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PL
Udział ilościowy i jakościowy komunistów Żydów w aparacie władzy „Polski Ludowej” był wyjątkowo duży, a w niektórych segmentach (centralny aparat partyjny, bezpieka, propaganda) wręcz dominujący. Mniejszość żydowska cieszyła się w Polsce autonomią i względnymi przywilejami. Było to w istocie odwzorowanie sytuacji ze Związku Sowieckiego lat dwudziestych. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest podsumowanie dotychczasowych wyników badań nad zaangażowaniem Żydów w aparat władzy komunistycznej w Polsce w oparciu o publikacje naukowe i źródłowe oraz częściowo własne badania autora w tym zakresie. W artykule przypomniano, na czym polegał mit „żydokomuny” w aparacie władzy „Polski Ludowej”, skąd się wziął i jaki miał wpływ na postawy antysemickie w polskim społeczeństwie. Następnie scharakteryzowano liczebność i wpływ Żydów w strukturach władzy komunistycznej w okresie stalinowskim i gomułkowskim, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem aparatu bezpieczeństwa. Przyjrzano się także przyczynom takiego zaangażowania Żydów po stronie komunistów i ich awansu w aparaciewładzy oraz problemowi ich tożsamości narodowej. Artykuł stanowi próbę weryfikacji mitu, tj. ustalenia, jak dalece pokrywał się on z rzeczywistością.
EN
The quantitative and qualitative participation of communist Jews in the power apparatus of “People’s Poland” was exceptionally large, and in some segments (the central party apparatus, secret police, propaganda) even dominating. Jewish minority enjoyed autonomy and relative privileges in Poland. It was in fact a mapping of the situation from the Soviet Union of the twenties. The purpose of this article is to summarise the results of research on the involvement of Jews in the apparatus of communist authorities in Poland so far, based on scientific and source publications, and partly the author’s own research in this area. The article reminds us of the myth of “Judeo-Communism” (żydokomuna) in the power apparatus of “People’s Poland”, where it came from and what was its influence on anti-Semitic attitudes in Polish society. Next, the number and influence of Jews in the structures of the communist authorities in the Stalinist period and in the times of Gomułka is characterised with particular emphasis on the security apparatus. It also looks into the reasons for such involvement of Jewish on the communist side and their promotion in the power apparatus, and the problem of their national identity. The article is an attempt to verify the myth, i.e. to determine how much it coincided with reality.
PL
Tworzenie się sieci klientelistycznych oraz nepotyzm w elicie władzy PRL nie były do tej pory przedmiotem odrębnych badań. Są one z reguły trudno uchwytne w dokumentach. Za jeden z przykładów funkcjonowania klientelizmu i nepotyzmu można uznać grupę osób protegowanych przez człowieka nr 2 w hierarchii władzy okresu stalinowskiego, Jakuba Bermana (jego znajomych, krewnych i spowinowaconych). Zachowane dokumenty polskie i sowieckie oraz relacje członków elity komunistycznej wskazują na główną rolę Bermana w polityce kadrowej kierownictwa PZPR, a także na funkcjonowanie grupy jego znajomych i członków rodziny usadowionych w rożnych strukturach władzy w Polsce. W dokumentach sowieckich zarzucano Bermanowi preferowanie „ludzi niepolskiej narodowości”, jak eufemistycznie nazywano osoby pochodzenia żydowskiego. Podawano konkretne przykłady osób z centralnego aparatu partyjnego (kierowników wydziałów KC PZPR), Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych, Ministerstwa Zdrowia oraz frontu propagandowego (Polskiego Radia i centralnych organów prasowych). Przedstawiony w niniejszym artykule przykład sieci powiązań personalnych stworzonej przez Jakuba Bermana oraz jego krewnych i znajomych z pewnością nie był odosobniony. Wymaga to skrupulatnych badań z wykorzystaniem relacji oraz informacji rozproszonych w rożnych źródłach.
EN
The creation of clientelist networks and nepotism in the power elite of the Polish People’s Republic have not been subjects of separate studies. They are usually hard to spot in documentation. Examples of the functioning of clientelism and nepotism include the group of proteges of number 2 in the hierarchy of the authorities of the Stalinist era, Jakub Berman (his friends, relatives and those of kin). The preserved Polish and Soviet documents, as well as stories of the members of the communist elite, point to Berman’s main role in the staff policy of the Polish United Workers’ Party and to the functioning of a group of his friends and family members positioned in various structures of power in Poland. In the Soviet documents, Berman was accused of preferring “people of non-Polish nationality”, a euphemism for people of Jewish origin. Specific examples were provided of people from the central party apparatus (heads of departments of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the propaganda front (the Polish Radio and central press bodies). The example, presented in the article, of the network of personal connections created by Jakub Berman and his friends and relatives was certainly not an isolated case. This requires detailed studies, using stories and information dispersed throughout various sources.
EN
The PUWP leadership in the years 1986–1990: A sketch for a portrait Actual power in the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP) was held by the socalled leadership, i.e. members of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee (CC). The Political Bureau formulated the party policy and made strategic decisions, while the Secretariat managed the day-to-day operations of the party apparatus. Due to the presence of workers’ representatives within the Political Bureau, and the participation in its meetings of large numbers of invited guests, in the years 1986-1990 the Political Bureau turned into a discussion forum. The real center of decision-making was located in the informal circle closest to the first secretary of the PUWP CC, Wojciech Jaruzelski. In the period under discussion, 35 real members of the power apparatus and 7 figureheads formed part of the Political Bureau and CC Secretariat. The greatest personnel changes in the membership of both organs of power took place on the eve of the “round table” discussions, in December 1988. The following criteria can be considered as key for promoting new people to the leadership of the PUWP: organizing skills, experience in leadership positions, specialized education, negotiation skills, and public speaking skills. But above all, those selected were people who could be trusted. Between 1986 and 1990, the PUPW leadership was very diverse in terms of origin, generational experience, and career paths. It included representatives of four (idea-based) generations of party activists. The oldest, those of the “wartime generation,” had joined the communist movement in the Polish Army during the last years of World War II. The so-called “zetempowcy,” who had been active in the Association of Polish Youth at the turn of the 1940s and 1950s before joining the PUWP, were the largest group. Representatives of the “Gomułka generation” had joined the party in the 1960s. The two youngest leaders belonged to the “Gierek generation” and had started their political careers in the 1970s.
EN
The aim of the article is to sketch a collective portrait of the members of the Ukrainian Club in the Sejm of the Republic of Poland in the years 1922–1927. It analyses their socio-demographic characteristics (age, social background, education, occupation and social status), political face and activity in the field of independence. The process of disintegration of the parliamentary club and the ideological evolution of these people, as well as their later fate are also presented. The deputies of the Ukrainian Club were overwhelmingly peasants’s sons, young people, and in large part thoroughly educated. More than half of them represented a very small stratum of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and white-collar workers, the rest. Almost all of them, both peasants and intelligentsia, were involved in the activities of various social organisations, mainly in the fields of culture, education and cooperatives. In the years 1917–1919, they participated in the struggle for independence and the creation of Ukrainian statehood structures. When they entered parliament in 1922, the process of crystallising their views and political orientation was not yet complete. Over the next few years, the Club disintegrated and radicalised towards left-wing or nationalist attitudes. The subsequent fate of most of them exemplifies the tragic fate of Ukrainian political elites under Soviet occupation.
8
Content available remote Ukraińcy w Senacie II Rzeczypospolitej (1922–1939) — portret zbiorowy
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EN
Ukrainians were the most numerous national minority in the Senate of the Second Polish Republic. They sat in the Senate continuously for five terms: from 1922 to 1939. A total of 28 representatives of the Ukrainian population came through the Senate benches. The purpose of this article is to sketch a group portrait of Ukrainian senators. Their political identity (party and club affiliation), socio-demographic characteristics (age, social background, education, profession and social status) and career paths were analyzed. The article discusses also subsequent history of the Ukrainian senators. To sum up, Ukrainian senators belonged to the parliamentary elite mostly because of how they used their education, social status and their extraordinary personalities to the benefit of culture, education, economy and local government. The authority of the representatives of the Parliament in local communities was also built by their commitment to the fight for the independence of Ukraine.
12
Content available remote "Realizm" polityczny w kierownictwie PZPR - płaszczyzny i interpretacje
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EN
The subject of this article are interpretations of the policy of PUWP in which the activities of the party leadership was presented as manifestations of political realism. Author analyzes two aspects of this policy: 1) relations with the Soviet Union under the rule of Wladyslaw Gomulka and Edward Gierek, 2) two different strategies used by the party leadership to resolve socio-political crisis in Poland in the years 1980-1981. Until 1970 the main argument in favor of such “realism” was the fact that the Soviet Union was the guarantor of the western Polish border. In the 70’s Gierek allegedly led the game with Moscow: for the price of dependence on USSR he modernized the state and developed contacts with the West. Imposition of martial law in 1981 in the interpretation of Jaruzelski prevented Soviet intervention and destabilization of the situation in the country. In fact, the alleged realistic attitude PUWP leadership meant the choice of such a strategy which allowed to remain in power.
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