikę poznawalności, w której zasada poznawalności jest ważna, ale paradoks Fitcha już nie obowiązuje. Logikę charakteryzujemy semantycznie, a także poprzez podejście aksjomatyczne i tabelaryczne.