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2012
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tom 14
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nr 1
15-33
EN
I reflect on a version of culturalist understanding of culture — which I call hermeneutic culturalism — and compare it with the reductionist approaches and Latour’s natur-cultur ontology. According to hermeneutic culturalism, (1) referring to oneself is a distinguishing trait of human beings, the basis of their culturality; (2) (modern) humans understand and treat themselves at once as cultural and natural beings; (3) social practice is correlated with what is treated (and particularly understood) in them and in their environment) as cultural, and with what is treated as natural. Hermeneutic culturalism is an epistemological anthropocentrism, but it is not universalist as it does not abstract from the fact that each concept is particular; it is not dogmatic either, as it constitutes a historic awareness and assumes a hermeneutic circle; and, finally, it is not objectivist, as it does not replace science, but rather leads to a symmetrical understanding of the study practice of natural sciences and objectivising humanities as idealising abstracting from — respectively — what is (understood as) cultural or what is (understood as) natural.
EN
I analyse the new book by Bruno Latour: An Inquiry into Modes of Existence. An Anthropology of the Moderns, in which he talks about undertaking an inquiry into values in order to contribute to “planetary negotiation”. Alas, his view of values is under-elaborated and raises many serious doubts. The postulate of overcoming the fact–value opposition leads to the reduction of values to facts; the universalist understanding of values rises questions, for instance: in what sense everything in the world,“from von Uexküll’s tick to Pope Benedict XVI, and even Magritte’s pipe,” evaluates, i.e., undertakes moral responsibility, has scruples, looks for an optimum. Unsatisfied with Latour’s account I offer a different perspective for considering values: a perspective of hermeneutic cultural ontology, in which values are not reduced to facts and remain tied to humans though not as their aims or desired states of affair. It is being, primarily human being, that has an axiological (ethical, aesthetical, cognitive etc.) dimension.
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